The last two chapters of Verbrechen der Sieger are titled “Polen” (Poland) and “Tschechoslowakei” (Czechoslovakia).

Poland was defeated and therefore did not have any legitimate armed forces and as a consequence not able to capture “Prisoners of War”. About 800,000 German POWs were concentrated in the area of East/Germany-Poland, among them 7,500 POWs discharged by Americans and delivered to the Poles (p.342). Nobody knows how many Germans were given to the Poles by the Russians, for one because both the Russians as well as the Poles refuse to allow access to the archives. And two, because the Poles did not label their camps ‘POW camps’ but ‘work camps’, and with this managing to get around the bothersome legalities concerning Prisoners of War. These camps also housed civilians, impossible therefore to come up with precise POW numbers. The closes estimate is 70,000; employed in a variety of slave labor positions, from mines to farm work (pp.228/39).

The Poles claimed that they had a right to employ German POWs, as part of reparations for damage done by the Germans. The fact that they received huge chunks of German territory was ignored. It is estimated that Germans worked a combined total of 61,393,060 days from 1945 to 1950: 70% of them in mines, 15% on farms and 15% rebuilding Warsaw. The average workday in Warsaw, for instance, started at 6 AM and lasted to 8 PM, 14 hr. days with a one-hour lunch break. In the winter they worked less hours, of course, because of the shorter days. As a doctor testified, Sunday was a workday as any other, although only 8 hours, there were no holidays (p.339). They received no pay and were wholly dependant on the rations provided to them by the camp commanders. Starting in 1948 they were to receive pay, a laborer 25 Zloty a day, a tradesman 50 and an engineer 75. That is what was on paper, in reality most received nothing, or 10% of what was due to them. The price for one kg of bread was 35 Zloty, one kg of butter 700, one pound of bacon 300 and 20 cigarettes 60 Zloty. Clothing was unaffordable; most POWs were dressed in rags. An IRC report states that in Warsaw camps there is a severe shortage of coats, shirts/pants, underwear, shoes and personal hygiene articles (p.340).

From 1947 on things improved – but took a turn for the worst again in 1949 when large contingents of them were released. The clothing of those to be discharged was stored, only handed to them at the last moment so as to have them appear fairly well dressed when arriving home.

German POWs were humiliated whenever and wherever possible. Those working in mines were treated worst of all, forced to walk around in rags in public, their heads shaven, with a number on their backs, often accompanied by a swastika. Officers were treated the same, everything possible stolen from them by civilians during the long “atonement/show” marches. Reports of ill treatment abound, driving some of them insane (p.341).

Train transports were as inhumane as the marches, 80 men forced into a freight car. For a three day journey 2kg of bread provided for 4 men, at the arrival they were send straight into the mines. The guards shot those showing signs of exhaustion. And if anyone of them still had a coat, it was taken away when they entered camp. Even those discharged had no assurance that they would get home, and, only those too sick to be of any use were let go, they were not considered to be humans but waste (Schrott) which had to be disposed of. From a transport of 700 men, leaving Lodz on December 18, 1945 for Berlin, only 360 arrived still alive, and that is only one example (pp.343/44).

The IRC did their best, but were powerless because the authorities were unwilling to cooperate, refusing to provide the locations of all the camps. POWs were forced to sleep in huts with cracks in the walls, on straw infested with any bug imaginable. To sleep outside in summer, to get away from the bugs, was forbidden (p.345). And, they had to work 14 hrs. a day, undernourished and deprived of sleep because of the bug problem, scores of them dying as a consequence (p.346). The physicians among the POW’s did their best, but even if they could identify the problem, there was no medicine to treat anyone. In some camps Polish students of medicine were supposed to care for the inmates, one for 1,000 inmates, they only spoke Polish and medicine, as well as any other equipment, was missing almost completely (p.347).

And as was the norm, no records of those who had died were kept, the bodies buried in unmarked graves. It is therefore easy for Polish authorities to fudge the numbers, anyone recording anything was punished and the records taken away. In one of the mine camps, Beirut, two thirds of the 600 men died from October 1945 to March 1947. Conditions in the “extermination” camp Karsten-Centrum were even worse, some 480 died during a period of two and a half month. Mass graves were dug, up to 500 buried in one of them. Some of the graves were/are close to the camps, but there is no interest in launching an investigating (true right up to this day). Some were buried in single graves, the name on a cross, but in 1948 all the names were changed into Polish sounding names, making any attempt at identification impossible. Typhoid epidemics broke out, claiming hundreds of lives (p.349).

All of this is hushed up. Throughout that time the IRC was prevented from conducting proper investigations. Only in 1947 were they allowed to visit an SS-camp in the district of Jaworzno, the inmates isolated to then, not able to send any letters home. The IRC was unaware that two more camps existed in that vicinity, camp Chrusty and Libiaz. It is impossible to know how many other camps were kept hidden, this explains why the veil of uncertainty still hides the fate of many of the POWs captured by the Poles. And this veil will probably never be lifted (354).

Czechoslovakia.   

On September 25, 1974, the parliamentarian Windelein asked secretary of state Gerhard Baum during a session of the Bundestag (German parliament) if it would not be advisable to compile the information on crimes committed by Germans and on Germans in a white book, to allow the younger generation to come up with an appropriate assessment of the worst period in European history. The reason for this request was the upcoming 30^th memorial of the end of the war. Baum answered that the young generation is sufficiently informed. When asked if that is the case also for crimes committed on Germans, Baum claimed that all of this is known, but pointed out that a summary of all the crimes committed on Germans would be impossible to come up with, because of the unreliability of the sources, forgetting to mention that the communist countries to this day refuse to open their archives. Baum then quoted foreign secretary Brandt who had stated that:

“…mit einer massierten Publizierung des Materials werde politische Absicht verfolgt und eine Diskussion des Inlandes oder gar des Auslandes provoziert”.

(…that by publishing the material a political agenda would be pursued, provoking a discussion in Germany and even abroad).

And, he continued, this would only open old wounds in all involved and would be counter to the efforts by the government to come to an understanding.

And indeed a storm of protest erupted in Czechoslovakia when even the intend of publishing documents on crimes committed on Germans was discussed. Rude Pravo, a Czech paper, in an article of March 10, 1975, talked of a “cynical demand for the publication of crimes committed during relocation” and an “immoral campaign”. Radio Prague already announced on February 17 that this was “an obvious and provocative attempt to falsify the history of WWI and to incite hatred”. When a few German papers did publish some documents, the same radio station dismissed it as “mendacious drivel”(erlogenes Geschreibsel), aimed at young people who had “no knowledge of history, or at best only an fragmented and distorted account of it”. And how would a person in the BRD, the broadcast continued, be able to ascertain if what is published is the truth? By publishing this the seed of mistrust is planted.

Two issues here: Baum is wrong when stating that the young generation is informed as to what really happened, and two, it is the communist authors who distort history. By publishing this book the intend is to break through the wall of lies and to inform Germans and the world – so an honest attempt can be made to find closure (pp.357-59).

The next sub-chapter is captioned: “So gerieten sie in tschechoslowakische Hand” (This is how they ended up in the hands of the Czechoslovaks).

Since Czechoslovakia was not one of the countries at war with Germany they also could not take any “Prisoners Of War”, but 25,000 German soldiers still ended up in their camps. And just as in other countries, here too exact figures are impossible to establish, no records were kept, the numbers of those dying in captivity unrecorded, the graves never found. To those perishing in captivity the numbers of civilians murdered during the campaigns of hatred against Germans, Austrians and Hungarians must be added. But as was done in Poland, here also civilians were interned in the same camps as POWs, 167 camps have been identified; the majority of them in the coal mining region of Moravia-Ostrava, with the uranium mine of Joachimsthal a special case, to be addressed later (p.359).

All the soldiers interned in Czechoslovakia were POWs who had either surrendered or were captured by the Red Army; about one million of them in the territory of Czechoslovakia-Saxony. This figure includes 135,000 soldiers handed over by the Americans, former citizens of Czechoslovakia before the breakup of the country. The Americans used treachery to identify them, as testified to by one of the affected. In one of their camps, Remagen, they announced over the loudspeakers that former Czechoslovak citizens are to report to the authorities, for early release. About 20,000 responded in that camp alone, among them German citizens, former officials of the Protectorate. The POWs were transported into Czechoslovakia in open cattle cars. Some of the soldiers captured in Czechoslovakia by the Americans were registered by them and then handed over to the Russians. Older POWs, as well as the sick were left for the Czechs; the rest marched to Russia, many of them perishing during the forced marches/transports (pp.359-362).

The motto was: “All Germans must perish” (Alle Deutschen müssen krepieren), maltreatment and torture the norm, verbal abuse the mildest form. Beatings with wooden sticks were the preferred method, but rubber truncheons and cables were also used (p.363). Former German citizens of the state of Czechoslovakia, created after WWI, were of course singled out for revenge. A transport of Sudeten-Germans, released from Russian captivity in September 1945, was made to stop in Tetschen-Bodenbach, the passengers taken to camp Böhmisch-Kamnitz, describes as an extermination camp. Every day several of them were beaten to death, among them invalids who had lost a leg or an arm. After six weeks the rest were marched to the mining camp of Dux, whoever straggled was shot.

Members of the remnants of the partisan units or revolutionary guards, who now represented the Czech army –which never existed until May 1945 –, were the worst perpetrators. They beat the prisoners when they entered the camp, the inmate’s hair was shaven, they were beaten again and then made to stand for hours in the hot sun (Here again I am reminded of the tales told by Jews). Beatings occurred day and night, the Czechs entering the camps at night, inmates were taken from their bunks and beaten unconscious, or until they were dead (pp.366/67). Many, many more details are provided here also, too many to list.

The IRC tried their best, but were prevented from entering the camps in many cases, if they were even aware of their existence. IRC officials pointed out that even though Germany had surrendered unconditionally, the soldiers had not lost their status a POW – to no avail, they were powerless. The IRC issued a memorandum on July 2, 1946, followed by a second on November 28, 1947, stating in the latter that the war had ended two years ago and that therefore the continued incarceration of POWs can not be justified. This also fell on deaf ears, the beatings continued into the fall of 1947 (pp.369/70).

Hygienic conditions were atrocious, medical care almost non existent. From fall 1946 on, no resident doctors were assigned to any of the camps, casualties impossible to ascertain but it is estimated that 20% of the inmates perished. From the 5,000 to 6,000 POWs passing through Camp Prag-Motol, a transit camp, about 1,600 died between August 1945 and March 1946 (374/75). Food was also at a premium. The British Member of Parliament, R.R. Stokes, published a letter in the Manchester Guardian in October 1945. He had visited 51 camps and had informed the Czech ministry of the interior about the conditions. In one camp for instance, on September 3, 1945, 550 pounds of bread, 750 pounds of potatoes, 80 pounds of sugar, 30 pounds of coffee, as well as 18 pounds of butter or margarine and some 70 pounds of vegetables were made available for 912 inmates, adding up to 750 calories per man. And they were forced to work very hard, making the inmates feel like slaves. Stokes made a surprise visit to one of the camps at 5:30 am, and was astonished that at 6:00 o’clock the first cars and trucks appeared, the drivers picking out ‘their’ slaves, a short time later the camp was empty. Anyone refusing to go was beaten mercilessly (pp.377/78). Young people and women were not exempt from the beatings and killings (pp.382ff).

Just a little about the Joachimsthal mine.  Because of the uranium deposits in that mine the Soviets had come to a secret agreement with the Czech government in exile already during the war, allowing the Soviets to mine the uranium for a period of 99 years. The whole area around the mine was hermetically sealed off, 300 German POWs working the mine at first but when it was fully developed in 1947/48, 7,000 POWs were taken to Joachimsthal. The hard work and the absence of even basic safety equipment made for treacherous conditions, one needs to add to that the exposure to radioactive material. The men worked crawling around on all four, the mineshafts extremely low and narrow to save costs. Cave-ins were the norm, the men suffered from shortage of air, pain in the lungs because of the mine dust, but no regular medical checkups were ordered. The food rations were also inadequate, many of the POWs, aware of their dangerous occupation, tried to flee, most of them caught and punished, some shot. In 1950 the survivors were finally released, the fate of them unknown (pp.389-394).

Thus ends the book. Some of the Joachimsthal miners continued to work in the uranium mines in Aue, East Germany. They probably knew that they were walking dead because of the exposure to radioactive rays and work in that mine earned them and their families the best ration cards. I saw one of them, paraded as an example, for he always fulfilled his work norm, exceeding the norm. He was a walking skeleton.

No need to add any more to this, many of the details were left out but I tried to give an overall account. It has not been easy for me to read this book; it brought back memories I did not know existed any longer. The sad part is that all of this has been forgotten, German soldiers who fought in WWII and were made to suffer and killed after the fighting had stopped are now on top of it – to add insult to injury – depicted as criminals by modern ‘historians’. The fifteen-volume documentary compiled by that scientific commission still not published, archives in Russia et al still locked. Some authors addressed the issues, Joachim Hoffmann one of them in his Stalins Vernichtungskrieg (Stalin’s war of destruction; Verlag für Wehrwissenschften, München 1996, pp.215-250). He was threatened with a lawsuit, his book ignored by system whores, pardon, ‘historians’.

Armes Deutschland.

The next chapter is titled “Soviet Union” (Sowjetunion), and begins with “Morgenröte der Befreiung“ (The dawn of liberation). It is well worth the effort to go into this before continuing with the plight of German POWs, this time in the Soviet Union (SU), for it lays the foundation for what happened to Germans who fell into the hands of the Red Army, soldiers and civilians alike.

To reiterate yet again, the publishing of the book was brought about because of the lies – concerning the conduct of German soldiers – emanating from the communist countries before the 1975 thirtieth anniversary of the defeat of “Fascism”. When the Organization of Repatriates (Organisation der Heimkehrer [Organization]) asked the German Chancellor to stop this defamation of the former soldiers, to set the record straight based on the material amassed (see Part I), the Polish news agency PAP wrote on April 26, 1975 that this defamation is an invention by revanchist organizations in an effort to rehabilitate the German armed forces (Verbrechen der Sieger, p. 169). The paper continued to say that the Organization is comprised of officers and soldiers who, because of their conduct in the war – ‘to put it mildly’ – had to remain a little longer in the POW camps. But, so the Organization, those soldiers did not need to be rehabilitated, their conduct was, for the most part, beyond approach. And, most of them, kept under horrendous conditions, were released only because the German government promised the reinstitution of diplomatic ties with Moscow (p. 170).

But nonetheless, in April 1975, “Novosti”, a Russian news service, saw the need to refute “the old stories about atrocities committed on German POWs” by publishing the USSR Decree Concerning Prisoners of War of July 1, 1941. No need to go into this, it promised POWs heaven on earth but was totally ignored by the Russian camp authorities, if they were even aware of it. Same for the POWs, if anyone of them would have known about this Ukase and asked guards to adhere to it, he would most likely have been shot on the spot (p.171). In fact, the publishing of those rules, which were ignored in Toto, was an insult to the 1.1 million German POWs who – under horrendous conditions – perished in Soviet camps. Even the – never published – documentation compiled by Germans could never tell the whole story because Russian archives remain locked, with good reason (p.176).

Russian soldiers were saturated with hatred for Germans. This is of course no excuse for the atrocities committed on POWs and civilians alike, but it was the Soviet authorities that had their commissars and the like preach hatred. The Jew Ilja Ehrenburg was one of them, just one example of what he had to say: “There is nothing as beautiful as a German corpse. Kill the Germans! – your old mother begs you, kill the Germans! –  your child pleads. Germans are not humans, they are wild beasts” (p.177).

In an interview with “Sowjetunion heute“ (Today’s Soviet Union), a glossy magazine published by the Soviet Embassy in Bonn, Pantelejemon Ponomarenko, the Red Army general in charge of partisan activities, stated that his partisans killed, wounded or imprisoned 1.5 million German soldiers and support staff (with imprisonment equal to a death sentence in most cases). The general forgot to mention anything about partisan warfare, the butchering by them, the authors refer the reader to a book by the Latvian officer Valdis Redelis “Partisanenkrieg…”, I’ve ordered the book and will follow up on this. Germans did react to partisan brutalities, but it was the partisans who initiated it and the “Commissar Order”, which in most cases did not even reach the troops, had nothing to do with the reprisal measures taken, they were taken out of necessity (p. 178). Ponomarenko, in that interview, identified communism as the ‘core’ of the partisan movement, and it is no secret that Jews had invented communism. The German leadership knew all of this and no doubt Jews were looked at closely in the occupied territories. For good reason, for not only were Jews “carriers of the Bolshevik idea”, they were also “leaders of the partisan movement” (R. Aschenauer, Krieg ohne Grenzen, Druffel-Verlag, 1982, p. 252). “Where there are partisans, there are Jews, and where there are Jews, there are partisans” (F.W. Seidler, Die Wehrmacht im Partisanenkrieg, Pour le Mérite-Verlag für Militärgeschichte, 1999, p. 124).

“Jews in the work camps sabotaged guns and other products they were making for the Germans.

Partisans with ammunition blew up thousands of Nazi supply trains, making it harder for the Germans to fight the war. In Lithuania, Jewish partisans were responsible for significant damage to Nazi trains.. Partisans also destroyed numerous Nazi power plants and factories, and focused their attention on other military and strategic targets, not on civilians.” http://www.jewishpartisans.org/t_switch.php?pageName=what+is+what+2

The thousands of Nazi supply trains part is probably an exaggeration, left over from the time when Jews bragged about their involvement in illegal warfare. This has now all but disappeared, Jews are to be seen as innocent victims.

On June 29, 1941, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the de facto ruling body, issued the order for the organization of partisan units, so-called diversion groups, with Ponomarenko later appointed as commander (p. 179). Stalin publicized this order in his radio address of July 3, 1941. Following this, men who could handle weapons, but also woman were recruited, Children also joined, see Part II (p. 180).

To be successful, and to ensure cooperation, the partisans also terrorized the population. Anyone suspected of collaborating with the Germans was killed, because the population was at first friendly toward the Germans, as those who were part of the eastern campaign know (p.180). This changed when the partisans unleashed their terror against the populace. When they entered a village they immediately killed the village elder, then they locked the family into the house and burned it down. The villagers fled into the forest, but when discovered by the partisans they were killed. The partisans left mountains of bodies behind, as well as distraught woman and horrendous destruction (p. 181). And to be sure, all of those killed by the partisans were no doubt also blamed on the Germans. And as attacks by partisans on civilians were carried out with partisans at times doubtlessly wearing German uniforms, hatred towards Germans was the result, which was part of what was intended.

The Ukrainian partisan chief Fjedorov (no first name provided) bragged that they had killed more than 25,000 Germans and derailed 683 trains transporting soldiers and war material. In a radio address he gave instructions as to how to kill a German guard. Sneak up to him and kill him with a strike to the head, using an axe. All of it has to be done quickly to prevent him from crying out. Fedorov published a book, translated into German: “Das illegale Gebietskomitee arbeitet” (The illegal territorial committee at work) (pp. 181-82). That book has also fallen into the black hole.

In another radio address of May 1, 1942, Stalin told his listeners that the partisans have become more brutal, more merciless (p. 183). A competition was initiated between partisan units; each partisan had to kill at least five fascists and has to take part in at least three actions per month (p.184). Ponomarenko described – in a book by the English authors Dixon and Heilbrunn “Communist Guerilla Warfare” – the ‘dress code’ of partisans: Whoever observed the Bogdan group could not know what to make of it. More than half of them were dressed in German uniforms, some wear civilian cloth manufactured in Rovno or Lutsk, others Slovakian and Polish uniforms. In the supply wagon clothing’s for all sorts of partisan activities are carried along: SS uniforms, Italian uniform pants, etc. Ponomarenko admits here that his partisans were bandits, dressed in German and other uniforms and thus not protected by any convention (p. 185).

Now to the ‘liberation’ by the Red Army. In the third edition of “Geschichte der Kommunistischen Partei der Sowjetunion” (History of the communist party in the SU), published in 1970 (1971 in German), we read:

“Die Rote Armee zog als Befreier nach dem Westen. Dem Sowjetvolk, das für seine Freiheit und Unabhängigkeit kämpfte, konnten die Schicksale der anderen Völker, die unter dem Joch des Faschismus schmachteten, nicht gleichgültig sein. Den Ideen des proletarischen Internationalismus treu, ver­wies die Partei während des ganzen Krieges immer wieder auf die historische Befreiermission der sowjetischen Soldaten. Von diesem hohen Ziel beflügelt, brachte die Rote Armee den Völkern Europas die Befreiung von der faschisti­schen Sklaverei… Über den versklavten Völkern Europas leuchtet die Morgenröte der Befreiung auf.” . (Seite 623)

(The Red Army moved westward as a liberator. The people of the SU, who fought for their freedom and independence, could not be indifferent about the fate of others who still suffered under the Fascist joke. True to the ideals of proletarian Internationalism, the party always pointed out the mission of liberation to the Russian soldier. Carried by that lofty idealism, the Red Army liberated the people of Europe from Fascist slavery…The dawn of liberation has broken over the people of Europe; p. 189).

Reading this I am reminded of my time in the GDR. The same slogans were used year in year out, while reality differed substantially. The Czechs experienced the liberation in October 1944. The country received a communist regime, Benes, who had returned from exile, was forced to resign in June 1948. On March 9, 1948, foreign minister Masaryk ‘fell’ out of a window, a protest march of 10,000 Prague students was greeted with gunfire (p.191).

Ukraine did not fare any better. According to a report compiled by the Kersten- Committee, published in Germany in 1962, the regime of terror started with the arrival of the Bolsheviks in Kiev. Anyone appearing suspicious was murdered; mass murder became the norm. When the Germans arrived in 1941 they found 6,000 mutilated bodies in the basement of the Lvov prison, and that is just one example (pp. 191-92).

Now to the Baltic’s: here also, when the Soviets first occupied the countries, the terror began. In 1941 – 10,000 Estonian men, woman and children were deported to Siberia, 34,000 from Latvia, among them 1,877 school children and 1,188 children under six years old, 34,260 from Lithuania. All of it as ordered by the butcher Serov. What was started then was completed in 1944 following the ‘liberation’: From 1945 to 1949, about 150,000 Estonians were taken to the SU, as well as 290,000 Latvians. The number of Lithuanians taken is not known. Those suspected of collaboration with Germans were executed (p. 194).

Poland also did not do so well during the liberation. As long as the Polish resistance fought along side the Red Army they were tolerated, but when the fighting stopped the officers were separated from the men and shot or taken to camps. Between July 1944 and 1945, 50,000 Polish resistance fighters were arrested, 20 commanders executed because of their expressed loyalty to the government in exile in London. Show trials were conducted and death sentences handed out. 40,000-resistance fighters were sent to Siberia, according to Mikolayczyk, head of the government in exile (p. 196).

Romania: Of the 3,331 priests and clergyman still around in 1945, by 1953 — 1,462 had been killed, 250 were missing, and 400-500 were jailed. 40 concentration camps still existed in 1955; in 1954 about 230,000 Romanian POWs were still held in Russian work camps, and 100,000 ethnic Germans were deported by the Red Army. Between 1940 and 1941 and after 1945, some 850,000 Rumanians from Bessarabia and Bukovina (Germans?) were taken to the SU. 30,000 men and woman were forced to help build the Black Sea-Danube Canal, among them priests, professors, farmers, workers and students. The Russian guards took women to be interrogated; they later returned beaten up and many of them had been raped. Those who became pregnant often died. When the camps were closed, the inmates were loaded into cattle cars and driven around for weeks, aimlessly. The majority died, because no real food was provided and no water (pp. 198-99). This was taken from testimony given before a UN commission; the US had sent Mark F. Ethridge to investigate. But here, too, one wonders if the part about transports in cattle cars without water was not later adopted by Jews.

Many more details provided, too many to list here, but nothing of it mentioned at the IMT, Russians acting as judges and prosecutors, the Red Army portrayed as liberators – as the most humane army in the world. And Germans are blamed for anyone missing, no doubt in those cases as well. East Germans were of course also hit hard by the liberation. Not just in the eastern part of Germany proper but also while trying to flee their ancestral homes in East Prussia, Silesia, etc., with Russian tanks plowing through refugee convoys consisting of women, children and old people for the most part. Hubertus Knabe wrote about it, in “Tag der Befreiung?” (Day of Liberation?, Propyläen Verlag, Berlin 2005), but that book will have to be discussed another time.

Russian officers told their troops that they are allowed to plunder and rape with impunity, and that they did. Official historiography wants us to believe that the conquest of Silesia and finally Berlin was delayed by two to three month because of stiff German resistance. Not so. It was the propaganda – and orders – hammered into the Russian soldiers that, when they entered Germany, they had now stepped into the “cave of the Fascist animal” (Höhle des faschistischen Tieres), and should take revenge however they please. The logical consequence was that the troops refused to follow orders, quasi deserting. Following the war Marshals Shukov and Chuikov openly debated if the war could not have ended three month sooner. Der Spiegel, a German magazine, wrote about it on July 14, 1965:

„Eine historische Sicht des ,Wunders an der Oder’, die von den Erinnerun­gen der beiden Marschälle erheblich abweicht, gab einer ihrer damaligen Untergebenen: Exhauptmann Boris Olschanski, der jetzt in Argentinien lebt. In seinem Buch ,Wir kommen vom Osten’ nennt der ehemalige Mathe­matikdozent die Gründe, die seiner Ansicht nach für den Abbruch der russischen Berlin-Offensive im Februar 1945 maßgebend waren: Auf der Jagd nach Frauen, Beute und Schnaps hätten sich ganze Teile der Roten Armee in den ostdeutschen Weiten verflüchtigt. Vergebens hätten die höheren Stäbe versucht, die plündernde, mordende und sengende Truppe wieder in die Gewalt zu bekommen. Fluchend habe sich der Chef der 5. Stoß­armee, Generalleutnant Bersarin (später der erste Stadtkommandant von Berlin) auf den Weg gemacht, um mit vorgehaltener Pistole die Befolgung seiner Befehle zu erzwingen. Doch auch Bersarin resignierte: ,Man kann nicht zwei Hasen auf einmal fangen: rächen und kämpfen. Die Armee hat sich aufgelöst, hol’s der Teufel!’”

(A former subordinate of the two Marshals, Captain Boris Olshanski who now lives in Argentine, provided an account of the ‘miracle on the Oder’ which differs from that of the two Marshals. In his book “We are arriving from the east” the former professor of mathematics gives his view of the reasons for the abandonment of the Berlin offensive in February 1945: In their hunt for woman, loot and booze whole segments of the Red Army vanished into the vast expanses of eastern Germany. The commanders tried in vain to regain control over the plundering, murdering and scorching troops. Lieutenant General Bersarin, swearing and with his gun pointing tried to have his orders adhered to. But he also resigned: ‘Impossible to catch two rabbits at the same time: revenge and fighting. The army has disintegrated, to hell with it!’; pp. 206-07).

I experienced some of it, our home only about 50km from the Oder/Neiße. And although by then Russian officers had regained some control, raping and pillaging still went on for days. On the other hand, German soldiers were severely punished if caught looting; some were shot (p. 207). Even the burning down of villages — which housed partisans and the villagers supporting them — was prohibited (p. 188).

It was not only the likes of the Jew Ilja Ehrenburg who urged Russian soldiers to kill Germans at will. In the Soviet Union no actions by individuals were tolerated, one can thus be certain that this incitement for hatred, the call to murder, was officially sanctioned. The so-called Kommissars played a large role in it, spreading communist ideology, i.e., hatred for Germans. They also positioned themselves behind the lines and ‘urged’ their soldiers on, discouraging any attempt to surrender with machine gun volleys into the formations of their own soldiers (Victor Suvorov, Marschall Schukow. Lebensweg über Leichen, Pour le Mérite, Verlag für Militärgeschichte, Selent, 2002, p. 262f). Hitler was aware of the commissars and issued the so-called ‘Commissar Order’, that order was also largely ignored by German officers, and thus ineffective, to the detriment of German POWs.

The actions by commissars not only resulted in spreading hatred of anything German but also made for a desperate type of warfare on the part of Russian soldiers. Afraid to move back, even in hopeless situations, out of fear of getting shot by the NKVD troops stationed behind the lines and commanded by commissars, they moved forward, resulting in what can only be called massacres. Suvorov describes this in the book mentioned above, but former German soldiers have also told me this. One of them, a former officer, told me that some of his soldiers became violently ill, vomiting, but had to continue firing into the onrushing Russian soldiers, who were often drunk, surrender would have been suicide. I fully understand that I am repeating hearsay, but these people had no reason to lie and Suvorov confirms what they told me.

Right at the start of the war, German soldiers who had been ambushed were found with their eyes gorged out and mutilated in the most horrendous fashion. One was found with his arms tied backward around a tree, his hands nailed to it, his eyes gorged out and his tongue cut out, some of them had their genital cut off (pp. 208-09). During the fight near Selisharova in November 1941 a field hospital with 30 to 40 wounded fell into the hands of the Russians. When the Germans recaptured the area they found only charred remains. The Russians had piled the wounded into a stack, poured gasoline over them and burned them. Woman also participated in the atrocities, slitting the wounded open. Here also pages upon pages of this and that the reason the Soviets are trying to prevent this from being published (pp. 208-13).

The numbers of those killed, unless found by Germans, will never be known, even if Russian archives should be opened, for the Russians did not keep records (p.176). The same goes for those German soldiers who died in captivity. Estimates of those captured range from 3.2 to 3.5 million, with about 1.1 million of them dying while held prisoner.

As for the treatment of POWs we have a repeat of what happened to them in Yugoslav captivity. It also started with Todesmärsche und Todestransporte (death marches and transports), the caption of a chapter (pp.219ff). The intent of the marches was to impress the population, German POWs displayed as trophies. It started with Stalingrad, bodies of German POWs covered with snow lining the marching routes. The temporary camp Beketova held 50,000 to 60,000 prisoners, 42,000 of them died of hunger and diseases. And as was the norm, German POWs were stripped clean, anything of any value, perceived or real, taken from them. During drunken parties Russian soldiers adorned themselves with the rings, watches and medals they had stolen (p. 220). About one quarter of the marchers died, either just collapsed or were shot as stragglers or while trying to reach drinking water.

Those transported by train did not fare better, the numbers of dead as high as those from the marches (p. 224). Of the about two million Germans taken prisoner outside the territorial SU, 250,000 died before they reached POW camps (p. 225). One of the harassments consisted of feeding the transported with salted herrings, but not supplying any drinking water.

Life in the camps was not better, with the Soviets making an effort to curtail the activities of the IRC; East-Berlin RC officials were taken to the SU and interned (p. 229). Bugs, fleas and rats were steady companions. In one of the camps with 5,000 inmates the toilet consisted of 4 holes dug into the ground, 15 small bowls for washing, and the death rate about one per hour (p. 234). And here also, the list goes on and on.

As in the Yugoslav camps, in Soviet camps German communists also formed Antifa (anti fascist) committees, supposedly organized to look after the welfare of the POWs. But they were traitors of the worst kind, setting work norms so high that many of the POWs died trying to fulfill them. They also participated in torture, pointing out victims to the officials. Those ‘confessions’ were later also used to convict in the show trials (pp. 237-245). Efforts were made by Antifa members to plant distrust between officers and men, successful to some extend, for rewards were offered (pp. 246-252).

Hunger was also a steady companion, making willing participants out of some to just have the ration increased if only for a day. To understand the actions of those a Russian proverb is offered: Someone with a full stomach will never understand the hungry. And they did not just go hungry for a few weeks, but for years (p. 253). The German commission formed to investigate the plight of POWs concerned themselves with rations, the details filling one of the 15, as of now unpublished, volumes. An average daily rations consisted of 400-600 grams bread, vegetables only in soups with traces of meat in them but mostly just water with clover or some corn in it. The consequence was dystrophy and diarrhea, with death the final solution in most cases. Packages send from home were opened, but still at times they were virtual life savers (p. 254). A few details: 60% of the bread consisted of water which was dispersed at 1:00 in the morning; the ‘bread’ was served hot in an almost liquid form, but the hunger forced it down (p. 256). Frozen potatoes were used and when spring arrived, the stench emanating from them was overpowering, causing many to vomit; unable to eat the ‘soup’. Regardless, the full, required, calorie count was recorded every day (p. 257).

And it must not be forgotten that the POWs were forced to work under those conditions, hard work in many cases, mining or work in the forest, with death bringing in a rich harvest. “Those who died did so in spite of all the efforts by Russian doctors”, or so “Sowjetunion heute” has it. True, some doctors tried but it was the inhuman communist system that was not interested in their survival. And all efforts made to reach an understanding must address this also (pp. 333-34).

Reading this is not easy for me, having experienced some of the effects of ‘liberation’ by the Red Army. Also, following the war, those soldiers lucky enough to have survived the Soviet POW camps talked openly about it; I heard many a horror story. But that side of it has now disappeared. German soldiers are now portrayed as criminals, with the other side fighting the ‘good war’. And historians participate in this distortion, willingly. One can only hope that there is a higher justice.

To be continued…

In the Fight with the Partisans:

This is the caption of the first chapter under “Yugoslavia” – getting back to Crimes of the Victors, the book under discussion. It contains four chapters in total, Yugoslavia, Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Instead of writing “the authors tell us”, or “we are told”, I’ll just translate what is written, not verbatim unless noted, with the page numbers added and add my comments if necessary.

Russian defense minister Marshal Andrei Grechko, during the 1975 preparation of the victory celebrations regarding the 30^th anniversary of Germany’s defeat, stated in the Czech press that it was not just the Soviet army that defeated Germany, but that the resistance groups of east and south Europe played a decisive part. The Yugoslavs protested, for Grechko placed the efforts of the Romanians and Bulgarian’s on the same level as those of the Yugoslavs. Marshall Josip Broz Tito, in a speech, talked of distortion of history (p.25). 1.7 million Yugoslav lives were lost in their fight for freedom; there could never be mention of a “joint victory over Fascism”. When reminded that the Red Army supplied the Yugoslav resistance fighters with weapons and logistics, Tito replied that all they lacked were tanks. The Russian historian Wladimir Selenin, in a TASS interview, praised the efforts of the Yugoslav partisans who tied up large continence of German troops, making it possible for Red Army troops to be successful elsewhere. Thus helping to defeat the Germans, as well as the Italians and making the landing of the Anglo-American troops in Italy possible. This was still not enough to satisfy Tito (p.26).

As an aside, concerning the defeat of the Italians, here is what A. Fredborg had to say about some of them:

“The Rumanians run like rabbits, and the Italians are little better,” a German officer told me. He added that German troops had been brought up to the Middle Don and replaced the yielding Italians and Rumanians…One of the most important prerequisites for the partisan activities in Croatia-and in Serbia and Montenegro too,…was the double game to which the Italians committed themselves. Why they did so, is not quite clear. Part of the explanation is probably that they quite simply wanted to buy themselves peace. However that may be, the partisans got arms, ammunition, and food from them.” (Behind the Steel Wall, p. 152; 158/59)

Hitler should have been more careful when picking allies, for, with friends like these… Now back to whose partisans get the credit for defeating the Germans. On a visit to Moscow by Yugoslav President Bijedic on April 9, 1975 – during a toast – Bijedic never mentioned the role the Red Army played in Yugoslavia, but told the audience that:

“Die Völker und Nationalitäten Jugoslawiens, die von der Kommunistischen Partei und vom Genossen Tito geführt werden, begannen mit den Vorbereitungen zum organisierten Kampf vom ersten Tage des Überfalls Hitlers auf Jugoslawien und der Kapitulation des monarchistischen Regimes im April, 1941 an. Nach Hitlers Überfall auf die Sowjetunion veröffentlichte die KP Jugoslawiens eine Proklamation, in der sie zum bewaffneten Kampf gegen die Hitlerbanden und für die Befreiung des Landes von den Eindringlingen aufrief, zu einem Kampf, der sich über ganz Jugoslawien ausbreitete“. (pp. 26/27)

(The people and nationalities of Yugoslavia, led by the communist party, made preparations for an organized fight on the first day of Hitler’s attack, after the capitulation of the monarchist regime in April 1941. After Hitler’s attack of the SU, the communist party of Yugoslavia published a proclamation calling for armed resistance against the Hitler gangs and to liberate the country. This fight eventually spread over all of Yugoslavia.)

Here again evidence that partisan warfare had been planned well in advance of Barbarossa. Tito confirmed this in Skopje: even before the outbreak of WWII preparations for resistance were made. At that time 80,000 soldiers served in the partisan units, 300,000 in 1942. When in September 1943 Italy capitulated, Tito was made president of the National Committee, acting as the Yugoslav government, illegally because Yugoslavia was occupied. After a visit by a Soviet military commission in February 1944, the “Liberation Army” was increased to 50 divisions of 130 independent partisan units consisting of 500,000 illegal combatants. In early 1945 the “Liberation” army was renamed “Yugoslavian Army”, equipped with the most modern weaponry and now numbering 800,000. The numbers are based on Yugoslav sources. But, even though in early 1945 a regular Yugoslav army existed, actions between partisans and regular troops were impossible to distinguish, forcing Germans to act. (pp. 27/28). And even though partisan units were then organized, they did not wear the same uniforms, no official symbols visible from a distance and did not carry their weapons in the open (p. 56). It was thus still impossible for the Germans to separate regular forces from the irregulars, but the Yugoslavs never made mention of this in their court verdicts against German POWs.

Hitler never intended to send troops into Yugoslavia – this whole action in fact endangered Barbarossa – but was forced to when Mussolini’s ill fated Greek adventure became bogged down The Germans fearing a British bridge head in the Balkans, had to act. But the Balkans were and are a witches’ brew of warring nationalities. Dr. Hans Laternser tried to make this clear at the IMT, pointing out that in the Balkans different norms apply, the fight between nationalities are conducted with a brutality unknown to the people of western Europe (p. 29). Dr. Rudolf Ibbeken testified at the IMT that in the Balkans it was not just a conflict between the population and the occupying forces:

“…sondern daß innerhalb des einen Krieges, möchte ich sagen, noch eine Unzahl von gleichzeitigen Kriegen im Lande stattgefunden hat”. (p. 30)

(…but I would like to say that inside of this war a number of wars were fought simultaneously.)

Another historian, Dr. Georg Scheller, pointed out that the brutality with which the war in Yugoslavia was fought was not peculiar to WW II, rather it was

“in keiner Weise ihre Ursache etwa in einem besonders scharfen Vorgehen der deutschen Wehrmacht. In allen großen und kleinen kriegerischen Auseinandersetzungen auf dem Balkan sind Grundsätze und Regeln, wie sie etwa in der Genfer Konvention verankert sind, nie zur Anwendung gekommen… Es ist mithin nicht richtig, die besondere Schärfe der Kriegführung auf dem Balkan der deutschen Wehrmacht zuzuschreiben. Sie ist vielmehr geschichtlich als eine besondere Erscheinung aller Balkankriege zu erklären und zu werten“. (Ibid.)

(…in no way the result of the drastic measures by the German forces. In all the big and small Balkan wars the rules, as those set down in Geneva, were ignored…It is thus wrong to claim that Germans are to blame for the rigorous warfare. Rather, it is historically a special occurrence of all the Balkan wars, and must be evaluated as such.)

In September 1941 Germans found the “Anweisung der Kommunistischen Partei Serbiens für den Bandenkrieg” (Instructions by the communist party of Serbia for bandit warfare) in Belgrade, those instructions were submitted at the IMT, too long to reproduce in its entirety, here then just a few details:

“Partisan warfare:

Communications behind the front are of value, rail lines, telephone lines and bridges must be destroyed…

Precise reports about enemy movements are vital

If the population is supportive, the area behind the front can be controlled, forcing the enemy to employ more troops.

Raids: It is of utmost importance to approach the enemy unseen…

Close combat: The knife is the most important weapon…” (pp. 30-33)

All of those instructions – and there are many more – to fight illegally, clandestinely. A raid is successful when “der Gegner bis zum letzten Mann vernichted (ist)”(when the enemy is destroyed to the last man). Tito ordered Serbian partisans

“…jegliche Kennzeichen abzulegen, die Waffen zu verbergen und erbeutete deutsche Uniformen anzuziehen. Im Jastrebac-Gebirge traten 80 Prozent der Partisanen in deutscher, der Rest in bulgarischer Uniform auf. Von hier wie aus dem Raum der serbisch-bulgarischen Grenze wurden Funksprüche abgefangen, in denen die Liquidierung deutscher Soldaten stets unter der Bezeichnung ‘abgeschlachtet’ gemeldet wurde“. (p. 37)

(…to take of all identification badges, to hide the weapons and dress in German uniforms. In the Jastrebac Mountains 80% of the partisans wore German, the rest Bulgarian uniforms. Radio messages were intercepted recording the killing of German soldiers as ‘butchered’.)

Again and again bodies of German soldiers were found with their eyes popped out, genitals cut off, heads split, and naked – almost impossible to identify (p. 40). The Red Cross emblem was no guarantee for safety, Persons wearing the Red Cross, buildings, trucks and trains marked with it were even singled out as targets, forcing the authorities to decrease the size of the emblem (p. 41). The armed forces compiled a whole collection of photos and reports of atrocities and handed them to representatives of the IRC (International Red Cross; p. 44).

All of this was ignored at the IMT. On August 21, 1946 defense attorney Dr. Laternser presented evidence of the partisan tactics, pointing out that those illegal acts were the reason for German reprisals and that it was not the Germans who engaged in illicit warfare. He stated:

“Affidavits 906 to 931 give examples of the fighting methods of the partisans, while Affidavits 906 to 920 describe particularly dreadful atrocities committed by partisan bands. Affidavits 921 to 924 prove the partisans’ actions in violation of international law, with regard to clothing, weapons, and other details. Affidavits 925 to 931 describe the extent of sabotage against railroads. That in spite of this the Germans fought according to the rules of international law, is proved by Affidavits 932 to 970. They show that the partisans were treated like prisoners of war.” (p. 393)

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/08-21-46.asp

As mentioned, all of this was disregarded. The judges maintained that Germany fought an illegal war, a “War of Aggression”. (p. 53) But as has been shown in part III, officers and soldiers can not be expected to differentiate between an illegal war and a legal war. Further, “Control Council Law No.10”, concocted in London following WWII, was law written after the fact, ex post facto, violating one of the fundamentals of jurisprudence. What it states under: “a) Crimes against Peace. Initiation of invasions of other countries and wars of aggression in violation of international laws and treaties…” is therefore of no consequence, for international law – agreements between states – never prohibited war. The Kellogg-Briand Pact on which this was based only states:

“Convinced that all changes in their relations with one another should be sought only by pacific means and be the result of a peaceful and orderly process, and that any signatory Power which shall hereafter seek to promote its national interests by resort to war a should be denied the benefits furnished by this Treaty;”

http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/kbpact.htm

There is nothing here about illegal wars and punishment of individuals. All it says is that if a state should go to war it will lose the benefits furnished by this Treaty. Thus German soldiers had every right to counteract the illegal partisan warfare.

More details about atrocities committed on German soldiers are provided, killing of those who had surrendered. Also more mention of the fighting between the Croatian Ustasha and the Serbian Cetnici, their atrocities blamed on the Germans (pp. 48-51; 63). A report states that when the ice started to melt on the rivers, masses of bodies could be seen floating down the Sava and Danube rivers. On some days the Germans fished out up to 30 bodies (p. 65). These were victims of the infighting between rival Yugoslav factions, but all of them no doubt part of the 1.7 million allegedly killed by the Germans. It is the duty of the occupying army to restore order (p. 59), but not only did the Germans have to fight partisans, intend on inflicting losses on them, they were caught between warring groups, compounding the problems.

When Yugoslav forces captured Belgrade, many of them illegal combatants, supported by Red Army units, up to 30,000 German POWs were shot. Hundreds of German female radio operators, Blitzmädel, and Red Cross nurses were killed by placing them on pointed posts; others were used for target practice (p. 70). 10,000 murdered German soldiers were buried in a mass grave near the Kalemagdan fortification. A Red Cross nurse testified that during the Belgrade fighting, all of the wounded in an ambulance train were killed with knifes. Most of the places were those atrocities occurred are known, yet no effort by an international body has been made to locate the graves (p. 70).

On May 6, 1945, General Kesselring told the commander of the southeast army, colonel general Löhr, that Germany would capitulate on May 9. Löhr then contacted Tito to work out the capitulation details. Anything agreed upon was totally ignored by the Yugoslavs as soon as the Germans had surrendered and disarmed. Some 150,000 German soldiers ended up as Yugoslav POWs immediately, something German officers tried to prevent, cognizant of the hatred felt. The number of those butchered is not known (p.75). How many German soldiers in total were taken POWs is impossible to ascertain, because of unknown number of those murdered. Official figures talk of 200,000 to 240,000. But, army group Löhr was at that time 400,000 strong. According to official figures, 80,000 perished between 1944 and 1949 (p. 78)

The POWs were moved to camps in so-called Sühnemärsche, atonement marches. The Geneva Convention states that POWs can march no more than 20km (12.5 miles) a day. One of the POWs groups was forced to march 75km in 20 hours (p. 85). Whoever strayed was shot. Food was scares, anyone begging for water or food was also shot. 10,000 perished during those marches (p. 92).

Camp life was no better. Hardly any food was provided and prisoners were forced to gather herbs and cook them, the result was diarrhea and dysentery. “Death worked with a scythe”, in Belgrade camp # 1 the dysentery barrack housed 800; it was called the death barrack with at least 10 corpses carried out each day (p. 93). Inmates were also worked to death, in lumber camps and mines. They were also forced to clear minefields, but were not supplied with the proper equipment. At times, at the end of a shift hundreds of POWs were chased onto the cleared field, to insure that no mines were left (p. 94). Those who died were buried in unmarked graves, their names never recorded.

The partisans stilled their thirst for revenge first on members of the Waffen-SS. According to a report, on Pentecost Sunday 450 soldiers were shot near Reichenburg, their arms tied together with telegraph wire in groups of six, all shot in the back. At the capture of Krusevac, 2,000 soldiers of the “Prinz Eugen” division were murdered. In Reichenegg the partisans forced POWs into a bunker and dynamited it. When the stench became too strong, survivors had to cover the bunker with dirt. At Susegrad, partisans undressed 90 soldiers and chased them into the Sava River. Whenever possible the inmates buried the dead and marked the graves with stones or wooden crosses. In 1948, after the last POWs had left the provisory camps, locals dispersed the stones, gathered the crosses and burned them (p. 96).

Reading this, one has to wonder if the Soviet prosecutors at the IMT used those real atrocities, as committed on Germans, to spread tales about German atrocities. Jews also seem to have copied some of this to ‘enrich’ their stories.

The “Antifaschistische Ausschüsse” (antifascist committee), short Antifa, played a sordid role in all of this. Founded by the communist Karl Wolch to represent the POWs, he, along with the co-founder Adolf Ische, soon showed their true colors. He blamed the fate of the POWs on the ‘breathtaking crimes committed by the Nazis’ and claimed that most POWs had realized this, many thousands remaining in Yugoslavia to assist in the rebuilding of the country (pp. 97/8). He further stated that whoever had seen a German concentration camp would well be able to appreciate the positive differences, conveniently forgetting the tens of thousands who perished during the ‘atonement marches’ and in the camps (p. 99). Some of those discharged had to sign an affidavit, promising to work for the unification of the workers at home (GDR), etc. Refusing to sign would have meant remaining in the camp. The Antifa helped to set work norms, many perished because of them (pp.100 to 104). They also assisted in torture, thus helping to extort ‘confessions’ from officers and soldiers, later used in trials.

Many more examples are provided, too many to list here. We now get to the Trials. Just as the Soviets before them – when they established the “Extraordinary State Commission for Ascertaining and Investigating Crimes Perpetrated by the German-Fascist Invaders and their Accomplices” in November 1942 – the Yugoslavs also established the “State Commission for Ascertaining War Crimes of the Occupying Forces and their Helpers” (Staatliche Kommission zur Feststellung von Kriegsverbrechen der Besatzungsmächte und ihrer Gehilfen) before the war ended (p.118). 4433 Germans and 2062 Austrians were to be charged with committing war crimes (one needs to wonder what happened to the Italians?).

The Nuremberg verdict in Trial VII vs. the South-East Generals, the so-called hostage trial, aroused the ire of the prosecution, because it had determined that partisan activity was illegal.

From Wikipedia:

“The tribunal had to deal with two pressing questions:

Were partisans “lawful belligerents” and thus entitled the status of prisoners of war?

Was taking hostages and reprisals against civilians as a “defense” against guerrilla attacks lawful?

On the question of partisans, the tribunal concluded that under the then current laws of war (the Hague Convention No. IV from 1907), the partisan fighters in southeast Europe could not be considered lawful belligerents under Article 1 of said convention. On List, the tribunal stated:

“We are obliged to hold that such guerrillas were francs tireurs who, upon capture, could be subjected to the death penalty. Consequently, no criminal responsibility attaches to the defendant List because of the execution of captured partisans…”

Regarding hostage taking, the tribunal came to the conclusion that under certain circumstances, hostage taking and even reprisal killings might constitute an allowed line of action against guerilla attacks. In the tribunal’s opinion, taking hostages (and killing them in retaliation for guerilla attacks) was subject to several conditions.”

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hostages_Trial

When that verdict became known, all of the Yugoslav verdicts should have been reversed, they were not. The Belgrade prosecution did wait until the verdict of the main IMT trial was published, but not until the aforementioned trial had concluded. The farcical trials started on October 14, 1946, in the first case, 32 former members of the Waffen-SS were indicted, 21 shot, the rest send to forced labor prison terms between five and twenty years. There were 11 main trials in total, the last one commenced on October 22, 1947. 121 German/Austrian officers were charged, 96 of them murdered (2 shot, the rest hanged), the rest send to long prison terms, life most often. All in all about 3,000 German and Austrian officers were imprisoned, 1,000 returned, 1,000 died while in capture, 1,000 were executed (pp. 118-123).

The verdict of the South-East Generals trial in Nuremberg of July 8, 1947 to February 19, 1948, in which partisan warfare was declared to be illegal, came too late for the officers murdered by the Yugoslavs following their “trials”. The haste with which those sham proceedings were conducted has to be suspect; also, did the Nuremberg ‘judges’ wait until the Yugoslavs were finished murdering the innocent?

The final act of this drama started on January 18, 1949 in Werschetz, Vršac in Serbian. Here also the ethnic conflict, common to the Balkans, played a role, Werschetz is located in the Banat with a large German population. It is possible that this city was picked for the benefit of the few Germans that were left behind, but not the issue here. Many of the remaining German officers and soldiers were put on trial. Who selected them is not known (p. 135), but since the Yugoslav claimed that the “fascists” had murdered 1.7 million of their citizens, more show trials were needed to satisfy the populace. A returning German soldier, Pfeiffer, later testified at a Munich court that he knew for a fact that no evidence of any wrongdoing existed for 95% of those charged (p. 136). Quotas were established: Since so and so many Yugoslavs had been shot, and since a number of Germans have been charged, every German had to have shot his percentage of them (p. 137). ‘Confessions’ were extracted through torture. One of them, Dr. Martin Speer, refused to commit/confess to any crime. He was hanged by his hands from the ceiling and beaten until he died. The preferred method of torture was tying the hands of the victim behind his back and then hanging him on the hands. Or fastening of a small pail to the genitals, and then loading the pail with bricks. Beatings with anything handy were also common. According to an Austrian officer, Werschetz was a ‘war crimes factory’ (pp. 135-161).

Many, many more details are provided, 26 pages worth, too much to list here. And here too, most of the accused were sentenced to death. But, the political climate had changed and Tito needed the BRD. Thus, on June 30, 1950 the sentences were reduced to 18 or 20 year jail terms (pp. 164/65). An effort was made to turn some of those sentenced into communists, or to work in the Yugoslav security service, spy agency. But as relation with the BRD improved, some were let go, having to promise not to tell, the rest were ignored so as to not stir up hatred, as detailed in Part I.

And this is what the history of the Third Reich is based on. Sham trials conducted by the victors in which the accused were convicted based on ex post facto ‘laws’, and prevented from making their case by submitting exonerating evidence; or on ‘confessions’ beaten out of them. We also need to remember that most of what really had happened was recorded, but the records never published, no doubt destroyed by now.

Vae Victis, but we need to add that following WW II a concerted effort was/is made to demonize Germans.

To be continued…

Dr. Rudolf Aschenauer, a lawyer who was involved in the defense of German soldiers, in his book about partisans “Krieg ohne Grenzen” (War without borders, [Druffel-Verlag, Leoni am Starnberger See, 1982]), complains that the partisan issue was never properly addressed in all the trials he was involved in (p. 139). To make his case he submitted an affidavit to that effect to a court, a copy archived at the Institute für Zeitgeschichte IfZ (Institute for Contemporary History). I believe I found it, but was told by the Institute that they are unable to release a copy because persons involved are still alive. A copout, here is their standard, printed, reply:

“Einsicht darf nur für nachgewiesene wissenschaftliche Arbeiten und nur unter der Auflage gestattet werden daß bei einer Verwendung die Namen der beteiligten Personen im Zusammenhang mit den Unterlagen nicht mitgeteilt werden“.

(Access to the material is only permitted for scientific projects and only under the premise that names of persons involved will not be made public.)

What ‘persons involved’ would those be, and why would I publish their names? In any case, the affidavit seems to have disappeared. Before we go into detail about partisans, per Dr. Aschenauer, a little from the introduction of his book (p. 9). My translation is of the essential parts:

On May 24, 1956, during a conference hosted by the IfZ, Loius de Jong, a Dutch historian and journalist, in his address to the audience remarked that it is impossible to write a serious history of the partisan movement without access to the documents still buried in archives. For locked archives he mentions: “The American Office of Strategic Service, the British Political Warfare Executive and the Special Operations Executive.” Aschenauer writes that many more archives could be added, Russian archives especially.

Not much has changed since then: archives are still locked. Sorokina and a host of others complain about it.

As an aside, de Jong also talked about German trials and stated:

“In den deutschen Landen werden Prozesse mit dem Hintergrund der Jahre 1939-1945 geführt, ohne daß die Gerichte im Besitz ausreichender Unterlagen sind. Ohne Gesamtzusammenhänge zu überblicken, kann man sich kein sicheres Urteil erlauben“.

(In the German states trials are conducted based on the events of 1939-1945, and this even though the courts are not in possession of adequate documentation. But without the ability to put events in context it is not possible to be certain).

Defendants before German courts are still not allowed to present their case – to try and present anything in context is deemed by the judges an attempt to “minimize.” At the IMT, for instance, the defense was prevented from referring to the Versailles Treaty, the blueprint of WW II. Why not allow this? Because, and this has been mentioned before, the intent was and is to convict Germans.

Why are the documents on partisan activities still under lock and key? Dr. Aschenauer notes in the closing of his Introduction that the documents of Jewish institutions should also be made available: that without all of the documents we can only attempt to deal with the partisan subject. As for Jewish documentation, why are they not released? Jews did engage in partisan activities. Aschenauer devotes a chapter to “Juden im Widerstand” (Jews in the Resistance, pp.246-259), showing that whole Jewish partisan units existed.

About 500,000 Jews served in the Red Army: 25,000 to 30,000 as active partisans (Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Die Juden in der Sowjetunion, F.A. Herbig Verlagsbuchhandlung GmbH, München, 2003, pp.375/76). S. Schwarz also covers the Jewish partisan issue, quoting extensively from a book by Moshe Kaganovich, Der Idischer Ontayl in der Partizaner-Bevegung fun Sovet-Rusland (The Jewish role in the Soviet partisan movement, Central Historical Commission of the Partisan Federation PAKHAKH in Italy, Rome 1948; in: Soloman M. Schwarz, The Jews in the Soviet Union, Syracuse University Press, 1951, pp. 309 – 333). According to this, Jews even had their own Partisan Federation and bragged about their involvement after the war. All of it has disappeared, and only one copy of the Kaganovitch book available in Hebrew or Yiddish. Why? Because Jewish partisans just don’t fit into the newest version of “history,” in which Jews are depicted as innocent victims. Were Jews shot by the German armed forces and the EG? Of course, if they were caught participating in, or organizing, partisan activities, aiding and abetting them.

As regards organizing partisan warfare in the Soviet Union, we have this:

“To this (the attempts by the Germans to change the Russian railroads to European gauge. Wilf) were added the special Russian tactics and not least the activities of the partisans, who also worked in depth. Apart from experience in Yugoslavia (to be addressed in the next part. Wilf), the German forces had not, until then, come up against this kind of warfare. The Russians, on the other hand, had prepared it for years, had accumulated supplies of ammunition, arms, and food, installed radio stations, and trained their soldiers systematically in partisan tactics. When the regular army retreated the partisans immediately went to work. They laid mines and carried on espionage. They blew up bridges and seized transports. But they did not only wage ‘the little war’ with every modem expedient-the partisans were obviously operating on lines of high strategy. They concentrated on important centres and had their own bases in areas which they left in peace. They would let through quantities of ordinary trucks, but would suddenly strike when a car with high officers passed. And they shifted their activities from one district to another, according to the general strategic situation. They might keep quiet for weeks and then appear just before a German offensive or a Russian attack and try to inflict the greatest possible indirect damage on the German operations.” (A. Fredborg, Behind the Steel Wall, George G. Harrap & Co, In Association with B.U.E. Ltd., 1944, p.45, in Krieg ohne Grenzen, p. 129)

Arvid Fredborg, a Swedish journalist reporting for Svenska Dagbladet, was stationed in Berlin right up to May 31, 1943 informing us that: “A journalist in Berlin was no doubt in a better position than other foreigners to study war time conditions in Germany.” No doubt about it.

On p. 42 of the Fredborg book:

“In private, political circles (the officials in the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Propaganda) did not conceal their indignation that the Russians did not follow the rules of the game. Instead of giving in when encircled, they forced the Germans to continue the fight indefinitely. The Russians were fighting cunningly and against all international law, it was said. They were lacking chivalry and considered it their duty to kill the enemy regardless of when, where, and how. In addition to this they willfully scorched their own country. What this Russian mentality really signified would soon dawn on different quarters in Germany…”

It was this kind of warfare that Hitler warned his generals about, but their proud Prussian tradition prevented them from changing their tactics. They could not conceive of the possibility that the eastern campaign would not accord with the rules of war by the other side. The German high command was, however, aware of the training of partisans in the SU, as there were intelligence reports about partisan maneuvers taking place in the spring of 1941 (Krieg ohne Grenzen, p. 116). Also, partisan warfare was/is part of communist ideology, a weapon in their fight for world revolution and dominance (Ibid., p. 56).

The early partisan successes are evidence that preparations for illegal partisan warfare in the Soviet Union was made well in advance of June 22, 1941, the start of Barbarossa. Einsatzgruppen (EG), units of the Security Police in charge of maintaining order in the occupied territories were formed in September 1939, during the Polish campaign: further evidence that the EG were not special ‘Jew killing squads’ as claimed. And restoration of order in the occupied territories was not an option, as stated in the Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907:

SECTION III

MILITARY AUTHORITY OVER THE TERRITORY OF THE HOSTILE STATE

Art. 42. Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.

The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.

Art. 43. The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.“(http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/195)

To restore “public order and safety” in an occupied territory is no easy task under any conditions, but nearly impossible when faced with a well organized resistance as was the case in Poland from September 1939 on, and later in the Soviet Union. In addition to the above Hague Rules, here is what “The United States Rules of Warfare” states, in part:

Ҥ 12. Uprisings in occupied territories.

If the people of a country or any portion thereof, already occupied by an army, rise against it, they are violators of the laws of war, and are not entitled to their protection.

§ 348. Hostilities committed by individuals not of armed forces.

Persons who take up arms and commit hostilities without having complied with the conditions prescribed by the laws of war for recognition as belligerents are, when captured by the injured party, liable to punishment as war criminals.”

And “The British Manual of Military Law” provides this;

Ҥ 19. Peaceful inhabitants, on the other hand, may not be killed or wounded, nor as a rule taken prisoner, if, however, they make an attempt to commit hostile acts they are not entitled to the right of armed forces and are liable to execution as war criminals. (August von Knieriem, The Nuremberg Trials, Henry Regnery Company, Chicago, Illinois 1959, pp. 360-61)

It is of note that some of those rules were suspended during the Nuremberg proceedings:

“At a time suspiciously close to the preparation of the Nuremberg prosecutions, the English and American provisions quoted above were changed so that they came to correspond to those of CCL No. 10, as enacted in 1945, according to which, acting on the basis of superior order, rather than eliminating criminal responsibility, is to constitute only an extenuating circumstance (Art. II 4b). One can hardly doubt that this change was made for the sole purpose of making it impossible for the defense to refer to that Anglo-American view which had failed to conform to CCL No. 10. The change would not, however, undo the fact that until 1944—i.e., exactly at the time when the Nuremberg acts were committed—a different view had prevailed in both systems…As soon as the prosecutions of war criminals were over, the change of the English War Manual was repealed.” (Ibid, pp. 248-49)

The Americans also restored their rules after the Germans were found guilty, fearing that the Chinese and North Koreans would refer to the Nuremberg rulings during the Korean War and charge American and British POWs with committing war crimes (Franz W. Seidler, Das Recht in Siegerhand, Pour le Mérite – Verlag für Militärgeschichte, Selent 2007, pp. 27-28)

Now to those early partisan successes. In Polish archives (ministry of the interior) the reports by the EG from September 6 to October 5, 1939 are stored, detailing the efforts made by the Polish resistance to inflict damage (Krieg ohne Grenzen, pp. 170-191). Aschenauer describes how well the resistance was organized and also the formation of partisan units at the beginning of the war with Russia (pp. 192-201). As mentioned before, he devotes a whole chapter to “Jews in the Resistance” (pp. 246-256).

German HQ was aware of the partisan problem before the Russian campaign of June 22, 1941, but grossly underestimated its extent. They did not realize how well they were organized as a part of the regular Soviet armed forces. From July to September 1941, 122 partisan units were formed in one area of the Ukraine alone, comprising about 5,800 persons, as well as 750 more working as agitators. In another area, 437 units were formed, consisting of 7,200 fighters. The Komsomol, Soviet youth organization, added 7,000 fighters (Ibid, p. 144). A report by the military police of June 22 – September 16, 1941 stated that 467 rail bridges were blown up and rail lines destroyed at 250 locations. (Ibid, p. 136). Losses were immense from the start—impossible to achieve without advanced training and the supply of essentials, like explosives. Aschenauer provides many more examples, as do other authors, confirming what Arvid Fredborg wrote about Russia’s official preparations for partisan warfare. This is addressed in more detail in the next part.

The legal aspects.

On November 12, 1940, Vyacheslav Molotov, Soviet foreign minister, arrived in Berlin at the invitation of Hitler. He brought with him a list of Stalin’s demands, all of which were impossible for Hitler to fulfill. Stalin had hoped that the minutes of this meeting were destroyed, but just in case he had a special unit, “Group Ulbricht,” search for them when the Red Army conquered Berlin. Their efforts were in vain: the minutes did finally surface, but have been largely ignored by “historians”. (Ernst Topitsch, Stalins Krieg, Verlag Busse + Seewald GmbH, Herford 1993, pp.139ff; Werner Maser, Der Wortbruch, Copyright 1994 by Verlag Olzog, München/Landsberg 2001, pp. 232ff).

Even if Hitler had decided to go along with Stalin’s demands, there would have been no guarantee that further claims would not follow. Also, Stalin had acted arbitrarily before (Der Wortbruch, p. 244). Hitler realized that Stalin never intended to keep his word, – the elimination of Poland played into Stalin’s hands: he now had a border with Germany and was able to amass troops there – but this is not the subject under discussion here. So on December 5 Hitler issued “Weisung Nr. 21 Fall Barbarossa” (Directive No. 21, Case Barbarossa). This was not a plan for attack, just a contingency plan, informing his generals that a war with the SU might be in the offing.

The situation deteriorated as Stalin moved more and more troops to the border (Walter Post, Unternehmen Barbarossa, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH Hamburg, 1995, pp. 354ff), therefore plans for a preventive strike were made. Waiting for Stalin to attack was too risky. Hitler was well aware of what to expect in a war with the Soviet Union: that the Red Army would not fight by international rules. He had intelligence reports about the Russian civil war as well as the Spanish civil war (Walter Post, Die verleumdete Armee, Pour le Mérite Verlag für Militärgeschichte, Selent 1999, p. 52; 66). Hitler tried to loosen the reigns a little, allowing the troops to confront the illegal warfare planned by the Russians. On May 13, 1941 he therefore issued the “Partisan Warfare and Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order.”

Here’s a little about that order:

“The defendants in the High Command Case were accused of having treated as partisans lawful combatants and peaceful civilians. In this context the so-called Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order becomes relevant. The background of this order is the following: Barbarossa was a term of camouflage for the operations against the U.S.S.R.; in the course of the preparations for these operations, Keitel, Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, upon direct instructions by Adolf Hitler, issued, on May 13, 1941, an “Order on Exercising Military Jurisdiction in the Area of Barbarossa and on Special Measures by the Troops” (Nuremberg Trials, p. 362).

The words “Partisan Warfare” have since disappeared from the heading: it is now considered Hitler’s order for German troops to kill with impunity. In reality it was no such thing. Here is part of that order:

“Treatment of Crimes committed by Enemy Civilians.

1. Until further order the military courts and the courts martial will not be competent for crimes committed by enemy civilians.

2. Franc-tireurs will be liquidated ruthlessly by the troops in combat or while fleeing.

3. All other attacks by enemy civilians against the Armed Forces, its members and auxiliaries will be suppressed on the spot by the troops with the most rigorous methods until the assailants are annihilated.

4. Where no such measures were taken or, where they could not be taken, persons suspected will be brought before an officer at once. This officer will decide whether or not they are to be shot. Against localities from which troops have been attacked in a deceitful or treacherous manner, collective coercive measures will be applied
immediately upon the order of an officer of the rank of at least battalion commander, if the circumstances do not permit the quick identification of the individual perpetrators.

5. It is strictly forbidden to keep suspected persons in custody in order to put them at the disposal of the courts after the reinstatement of judicial jurisdiction over the indigenous population” (Ibid.)

Point 6 – omitted by von Knieriem for some reason – states that military courts can be reinstated if agreed upon by all commanders and if the area is sufficiently pacified (Verleumdete Wehrmacht, p. 53).

The German high command was not at all in favor of this order, fearing a breakdown of discipline. Therefore Commander in Chief of the army, Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, augmented this order with the so-called “Discipline Order” on May 24. Some details:

“While the Führer’s Order, in the interest of an effective conquest of the enemy and a speedy pacification of the country, intended to loosen military discipline, the Brauchitsch Order insisted on the ruthless and unconditional maintenance of army discipline. As far as criminal acts of Soviet civilians were concerned, the Brauchitsch Order could not restore the jurisdiction of the military courts abolished by the Führer’s Order; but an attempt was made to keep punishment through the field commanders within reasonable and fair limits by restricting the Führer’s Order to “serious cases,” while lighter offenses were supposed to be punished with temporary measures which were, for all practical purposes, a circumvention of the Führer’s Order.

There can be no doubt that von Brauchitsch tried to limit the Führer’s Order to a reasonable scope without trying to sabotage it entirely. His order must have been meant in this way, and in this sense it was also understood by the field commanders, who unanimously testified to that effect.” (Nuremberg Trials, p. 364)

There is no mention at all about permission to kill with impunity, quite to the contrary. As to number 4 in the above order, here are some general comments about problems encountered when trying to determine guilt or innocence:

“Furthermore, when guilt is not proved, the reason for acquittal usually lies in the fact that it cannot be proved in any way permissible under the law. The only basis for punishment would thus be the subjective belief of the judge. The situation is different, however, when the circumstances have almost completely convinced the judge that his suspicion is well-founded, but those persons who could tell the truth cannot be induced to speak. In such a case the judge may indeed be convinced of the guilt of the suspect, even in spite of some lingering doubts. Everyone who has ever rendered a judgment on the basis of circumstantial evidence or has witnessed such a judgment knows that such ultimate doubts may remain even after the passing of a legally unquestionable sentence. Considering the well-known fallaciousness of proof, the lacking or defective memory of witnesses and their liability to be influenced by rumors, hearsay, or even their own imagination, not to speak of intentional prevarication, who can ever feel absolutely sure that he really knew exactly the true course of events? All legal systems are therefore satisfied either to leave such questions to a jury, who need not give reasons for their verdict, or to require no more than that the judge be convinced “beyond reasonable doubt.”…” (Ibid., p. 368)

And this is in reference to peacetime conditions, which are totally different from what field commanders were faced with.

Von Knieriem continues:

“Certainly the German officers by whom executions were ordered were not always fully convinced or even without reasonable doubt. But they had to act in situations requiring speedy decisions and in which they could be sure that they would never obtain a better basis for their judgment. This consideration should by itself suffice to exclude the mechanical application of the rule of in dubio pro reo, which was intended for normal situations. Moreover, the acts in question were of a kind impossible of occurrence on such a scale in normal situations. Partisan activity was of tremendous scope. According to the testimony of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, the interruptions of railway traffic caused by partisans amounted to 1,200 to 1,600 a day. To these were added raids on shelters, vehicles, and small units; acts of sabotage directed against cables, bridges, broadcasting stations, and air-fields; acts of violence against the peaceful population—all in all, several thousand war crimes per day.” (Ibid.)

This was about trying to get partisans, and by extension actions of illegal combatants, under control. Enormous damage was done daily: German soldiers were killed, desperately needed supplies were destroyed, and thus commanders were under pressure to stop these illegal activities. But, the measures taken were mostly ineffective. The statistics prove it. From Behind the Steel Wall, by Fredborg, pp. 153-54:

“Another drawback was that the Germans had not been able to curb the partisans. These were slowing down all the movements of the Wehrmacht, hampering their supplies, and so forth. From Leningrad to the Caucasus came the same story of the increasing numbers of partisans, of their growing impudence, and, last but not least, of how the partisan warfare was moving westward.

By this time the partisans were appearing on a large scale in the Ukraine, where they, in 1941, had not yet been operating in great numbers. In the Generalgouvernement they were slowly advancing westward, and even from Wartheland reports arrived indicating that the Poles there had indulged in partisan activities. In the Baltic States the Germans had to reckon with the partisans…

Even the smaller partisan groups were in communication by radio with the regular Russian troops. If their position threatened to become untenable Russian planes, summoned by radio, intervened in the fighting.

All reports were unanimous in pointing out that the German troops had not found a remedy against the partisans. In daytime they were Russian workers in German service, and by night they were soldiers. To try to separate the sheep from the goats was considered impracticable, especially as the goats were so numerous.

In addition to these unfavourable factors, the superior winter tactics of the Russians should be particularly stressed.”

A now a few stats concerning reprisals:

“How successful these measures were is indicated by the entries in an Atlas of Operations of the Army Group North. The entry dated November 9, 1941, states that up to that date, 1,767 partisans were killed fighting, 1,213 were summarily executed, and 5,667 persons were arrested as suspected partisans; of these, 648 were executed. The number of 5,019 suspects released from arrest shows that suspected persons were not at all simply shot, and it is probable that as to the remaining 648, the suspicion had been proved to be justified. The figure of 1,213 partisans summarily executed also shows how relatively insignificant the German countermeasures were in comparison with the scope of partisan activities mentioned above. The 1,213 partisans shot during a period of 120 days, conservatively estimated, means 10 executions a day. That means that, on the average, one partisan was shot approximately every third day in the area of each of the divisions of the Army Group North.” (Nuremberg Trials, p. 370)

As partisan activity increased, reprisal measures increased: more partisans meant more executions. This was never taken into consideration at the IMT: partisans were ignored and reprisal measures deemed illegal; soldiers and officers performing their duties were branded as criminals. An elusive definition of “international law” was used to convict, but this ought not to have been applied since those convicted could never have been aware of this “law.” No specific, written international law even exists, only agreements between states which are impossible for individuals to be aware of.

There is another issue here: A law is not only put in place to punish, but also to protect.

“Therefore, the result remains the same: International law is not in a position to protect individuals, wherever they may be, against a domestic law which is illegal from the point of view of international law. According to general legal principles, it therefore cannot expect the individuals to expose themselves to such a risk. For the individual, always and everywhere, national law precedes international law. He has to obey the national law even where it compels him to violate international law.”(Ibid., p. 47)

Only lex loci — the law of the land — applies. The tribunal of the I.G. Farben case (No. VI) makes this clear:

“We cannot say that a private citizen shall be placed in the position of being compelled to determine in the heat of war whether his government is right or wrong, or, if it starts right, when it turns wrong. We would not re-quire the citizen, at the risk of becoming a criminal under the rules of international justice, to decide that his country has become an aggressor and that he must lay aside his patriotism, the loyalty to his homeland, and the defense of his own fireside at the risk of being adjudged guilty of crimes…or of becoming a traitor to his country…if he makes an erroneous decision based upon facts of which he has but vague knowledge. To require this of him would be to assign to him a task of decision which the leading statesmen of the world and the learned men of international law have been unable to perform in their search for a precise definition of aggression.”(Ibid., p. 508; source: Engl. Rec. pp. 15706 f)

A surprising admission, but correct nevertheless. Therefore, for a person to commit an illegal act, he/she has to be aware that it is illegal—must be conscious of the fact that what he/she is about to do is illegal. A little more detail:

“For if international law only addresses itself to states and only regulates their mutual relations, it cannot contain genuine criminal law. According to the legal opinion of all civilized states, only individuals are criminally responsible; thus, there cannot be a criminal responsibility of states. But as international law does not address itself to individual human beings, it cannot prescribe their punishment. For an act can only be punished by a law, if the same law had forbidden the act. If, however, international law does not address itself to individuals, it cannot contain prohibitions for individuals; and if it does not contain prohibitions for individuals, it cannot contain provisions for their punishment.”(Ibid., p. 47)

One more issue that was never considered at the IMT: “only individuals are criminally responsible.” To punish individuals their guilt must be proven and it must be shown that they acted in violation of an existing law, a law they were obliged to uphold, thereby making them aware that they acted illegally.

As for “Consciousness of Doing Wrong” (Ibid, pp. 217ff):

“Fortunately, we can leave aside the so-called problems of the will, which are extremely complicated; as, for example, that of the so-called dolus eventualis (conditional intent). We can limit ourselves to the problem of determining what the actor had to know in order to be punishable. What knowledge means in this context is clear: The actor must have known the circumstances which render his act punishable…This so-called knowledge of the circumstances of the act is not irrelevant to our discussion, in the course of which we shall encounter cases in which the knowledge, or rather lack of knowledge, of certain circumstances should have been considered. Even more significant, however, is the question of whether or not the actor, in order to be charged with intent, must have known that his act was unlawful in the sense of its constituting a wrong. This problem is generally designated as that of the “consciousness of unlawfulness” or of doing wrong, and can be expressed in the following terms: Can the guilty intent be imputed to an actor who was not conscious of doing wrong? As the act must first be unlawful for the problem of the actor’s guilt to be raised at all, the question may also be expressed in the following way: Can anybody be punished for being guilty of intent if he was mistaken about the lawfulness of his act? This is why the problem of the consciousness of doing wrong is generally designated as that of error of law or, since unlawfulness means that the act is prohibited, as the “error of prohibition.” Irrespective of the manner in which the question is formulated, its meaning is always the same; it refers to the determination of the extent, if any, to which the actor was conscious of doing wrong.”(Ibid, pp. 218/19)

The author, von Knieriem, goes into detail about this issue, too much to address here. At the end of the chapter he sums it up as such:

“The actor is not punished, however, if he considered his act lawful and could reasonably consider it so under the circumstances…But from the welter of contradictory cases and opinions we have obtained at least a negative definition of the concept of guilty mind, which must be correct if the concept of guilty mind is to have any meaning at all: No criminal responsibility exists where the actor considered his act permitted and could reasonably do so under the circumstances.

For Nuremberg this would mean: If the German or any other continental legal System had been applied, it would have been necessary to prove for every defendant either that he was conscious of doing wrong or, under certain circumstances, that he was blameworthy for not having had such consciousness. It does not appear to be fully clear how far such proof would have been required if American law had been applied. But so much is sure: According to American law, too, sentence could not be passed on a defendant who proved that he was conscious of acting in accordance with the law and that he could reasonably have such consciousness under the circumstances. Practically speaking, the difference between the two legal Systems seems hardly significant. In continental law, too, the problem of consciousness of doing wrong is hardly ever relevant unless it is specifically raised. In the great majority of cases the problem is taken up neither by the court, nor by the defendant, the defense counsel, or the prosecutor. But even where it is brought up it usually turns out to be irrelevant, because as a matter of evidence, German law, too, proceeds from the conviction that for a normal person the consciousness of doing wrong can be assumed. Generally it is therefore incumbent upon the defense to prove that consciousness of doing wrong was lacking in the particular case, and success is unlikely unless there is presented some really good reasons for the defendant’s lack of that consciousness. In itself the difference thus has by no means the significance that one might be inclined to ascribe to it on the basis of the great difference of theoretical conceptions. In Nuremberg it would therefore not have made much of a difference which national law was applied. Even though one would have tried to do the impossible and apply international law, punishment would have been inadmissible where there was no guilty mind—i.e., where the actor was not conscious; of doing wrong…. It must be emphasized again that the problem of consciousness of doing wrong could only become relevant if the act in question was unlawful under the German law of the time. Not unless the act was unlawful in that sense could it be at all significant whether or not the actor believed that his act was justified by necessity of war or as retaliation or that it was permitted under the law of war in consequence of a change in international norms. Even if the opinion that German law is of ultimate significance were erroneously rejected and if some foreign law or even the nonexistent international criminal law were applied without regard to punishability under German law, it would be necessary to examine whether the actor considered his act permitted because he believed in some ground excluding unlawfulness. To the grounds of exclusion of consciousness of doing wrong we should add, however, the actor’s knowledge or reasonable belief that his act was justified under German law, because at the time the acts were committed none of the persons who were later accused could foresee that he would ever be judged by any other law.” (Ibid., pp. 230ff)

Nothing needs to be added. The partisans were real and their actions illegal; thus reprisals by Germans were legal. Condemning Germans for acting illegally and punishing them under a nonexistent law, while concurrently ignoring the partisans was a miscarriage of justice. But the Nuremberg proceedings were never about administering justice. They were conceived simply to punish Germans.

“Doctor August von Knieriem deserves special attention. For many years…General Counsel of Germany’s largest business enterprise, the Interessen-Gemeinschaft Farben Indistrie, Aktiengesellschaft, more generally known as I.G.Farben. Obviously none but a lawyer of outstanding attainment could could obtain a position of such prominence and responsibility. Exactly by virtue of this office, Doctor von Knieriem found himself in the less enviable position of being charged with war crimes. In one of those twelve trials which were conducted in Nuremberg before military tribunals…Doctor von Knieriem was accused of having participated in the planning, preparation and waging of wars of aggression…He was found innocent of all charges and acquitted. His book has grown out of this personal experience”. (From the Preface to the American Edition, by Max Rheinstein, p.ix [The Nuremberg Trials]).

To be continued…

The next chapter is by Prof. Dr. Fritz Münch, titled: Zum Recht der Kriegsgefangenschaft (The Rights of Prisoners of War).

The author tells us that existing law concerning POWs is relatively new, going into some detail regarding the Hague Rules of Warfare and the Geneva Convention. He also states that during WWII all of the belligerent parties were signatories to those agreements, except for the Soviet Union (SU). The Communist/Bolshevik regime of the SU considered all agreements signed by the Czarist government null and void, but the overwhelming majority of public opinion assumed that the SU would honor those agreements, since they had become part of international law (p. 15ff). The book under discussion proves this wrong; also, there is no such thing as “International Law,” only agreements between states.

On p. 18 Münch begins addressing the real issue, the partisan problem, which has now moved increasingly into the background: the intent is to depict German soldiers as indiscriminate murderers, who killed at will for no reason and combed the vastness of Russian territory in search of Jews to exterminate them. But the partisans were real and the subject of illegal combatants and legality of reprisal is part of the subject here; the book provides ample material regarding partisan activity, but first a little about the emergence of the partisan problem.

Münch writes that the partisan problem arose for the first time in 1899, at this time only effecting Belgium and Switzerland. A compromise was reached, allowing for the populace to organize and fight the approaching enemy, but that – when the territory was occupied – civilians had to cease fighting. This never solved the problem, so later an attempt was made to establish rules concerning the difference between legal and illegal combatants, which is addressed in some detail later. This early imprecise interpretation led to misunderstandings already in WWI. The author continues by writing that it is impossible to provide sufficient care for POWs as stipulated by the Hague Rules: “63. In the absence of a special agreement between the belligerents, prisoners of war shall be treated, as regards board, lodging, and clothing, on the same footing as the troops of the Government that captured them” when whole armies are captured, as has been shown during and after WWII. He then summarizes the shortcomings during the German POW trials, the IMT et al:

-  treatment of prisoners as criminals without providing evidence that the Rules of Warfare were violated.

-  discarding the Rules of War by asserting that Germany as a state has ceased to exist.

And finally, failure to discharge prisoners of war after hostilities ceased and employment of these prisoners in dangerous jobs.

Münch then refers to the “Geneva Convention relative to the ‘Treatment of Prisoners of War’” of 1949, enforced on October 21, 1950, in which some of the issues were addressed, retroactively. He quotes from Article 84, which states:

“A prisoner of war shall be tried only by a military court, unless the existing laws of the Detaining Power expressly permit the civil courts to try a member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power in respect of the particular offence alleged to have been committed by the prisoner of war.

In no circumstances whatever shall a prisoner of war be tried by a court of any kind which does not offer the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality as generally recognized, and, in particular, the procedure of which does not afford the accused the rights and means of defence provided for in Article 105.”

And Article 99, the first paragraph:

“No prisoner of war may be tried or sentenced for an act which is not forbidden by the law of the Detaining Power or by international law, in force at the time the said act was committed.”

Anyone even vaguely familiar with proceedings of the “International Military Tribunal” (IMT) at Nuremberg in 1945-46 will have to ask: why now; why were the German military personnel accused of all sorts of crimes not explicitly declared illegal by German laws and not addressed in detail by international agreements, termed “International Law”? After all, what was agreed upon in 1949 did not exist in WWII, as the laws used to convict Germans were written in London after the fact. Article 99 is notable: it forbids the sentencing of POWs based on ex post facto law (written after the fact; p. 21) And that is exactly what happened at Nuremberg, as addressed later on.

We then learn that a Stockholm Institute determined that from 1945 to 1969 – 90 international conflicts occurred, the number of victims allegedly equal to that of WWII. Eugene Davidson writes much the same in his The Nuremberg Fallacies, making a mockery of what Justice Jackson – and I am having a real problem with the word ‘justice’ before Jackson’s name – wrote on June 7, 1945 in his letter to the President:

“In arranging these trials we must also bear in mind the aspirations with which our people have faced the sacrifices of war. After we entered the war, and as we expended our men and our wealth to stamp out these wrongs, it was the universal feeling of our people that out of this war should come unmistakable rules and workable machinery from which any who might contemplate another era of brigandage would know that they would be held personally responsible and would be personally punished. Our people have been waiting for these trials in the spirit of Woodrow Wilson, who hoped to “give to international law the kind of vitality which it can only have if it is a real expression of our moral judgment.”

No other trial took place as a result of the wars mentioned above; no one was punished for crimes committed as the Germans were, and that even with agreements now in existence. Also, morally is not now – or has it ever been – a part of the criminal justice system, it is only the letter of the law that counts.

Münch closes his essay by stating that it would have been best, since no explicit “international” laws existed during WWII, for each country to try their own soldiers based on lex loci, the law of the land, instead of applying law written after the fact and covering up the crimes committed by the victorious powers. But, as shown above by the IMT president’s statement concerning the one-sidedness of proceedings, the intent was not to administer justice at the IMT, or the follow up trials, but to convict the Germans.

Not much needs to be added to this: victors’ ‘justice’ at its finest, vae victis indeed.

About the (now nonexistent) Partisans.

Before continuing with the book review, some general comments on the partisans – the underlying issue. For it was the reprisals by the Germans, including the actions of the EG, (Einsatzgruppen; rapid response units) – formed by the Germans to combat partisans – which were declared to be war crimes by the IMT judges, the measures taken considered to be in breach of “international law”. The judges ignored the partisans almost completely, and consequently the counter-measures taken by the Germans to fight the partisans are now considered to be almost exclusively ‘Jew killing’ actions. It is beyond the scope of this work to address this nonsense about a few thousand German soldiers scouring the vast Russian landscape on the lookout for Jews, – none of the alleged ‘dozens of mass graves’ have ever been discovered – this is to show that partisans were a huge problem, a war deciding issue, and that reprisals by the Germans were justified, though largely ineffective.

To the definition of combatants as per the: “Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907”, in force at that time:

“CHAPTER I
The qualifications of belligerents
Article 1. The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and volunteer
corps fulfilling the following conditions:
1. To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance;
3. To carry arms openly; and
4. To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
In countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the army, or form part of it, they are included under the denomination “army.”
Art. 2. The inhabitants of a territory which has not been occupied, who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops without having had time to organize themselves in accordance with Article 1, shall be regarded as belligerents if they carry arms openly and if they respect the laws and customs of war.
Art. 3. The armed forces of the belligerent parties may consist of combatants and non-combatants. In the case of capture by the enemy, both have a right to be treated as prisoners of war.”(http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/195)

Partisans, by definition, could never adhere to those rules; they have to operate under cover if they hope to be successful. During the war, the soldiers coming home on leave from the eastern front frequently talked about partisans, the word in everyone’s moth, I remember it well. We also have, for just one example, a war time publication by the Soviet War News, published by Hutchinson & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., London, New York, and Melbourne, by authority of “Soviet War News”, issued by the press department of the Soviet Embassy in London (this was sent to me; the article is not dated, but is apparently a 1942 issue). It is “An Account of the Work of Soviet Partisans behind the Nazi lines”,  the essay titled: “We Are Guerillas”. Here is the introduction in its entirety:

“What is a guerilla? He is defined in dictionaries as “one engaged in irregular warfare, generally in small independent bodies”. The term is derived from the Spanish guerra, meaning war, and guerillas were the main force which prevented Napoleon from ever completely conquering Spain. And the same guerillas, in their Russian form, harassed Napoleon unmercifully when he invaded Russia in 1812.

In Russia, guerillas are generally called “partizans”. They developed as a fighting force with a tradition all their own, during the years of civil war which followed the Soviet revolution in 1917. While a life-and-death struggle was going on between Whites and Reds—between those who wanted to restore the inequalities of the old regime and those who supported the government of the people—thousands of men and women, mostly peasants, joined the guerillas.

Brave and skilful leaders sprang out of their ranks, men like Chapayev and Shchors, of whose exploits colorful sagas have now passed into the rich folk-lore of the Russian people. In the rolling plains of the Ukraine, the marshes of the Dnieper, the Cossack lands around the Don, and in the barren steppes of Siberia, everywhere the partizans fought untiringly to help the then young Red Army against the enemies of the Soviets.

That was just over twenty years ago. There are still thousands of men in the Soviet Union today who fought with Chapayev and other partizan leaders, who remember the old traditions of guerilla warfare, and who have not forgotten how to deal with invaders.

From the very first days of the German Invasion in June 1941, guerilla bands were formed wherever the enemy appeared. After Stalin’s call to the nation on July 3, when he urged the Soviet people to create in the German rear “conditions impossible for the enemy” the guerilla movement spread like wildfire.

Once again brilliant leaders sprang up everywhere. Literally thousands of detachments were formed. Men, women and even children are fighting in these detachments, pitting their bravery and native ingenuity against the mechanized juggernaut pt Nazism. They are a source of constant terror to the German troops, who can never be sure that an innocent-looking clump of bushes does not conceal a machine-gun, or that a simple peasant girl is not carrying a hand-grenade in her market basket.

While the major portion of this book is concerned with the tactics and operations of Soviet guerillas, the heroic struggle of guerillas in other parts of Nazi-occupied Europe receives its share. From Finland in the north, through Central Europe to Greece in the south, the trail of guerilla fire is here laid in (the German and Italian rear).

This fiery trail is growing every day fiercer. The guerilla movement is the foundation of a new people’s army which will one day link up with the regular Allied forces to smash Fascism from the face of Europe.”

And this is what the German fighting forces were up against, never knowing when a shot would ring out from somewhere killing a comrade, or when a bomb would explode destroying rail lines and killing soldiers, or if bridges would be blown up, etc., etc.; never knowing who to trust, as even women and children participated in this illegal warfare. The Germans did their best, but were powerless to stop the activities because of the sheer numbers of partisans involved. And the “partizans” were not a rag-tag group, but part of the Red Army. On May 30, 1942 the administrative unit of the partisan movement was formed under the command of General P.K. Ponomarenko. From then on the partisan army was considered to be equal to other groups of the Red Army: infantry, air force and navy, and were called: “Soldiers of the Red Army operating behind enemy lines.” (Franz. W. Seidler, Die Wehrmacht im Partisanenkrieg, Pour le Mérite-Verlag für Militärgeschichte, Selent 1999, pp. 24-5)

But even before May 1942, partisans were led and supplied by the Red Army, the appointment of Ponomarenko just made it official. And now a little about numbers: at the end of 1943, Ponomarenko proudly published the results of 2 years’ ‘work’: 300,000 German soldiers were killed, among them 30 generals and 6,000 officers; 3,000 trains derailed; 3,263 bridges destroyed; 859 munitions depots blown up. In 1961 an official account followed, published in Moscow under the title “Sowetskie Partizani”: 500,000 German soldiers, officers, members of the SS and police, as well as train crews had been murdered. In a different publication the following numbers are provided: 18,000 military trains destroyed; about 500,000 explosive charges activated; 42,000 trucks destroyed; 2,000 rail- and 8,000 street bridges destroyed; 9,400 locomotives and 85,000 rail cars destroyed. (Ibid, pp. 36-7)

Following the war, partisans were praised and honored, especially in Russia but in other eastern countries as well. In an East German publication we read that in the SU, 1,933,000 partisans were active: 250,000 in Bulgaria; 500,000 in Yugoslavia (this is confirmed in the book under discussion, p. 27); in Poland 350,000; more numbers for other countries are provided, totaling 4,409,500 illegal combatants fighting the German forces. (Atlas Zur Geschichte, Band 2, VEB Hermann Haack, Geographisch-Kartographische Anstalt Gotha/Leipzig 1975, p. 46). The map also shows huge areas completely under partisan control.

In spite of all this we are still told that the EG were ‘Jew killing’ units exclusively! In 2009, for instance, a National Geographic documentary was produced with the title “Nazi Death Squads”, referring to the EG. One of the ‘historians’ participating in this vile piece of hate propaganda, Richard Rhodes, told the audience “that he had nightmares dealing with this material, but pushed through those feelings to tell the story.” Historians, he continued, still claim that the death camps were the centers of the killings, with the EG killings “shrugged off as wild excesses,” because historians are unwilling to confront this material. To call this guy deluded is praising him, but he has one thing right. Lately – because the numbers of Jews allegedly killed in concentration camps is revised downward almost daily – the ‘crime scene’ is increasingly being shifted to alleged mass murders of Jews in the east, “in ditches,” as these numbers are impossible to verify (Saul Friedländer, The Years of Extermination: Nazi Germany and the Jews, 1939-1945, 2007). The NG documentary used to be available online, but no longer. I taped the show.

As mentioned in the introduction to We are Guerillas, in a radio address of July 3, 1941, Stalin called on the Soviet people to resist and form partisan units:

“In case of a forced retreat of Red Army units, all rolling stock must be evacuated; the enemy must not be left a single engine, a single railway car, not a single pound of grain or gallon of fuel. The collective farmers must drive off all their cattle and turn over their grain to the safe keeping of the state authorities for transportation to the rear. All valuable property, including non-ferrous metals, grain and fuel that cannot be withdrawn must be destroyed without fail.

In areas occupied by the enemy, guerilla units, mounted and on loot, must be formed; sabotage groups must be organized to combat enemy units, to foment guerilla warfare everywhere, blow up bridges and roads, damage telephone and telegraph lines, set fire to forests, stores and transports. In occupied regions conditions must be made unbearable for the enemy and all his accomplices. They must be hounded and annihilated at every step, and all their measures frustrated.”

This call went out before even two weeks passed following the German preventive strike of June 22 code named “Barbarossa”. Is it possible to form partisan units in as short a time as this? No, and we have evidence that partisans were organized and trained well in advance, with details provided later. But first the follow up order by Stalin called “Stavka Order No. 0428” of November 17, 1941. Stavka translates roughly into  ‘High Command’ of which Stalin was in charge from July 10, 1941 onward (Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Heft 4, 2000, p. 667):

“The Stavka of the Supreme Commander orders the following:

1. All villages situated in the hinterland of the German forces, to a depth of 40 to 60 kilometres from the front line and 20 to 30 kilometres to the left and right of the roads, are to be destroyed and reduced to rubble. Air forces are to be immediately brought in to assist in the destruction of the villages in the required operational radius, and also sufficient artillery and mortar fire, reconnaissance and ski details, together with partisan sabotage groups equipped with incendiary bottles,

2. In each regiment special details of 20 to 30 men are to be formed in order to dynamite and burn down die villages. Particularly courageous men who act boldly in destroying the villages are to be recommended for a government decoration…”

(http://books.google.ca/books?id=aESBIpIm6UcC&pg=PA471&lpg=PA471&dq=Stalin%27s+Stavka+order+No+0428&source=bl&ots=3FiwAKbr23&sig=1CGQkuABjJ0pz0pJ0OLINdgK7lA&hl=en&sa=X&ei=-Zg T_DaGoSPigL536yrAQ&sqi=2&ved=0CB4Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Stalin%27s%20Stavka%20order%20No.%200428&f=false)

The aforementioned “Vierteljahrshefte…” by the IfZ (Institute for Contemporary History) has a full copy of the order in German, as discovered in Moscow archives. There is some controversy swirling around this order, though not about the above wording: some allege that it contained a section about the Soviet soldiers/partisans having to dress in German uniforms, to stir up hatred toward the Germans, because many Russians welcomed the arrival of the Germans. The authors of the IfZ article, Christian Hartmann and Jürgen Zarusky, discard this; what they found in Russian archives as well as in the Washington National Archives (Series 429, Roll 461) contains nothing of the sort. I do not doubt this order was given, but Stalin was surely not foolish enough to put it on paper. There is ample evidence, however, of partisans et al. wearing German uniforms, since German soldiers were routinely found naked and mutilated. Prof. Seidler, for instance, writes that more and more partisans were wearing German uniforms and that the number of foreigners, who had been employed as helpers (HIWIS) or as local policemen, deserting in German uniforms was steadily increasing (Seidler, p.34; Report by the Reichskommisar for Ukraine of June 25, 1943, Bundesarchiv Berlin, BDC O.217 II, Bl.108ff).

These Stalin orders were followed, with civilians the targets. Efforts were then made to make it look like Germans committed these crimes, this cannot be proven for obvious reasons, but the destruction was real: the Tätigkeits und Lageberichte (Action and situation reports, TuL) issued by the EG provide ample evidence of the destruction left behind by the retreating Red Army troops as well as acts of sabotage committed while the territory was occupied by the Germans (the TuL are contained in Die Einsatzgruppen in der besetzten Sowjetunion 1941/1942, by Peter Klein. I have copies of them; the book itself seems to have fallen into the black hole, as I am not able to find a copy). Wearing of German uniforms by enemy soldiers and partisans is also mentioned in the book under discussion—part of the subject in the next chapters. But rest assured that all the destruction and killings done by the Russians were blamed on the Germans after the war. Marina Sorokina, a Russian historian, published a related article in Kritika titled “People and Procedures”, a very informative essay critical of the “investigations” undertaken by the “Extraordinary State Commission” (ESC) formed by the Soviets to collect evidence of alleged German crimes.

She writes in regard to this issue:

“At the same time, the postwar years saw the publication in the USSR of a number of memoirs, written in the genre of the heroic saga by local Soviet and party figures who had participated firsthand in fulfilling Stalin’s directive. These memoirs contain a multitude of examples of the destruction of industrial and agricultural enterprises before the arrival of the enemy…Nearly a half-century later, it must be recognized that the Stalinist plan to create the phantom of a “public prosecutor” of fascism was a success. The ChGK (ESC) fulfilled its representational function during the war years, and in the postwar years faithfully kept the topic of “war crimes” sealed off from Soviet society. The documentary materials it created and collected, however, have turned out to be the latest Russian mass grave. In the process of excavating it, historians will for a long time to come be faced with the sometimes fruitless task of distinguishing “ours” from “others,” and executioners from victims.” (Marina Sorokina, People and Procedures, Slavica Publishers, Indiana University, Kritika Fall 2005, p.830, footnote 107 and p. 831, as well as a series of IV articles available at http://www.revblog.codoh.com/2011/06/).

Efforts are now made by some Russian historians to separate “ours” from “others”, but too much rests on the official version of history -  as presented – to be maintained. Therefore I have little hope that the truth will be told anytime soon.

To be continued….

The following essays are based mostly on “Verbrechen der Sieger. Das Schicksal der deutschen Kriegsgefangenen in Osteuropa”(Crimes of the victors. The fate of German POWs in Eastern Europe, Druffel-Verlag, Leoni am Starnberger See, 1975). It begins with a foreword by Brigadier General Wolfgang Schall, retired, POW in the SU (Soviet Union) from 1945 to 1955, as well as a statement of intent by Wilhelm Anders. No actual author is mentioned; it is a compilation of documents and witness statements by the Verband der Heimkehrer und Bund der Vertriebenen (Organization of Returnees and Organization of the Dispelled). They decided to publish this book in 1975 – as preparation for the celebration of the 30th anniversary of Germany’s defeat, and the distortions of history affiliated with that defeat – were underway.

Since then, many books have been written defaming German soldiers, portraying them as brutal killers. The latest effort by Sönke Neitzel and Harald Welzer, simply titled “Soldaten” (Soldiers), features a collection of ‘newly discovered‘ British and American wiretaps, allegedly of conversations of German POWs in various camps. And of course there was the 1995-1999 exhibition, “Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941 bis 1994”(War of Annihilation: Crimes of the German armed forces 1941-1945), produced by the Hamburge Institut für Sozialforschung (Hamburg Institute for Social Research), with its many distortions and outright lies, addressed by Walter Post in “Die Verleumdete Armee” (The defamed army, Pour le Mérite, 1999). These are just two of many examples of German scribblers, who call themselves historians, distorting history. But all of them ignore the book under discussion.

W. Schall writes, on p.7:

“Was die Wissenschaftliche Kommission für deutsche Kriegsgefangenengeschichte in fünfzehn Bänden und mehreren Beiheften an Zeugnissen zusammengetragen hat, ist ein Epos des Grauens und Leidens, das oft jede Phantasie übersteigt. Und doch haben wir es erlebt und sind Zeugen — soweit wir die Heimat wiedersehen durften“.

(The fifteen volumes of testimonies, compiled by the Scientific Commission for Prisoner of War History, tell of an epoch of horror and sufferings straining the imagination. But we did experience it and are witnesses – those of us, at least, who were fortunate enough to return home.)

Mr. Schall tells us that an official body did gather evidence of crimes committed by the victors, consisting of documents as well as testimonies: a fifteen volume endeavor. Prof. Seidler writes that the Wehrmacht (Third Reich fighting force) investigations documented 8,000 cases, including crimes committed by partisans on German soldiers, the results are contained in 226 folders. The whole of it was taken to the USA and only returned in 1968, with many of the files missing (Franz W. Seidler, Die Wehrmacht im Partisanenkrieg, Pour le Mérite-Verlag für Militärgeschichte, Selent, Austria 1999, p. 87). Prof. Seidler also writes that at the end of the war the Allies were not able to prove that Germans violated that elusive “International Law”; Germans, however, had documented numerous cases of the Allies doing so (Ibid, p. 89). The President – during the IMT proceedings of May 16, 1946 – prevented the German defense counsel Dr. Laternser from pointing this out, stating:

“We are not trying whether any other powers have committed breaches of international law, or crimes against humanity, or war crimes; we are trying whether these defendants have.” (http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/05-14-46.asp , p. 521)

Victor’s ‘justice’ at its finest. What happened to this fifteen volume magnum opus? W. Anders writes on p. 9:

“In einem Telegramm an den Bundeskanzler forderte das Präsidium des Verbandes der Heimkehrer die „sofortige Freigabe der unter Verschluß liegenden deutschen Kriegsgefangenen-Dokumentation durch die Bundesregierung”.

(The steering committee of the [abovementioned] organization, in a telegram to the German chancellor, is demanding that the POW documents still under closure be released immediately.)

Why would this material be, to this day, under lock and key? If reconciliation is the aim, or “never again”, is it not of utmost importance that the truth is told and all sides heard? Apparently not, since finger pointing directed solely at the Germans continues unabated. And this one-sidedness is supposed to be the basis of understanding between peoples? Never!

W. Anders titled his introduction: “Warum dieses Buch geschrieben wurde” (Why this book was written). It starts out with a declaration by the Organization (I will refer to the Verband der Heimkehrer as the Organization), an appeal to Germans for unity:

„Zur Würde eines jeden Menschen gehört sein guter Ruf. Ohne Grund und leichtfertig darf er nicht in Frage gestellt werden. Dies gilt auch für die Deutschen.

Der überwältigende Teil der deutschen Soldaten hat nicht für eine unmenschliche Diktatur, sondern in Erfüllung der Pflichten für Volk und Vaterland gekämpft. Unser Volk darf diese Soldaten nicht als imperialistische Faschisten-Horden beschimpfen lassen. Es ist aufgerufen, sich in Wahrung seiner Selbstachtung dagegen zu wehren.

Wir verschweigen kein Unrecht, das Deutsche begangen haben. Wir wehren uns aber dagegen, daß jede Erwähnung des schweren Unrechts, das an Deutschen begangen wurde, unterdrückt wird. Wir rechnen nichts auf, aber verwahren uns gegen jede Geschichtsklitterung und gegen jede einseitige Dokumentation“.

(Part of everyone’s dignity is a good reputation; it must not be jeopardized. This also applies to Germans.

The overwhelming majority of German soldiers did not fight to protect an inhuman regime, but considered it their duty to fight for their nation. Our people must not be allowed to defame those soldiers as imperialistic fascist hordes. We call upon them to defend them, so as to sustain their own dignity.

We are not interested in covering up injustices committed by Germans. We are however protesting against the cover up of the injustices committed against us Germans. We are not interested in finger pointing, but are against the distortion of history and the one-sided portrayal of history.)

The book was published based on documents and testimony supplied be members of that organization and because the German government refused to publish the material. And also because of the waves of propaganda emanating from the east about “German criminals” alongside portrayals of the Soviet army as the “most humane army in the world”, this according to a TASS release (p. 11). Novosti, a Russian daily, praised the immediate help provided by the Red Army, supplying necessary goods for civilians (Actually they stole everything they could get their hands on; I witnessed some of it. Wilf). The article continued to say that the treatment of German POWs was “beyond reproach” and in compliance with the Geneva Convention, which surprised the POWs (p. 10). Here’s a comment by the Organization, on the same page:

“Dies ist ein Hohn auf die 1,2 Millionen in sowjetischen Lagern umgekommenen deutschen Kriegsgefangenen und Hunderttausender von Heimkehrern, die nach ihrer Entlassung in der Heimat vor Entkräftung verstorben oder heute noch schwer gesundheitsgeschädigt sind“.

(This makes a mockery of the 1.2 million German POWs who died in Soviet captivity, as well as of the hundreds of thousands who died at home as a result of malnutrition or are still suffering from the effects of ill treatment.)

The “Voice of the GRD” (Stimme der DDR) on April 26, 1975 asked why German fathers and sons were killed. Their answer: they were part of a “fascist campaign of conquest” and it is therefore a fact “that every German soldier was a participant in the biggest crime in European history.” This is how every German soldier was branded a “war criminal,” a practice originating from propaganda at that time and now accepted as fact by “historians” and the public. The Czech news agency PAP stated on the same day that “German soldiers were kept a little longer in POW camps because of their dishonorable fighting practices.” This “little longer” meant ten years for many, violating all international agreements regarding treatment of POWs.

But, there appears to have been some concern in the East about the truth emerging. On March 20, 1975 – keep in mind that this hype was all about the 30^th anniversary of the defeat of the “German Fascists” and the May 8^th celebrations – Radio Moscow raised concerns about “curious news” coming from Bonn (the German capital then), of the pending release of “disreputable (berüchtigte) documents concerning crimes allegedly committed on German soldiers during the war,” and that the publication of this material would be considered a new “provocation.” Radio Moscow continued to say that in this document, “soldiers and partisans of the SU, Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, in fact the whole of the antifascist organizations, are defamed.” A comment by the authors: “Whoever experienced the malicious and devious tactics used by the partisans will have to agree that it is not a defamation, but fact.” (p. 11)

No effort was spared to prevent the publication of the 17 volume documentary, as well as the book under discussion: the eastern paranoia suggesting that details were known and publication was feared. “The intent was to exonerate the Germans and defame the Red Army”: that according to the eastern mass media. “Izvestia” on March 1, 1975 called the documentary “dirty rubbish” (diesen dreckigen Plunder); Radio Prague talked of a “neofascist provocation”; Radio Moscow informed its listeners that this was “in contrast…to the spirit and contents of the agreements signed with the socialist countries,” referring to the 1975 Helsinki accord then in preparation.

As expected, the German government, no doubt ‘encouraged’ by others, caved in. Government spokesman Bölling declared on February 4, 1975, even before the big push from the East, that although the facts cannot be denied and he has no reason to doubt any of it, he is against publication of the documents because it would nullify all efforts made by German governments. “By our policy we have for years tried to come to an understanding with other countries, to overcome the problems of crimes committed by Germans and on Germans.” And he considers it bad politics that this issue “is pushed to the fore and used by those not interested in conciliation.” (pp. 12, 13)

The authors protest against this interpretation, especially the last sentence. It is not them who are preventing conciliation, but the East that continues to distort facts, portraying German soldiers as criminals and the others as saints. It is not the Organization’s intention to shift the blame, but to present facts to prevent this subject from being used as a “political club.” Soldiers especially are interested in peace, but if one side continually sabotages every effort at coming to an understanding, by distorting facts, peace cannot be achieved.

Wilhelm Anders closed his deliberation by stating that, according to a poll, 55% of Germans are in favor of addressing this issue fairly. He asks, “Are they all “Neofascists, Revanchists or Enemies of Détente?” One has to wonder if 30 years plus later 55% of Germans would still welcome a fair reworking of history. I doubt it; it appears that most Germans today are satisfied with distorted history and are comfortable with their guilty role. This is a disturbing development: the intended “re-education,” or brainwashing, has taken effect.

To be continued….

By the term “Action Reinhard(t),” official historiography refers to the (alleged) mass murder of Jews in three German camps: Belzec, Sobibor and Treblinka. Some, ahem, historians include Chelmno, but I am using an article by Dieter Pohl, “Massentötung durch Giftgas im Rahmen der ‘Aktion Reinhardt’. Aufgaben der Forschung” (Mass murder by poisonous gas during “Action Reihardt.” Assignment for researchers) as a guideline, and he mentions only three camps. His article appeared on pp. 185-195 in “Neue Studien zu Nationalsozialistischen Massentötungen durch Giftgas”, published by Günter Morsch and Bertrand Perz, Metropol Verlag Berlin, 2011—the most recent ‘industry publication’. This book is the result of a conference of May 2008 in Berlin, which was attended by 200 scientists from many countries. The intent was to present new material to help combat revisionists, who, to this day, deny the mass murder by poisonous gasses of millions of Jews in gas chambers. The book is a declaration of “Holocaust” bankruptcy.

But, as my title suggests, the spelling of the name of the action differs: In some publications we read “Reinhard,” in others “Reinhardt.” Why is that? Pohl claims in his article that 1.35 million people (he writes Menschen) were killed during this action: according to him, about one quarter of all Jews killed (here he writes Jews), about half by poisonous gasses. “Action Reinhard(t)” thus refers to an enormous crime, and one would expect exactitude in research, beginning with the spelling of the name.

It might be possible to dismiss the “Reinhardt” vs. “Reinhard” issue as a simple spelling error – albeit an unlikely scenario, for surely “historians” are not that sloppy – if it were not for the reference to Fritz Reinhardt of the finance ministry by Messrs Morsch and Perz in “Neue Studien…”, p. XVII, footnote 11. They write:

“…Die von der unterschiedlichen Schreibweise des Namens „Reinhard“ und „Reinhardt“ in den Quellen ausgelöste Kontroverse über die Frage, ob sich die Bezeichnung „Aktion Reinhard(t)“ auf Reinhard Heydrich oder möglicherweise auf Staatssekretär Fritz Reinhardt im Reichsfinanzministerium bezog, ist mittlerweile entschieden. Die Bezeichnung geht tatsächlich auf Heydrichs Vornamen zurück, der allerdings in den Zeitgenössischen Quellen selbst teilweise fälschlich mit Reinhart geschrieben wurde…“

(Roughly: The controversy concerning writing “Reinhard” or “Reinhardt”, referring to either Heydrich’s first name or that of Fritz Reinhardt of the finance ministry, has been settled. The description goes indeed back to Heydrich’s first name, spelled erroneously at times as Reinhardt.)

Messrs. Morsch and Perz are unclear as to who settled the issue, although they cite sources. But if this was just a spelling matter, and if “Aktion Reinhard(t)” was conceived by Reinhard Heydrich as a ‘Jew killing action’, why even mention Fritz Reinhardt? I am sure Morsch et al. know more about this, but what they know will just not fit into the narrative. Economics did play a role, and after looking at the issue closely, it is apparent that this action was initiated by the finance ministry, by Fritz Reinhardt, and that Reinhard Heydrich had nothing to do with it. His role was appended to the story later on by shysters, who refer to themselves as “historians”.

But before addressing this issue, a little about what Herr Pohl wrote. By stating up front that 1.35 million people were killed during this action, he follows what Julius Wellhausen dismisses as shysterism, to put it bluntly, when he writes:

“Für die Deutung werden die Thatsachen vorsausgesetzt und aus der Deutung werden sie bewiesen“(Die Pharisäer und Sadducäer, 1. Auflage Verlag Bamberg, Greifswald 1874. My copy Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1967, p.66). What he writes is – and Wellhausen is referring to biblical scholars here – that for the interpretation of an event, in this case “The Holocaust”, the event is established as fact up front, and substantiated through the interpretation. In other words, that which should be investigated, “The Holocaust”, is established as fact and substantiated by the interpretations of what is accepted as ‘evidence’. That research into this “action” is lacking, to put it mildly, Pohl confirms:

“Die Hintergründe dieses Massenmordes sind bis heute nicht völlig durchleuchtet.“ (p. 185)

(Trans: The background as to why this mass murder took place has not clearly been established to this day.)

Pohl wrote this after he softened his readers up with tales of gruesome mass murder, including the murder of children, but then admits later that we still don’t know why it happened. Clear indications of the Wellhausen syndrome: one must believe in mass murder, dismissing essentials. As an aside, on December 19 of this year (2011), an article appeared in Die Welt, a German daily, titled: “Hitler gab nicht “den” Befehl zum Holocaust” (Hitler did not issue the Holocaust order). The author, Felix Kellerhoff, writes that between 5.26 and 6.1 million Jews were killed and then continues:

“Obwohl diese Tatsachen unverrückbar feststehen, gibt es eines nicht: den einen schriftlichen Befehl Adolf Hitlers, mit dem das Jahrhundertverbrechen angeordnet worden ist. In keiner Akte ist dieses Dokument aufgetaucht, es gibt kein Zitat daraus und nicht einmal halbwegs verlässliche Zeugenaussagen, wann diese Weisung ergangen sein soll.”

(Even though [mass murder] is a fact, one thing we don’t have: a written order by Hitler to commit the crime of the century. In no file has this document been found: we have no citation of it and no reliable witness testimony as to when this instruction was issued.)

Quite an admission! He tries to explain why nothing resembling an order or plan has ever been found, while still asserting that “The Holocaust” happened:

“…dass der Holocaust nicht auf eine zentrale Weisung Hitlers zurückging, sondern sich zwischen Sommer 1941 und Frühjahr 1942 schrittweise entwickelte”.

(…the Holocaust was not based on a centralized instruction by Hitler, but instead developed step by step between the summer of 1941 and the spring of 1942.)

(http://www.welt.de/kultur/history/article13759672/Hitler-gab-nicht-den-Befehl-zum-Holocaust.html)

To claim that this “crime of the century,” the alleged plan to murder between 5.26 and 6.1 million Jews, developed on its own is nonsense, pure desperation. But this article is a topic on its own; thus, back to Pohl. He continues on about the deportation of Jews, the establishment of ghettos, that many died/were killed, and that mass murder was already happening on Soviet territory after the war against the S.U. commenced. Then the National Socialist leadership decided, perhaps in September 1941, to conduct mass murder outside Soviet territory as well. On p. 186 we read:

“Aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach am 13. Oktober 1941 beauftragte SS-Chef Heinrich Himmler deshalb den SS- und Polizeiführer im Distrikt Lublin, Odilo Globocnik, eine solche Mordaktion im GG zu organisieren. Vermutlich wurde dieser regionale SS-Führer beauftragt, weil er besonders gute Kontakte zu Himmler pflegte, selbst mit Siedlungsplanungen auftrat und weil er als besonders rücksichtslos galt und schon zahlreiche Verbrechen begangen hatte”.

 (It is most likely that on October 13, 1941, SS-Chief Heinrich Himmler instructed the head of the Lublin district SS and police, Odilo Globocnik, to organize a murder action in the general government. This SS leader was most likely picked because of his good [close] contacts to Himmler, involvement in settlement planning—known for his ruthlessness.)

One needs to read this slowly: It is possible that Globocnik was picked on October 13, 1941, allegedly because of his “good” contacts to Himmler. We don’t know exactly when Globocnik was chosen, but he was possibly picked because Himmler liked him: renowned German efficiency in its finest form.

We then learn that between the end of the 1970s and the mid-1990s advances were made in research into the so-called (sogenannten) Action Reinhardt (he continues to write it with “dt”) extermination camps, referring to “Nationalsozialistische Massentötungen…”, a 1983 publication by Kogon/Langbein/Rückerl and a book he authored with Musial. The Kogon et al. book does nothing to establish mass murder allegations as fact, as no investigation reports by experts in the field of crime investigations are mentioned, i.e. none exist: everything is based on innuendo and circumstance. Pohl admits it when he writes (p. 187):

“Die Forschungen stoßen vor allem durch den Mangel an aussagekräftigen Quellen an Grenzen. Im Gegensatz zu den Konzentrationslagern sind für die Lager der „Aktion Reinhardt” fast keine zeitgenössischen Akten überliefert. Letztere wurden schon im Herbst 1943 fast vollständig vernichtet, die Lagerinstallationen komplett abgebaut [6]…Deshalb stützt sich die Geschichtswissenschaft fast durchweg auf Befragungen der Täter, der wenigen Überlebenden und polnischer Augenzeugen…“

(Research is limited by the almost total absence of meaningful sources. In contrast to the concentration camps hardly any documents have been found about the “Action Reinhardt” camps. Those were almost completely destroyed in the fall of 1943, when the camps were dismantled [6]…This is why historiography is based for the most part on perpetrator statements and remaining Polish eyewitnesses.)

Under [6] we read that Globocnik wrote about the destruction of documents in a letter of January 5, 1944 to Himmler. As a source, Pohl refers to the Nuremberg trials (Der Prozeß gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militärgerichtshof, Nürnberg 1949, Bd. 34, S. 71). I have not been able to confirm this since I have no access to German documents and there is nothing in Avalon I could find. But even if documents were destroyed, we have no idea what was lost or what anything refers to. To assume that it had to do with mass murder is like saying: “The information we need is contained in the documents we don’t have.” The whole case for mass murder as the intent for “Action Reinhard(t)” rests on hearsay. But, some Globocnik documents survived; more on that later.

Pohl then goes into some detail on Soviet trials, but concedes:

“Was ist diesen sowjetischen Akten nun zu entnehmen? Zunächst muss berücksichtigt werden, dass es sich nicht um rechtsstaatliche Verfahren handelte. In den Vernehmungen wurden die Beschuldigten oft bedroht, gelegentlich, besonders bei den Prozessen Ende der 1940er-, Anfang der 1950er-Jahre wohl auch misshandelt. Deshalb sind individuelle Beschuldigungen und Selbstbezichtigungen eher mit Vorsicht zu betrachten. Die Aussagen zur allgemeinen Lagergeschichte lassen sich jedoch teilweise verifizieren und erscheinen meist glaubwürdig. Deshalb ist es wichtig, die Materialien mit westlichen Untersuchungsergebnissen zu konfrontieren und daraus auf die Glaubwürdigkeit zu schließen.“

(What can be learned from the Soviet documents? First, we must take into account that these were not legal trials (rechtsstaatlich translates into constitutional). During the interrogations the accused were often threatened and sometimes, especially during trials toward the end of the 1940s, abused. As such, accusations and self incriminations must be treated with care. Statements about conditions in the camps can be partially verified and appear to be believable. It is therefore imperative that the material is compared to western investigation results.)

A mouthful, to be sure. Pohl admits that what was beaten out of the accused by the Soviets is for the most part useless; still, he wastes pages on it. As for reports on conditions in the camps, they “seem” to be believable. The last sentence is, however, what takes the cake. He writes that western investigation reports need to be consulted. What investigations? No investigation by a competent body of experts has ever been undertaken. He later mentions Andrzej Kola, who took some soil samples at Belzec. The problem with that is that whatever he claims to have found cannot be verified, since the camp has since been sanitized and the ground covered over. What was offered is bunk. Carlo Mattogno demonstrated this (http://www.vho.org/GB/Books/b/). Pohl later admits that what is claimed cannot be substantiated. He writes:

“Das größte Desiderat bleibt jedoch weiterhin die Rekonstruktion des Schicksals der Opfer. Mit der Entdeckung des Höfle-Telegramms und dessen Veröffentlichung im Jahr 2001 erscheint es möglich, wenigstens die Zahl der Opfer in den drei Lagern zu bestimmen.“

(The biggest ‘desideratum‘ remaining is to ascertain what happened to the victims. With the assistance of the Höfle telegram and its publication in 2001, it appears to be possible to at least determine the number of victims in the three camps.)

Heaven help! First he uses the term Desiderat, a word not commonly used in German. Webster’s defines this as “of desiderare; to desire; to entertain or express a wish to have or attain.” Golly gosh, why use this word when he could have used wünschenswert (“desirable”), or some such? Was it done to befuddle the issue? No doubt in my mind; what he writes is astonishing, to say the least. He admits that we don’t know what happened to the Jews, yet he turns them into “victims.” Then he follows this up by writing that finally in 2001 we became aware of some numbers, thus it is now apparently possible to know the number of “victims.” What was used before, and how is a telegram with some numbers on it evidence of mass murder?

But he is not done with his declaration of bankruptcy, he tells us:

“Lange Zeit spielten die Zeugenaussagen der sogenannten Bystander, also zumeist der Anwohner der Vernichtungslager, keine herausragende Rolle bei der Rekonstruktion der Vorgänge. Zwar haben polnische Justizbehörden vor allem unmittelbar nach dem Krieg und dann in den 1960er-Jahren auch Personen aus diesem Kreis befragt, darüber hinaus ist dies jedoch nicht systematisch betrieben worden. Das ist insofern bedauerlich, als gerade die Anwohner oft einen genauen Einblick in das Lagerleben hatten, manche polnischen Handwerker gingen gar in Vernichtungslagern ein und aus; einige der Trawniki-Männer hatten Beziehungen zu Einwohnern aus dem Dorf. Auch das Eisenbahnpersonal in den Dörfern bestand in der Mehrheit aus Einheimischen. Inzwischen kommt die Zeit für solche Befragungen an ihr Ende.“

(For a long time witness testimonies of the so-called bystanders, neighbors of the camps, were not considered when trying to reconstruct what happened. Although Polish judicial authorities did interrogate some of them after the war, and in the 1960s, but it was not done systematically. This is distressing, for those neighbors were able to observe life in the camps: some Polish tradesmen came and went; some of the foreign guards had relationships with people in the villages. The train personnel also consisted mostly of locals. But by now the time to consult them is coming to an end.)

Unbelievable, but exactly what we have been saying all along. These camps, Treblinka especially, were not hidden: the alleged killing site of Treblinka was on higher ground. And yes, locals came to sell their goods, workers entered and left the camps. At Treblinka, we are told that 880,000 Jews were killed and buried at first in huge mass graves, said graves to measure 50m x 25m by 10m deep (roughly 150′ x 75′ by 30′ deep). Digging those holes could not have been concealed, yet we have no reports, no pictures, nothing; to top it off, those huge pits have never been located. Then it was decided to exhume the bodies and burn them on pyres, with fires raging night and day. And again, not one report by the locals—no pictures, nothing. So yes, Pohl is right; there is no evidence of mass murder.

As for the alleged “murder weapon,” he writes that the exhaust of internal combustion engines was the killer. Again, no details, and here he is careful: diesel engines are mentioned, which are internal combustion engines, but they are unsuitable for mass murder.

What Pohl writes confirms the case made by revisionists. There is no evidence of mass murder in the “Aktion Reinhard(t)” camps. In fact, it was impossible to murder hundreds of thousands without anyone noticing, taking pictures, writing reports, etc. Thus we need to look for an alternative intent to understand what was meant by “Aktion Reinhard(t)”. The “t” spelling gives us our clue. Morsch et al. mention Fritz Reinhardt from the finance ministry, dismissing him of course—but why refer to him at all? When “The Holocaust” story emerged, the real Reinhardt did not fit in and was therefore dropped into a deep, black hole.

But we do have some indications that this “Aktion Reinhardt”, and I am convinced that this is the correct spelling, was an economic undertaking, originating with the finance ministry. Early publications are extremely helpful in determining how the story developed: what was written then and how it compares to what we are told now. One of those early publications provides details, the title Die Todesfabrik (The Death Factory) by the Czech Holocaust survivors Ota Kraus and Erich Kulka (Kongress-Verlag Berlin, 1958). The two arrived in Auschwitz on November 4, 1942 and were transferred to Birkenau two days later (p. 10). They were successful in organizing resistance groups, were well informed as to happenings inside the camp, and so informed the world. Again, the subject of another discussion, but in a sub-chapter of their book, titled “Aktion Reinhard” (pp. 123-126) they provide details of this action. There’s too much to discuss here, so I just copied (from pp. 124-25) portions of the testimony by Rudolf Höß during his 1947 Cracow trial:

“Welche Dimensionen diese Aktion hatte und was für ungeheure Vorteile nicht nur das Reich, sondern auch die nazistische Herrschaftsclique daraus zog, bewies am besten die Aussage des Kommandanten der Auschwitzer Lager, Rudolf Höß, während seines Prozesses:

„Unvorstellbare und nicht abzuschätzende Werte von Hunderten von Millionen sind erfaßt worden. Ungeheure Werte sind gestohlen worden von SS-Angehörigen und Polizisten, von Häftlingen, Zivilangestellten und Arbeitern, vom Bahnpersonal.Beim Entladen der angekommenen Judentransporte blieb das gesamte Gepäck auf der Rampe liegen, bis alle Juden nach den Vernichtungsstellen beziehungsweise ins Lager gebracht waren. Danach wurde durch ein besonderes Transportkommando das gesamte Gepäck in der ersten Zeit nach der Sortierstelle – Kanada I – gebracht, um dort sortiert beziehungsweise desinfiziert zu werden. Auch die Kleidung der in den Bunkern I und II bzw. Krematorien I bis IV Vergasten wurde nach der Vergasung nach der Sortierstelle gebracht.Schon 1942 war Kanada I nicht mehr in der Lage, die Sortierung laufend zu erledigen. Trotz immer wieder neu aufgestellter zusätzlicher Schuppen und Baracken, Tag- und Nachtarbeit der sortierenden Häftlinge und andauernder Verstärkung dieser Kommandos, türmte sich das noch unsortierte Gepäck, obwohl täglich mehrere Waggons, oft bis zu zwanzig, mit sortiertem Material verladen wurden. Berge von unsortiertem Gepäck türmten sich zwischen den Baracken. Die Arbeitskommandos konnten noch so verstärkt werden, während des Ablaufens der einzelnen Aktionen – die immer zirka vier bis sechs Wochen dauerten – war an ein Nachkommen nicht zu denken. Erst in längeren Pausen wurde annähernd aufgeräumt.Nach der Sortierung nach Abschluß größerer Aktionen wurden die Wertsachen und das Geld in Koffer gepackt und mit Lastwagen nach Berlin zum Wirtschaftsverwaltungshauptamt gebracht, von da zur Reichsbank. Eine besondere Abteilung der Reichsbank befaßte sich nur mit diesen Sachen aus den Judenaktionen …Das Zahngold wurde im SS-Revier von den Zahnärzten zu Barren eingeschmolzen und monatlich dem Sanitätshauptamt zugeführt…”So sah die „Aktion Reinhard” aus, (beschrieben von einer besonders maßgebenden Person, dem Kommandanten der Auschwitzer Lager.”

Just roughly: “What dimensions this action had – and the tremendous benefits arrived from it – is best described by Commandant Rudolf Höß during his trial:
“Values in the hundreds of millions were obtained, enormous amounts have been stolen.

During the unloading of the trains, the luggage was left lying on the ramp, all Jews were taken to be executed or admitted to the camp. Thereafter, the entire luggage was sorted out and disinfected in Kanada I. The clothing of those gassed in Bunker I and II, as well as in crematoria I to IV was also taken there.
By 1942 Kanada was no longer able to do the sorting. Despite the addition of new sheds and barracks, the still unsorted luggage was piled high, although several rail cars each day – often up to twenty – were loaded and left with sorted material. Mountains of unsorted luggage piled up between the huts. The work details could be enlarged, however during the individual actions – which lasted approximately four to six weeks – this was impossible.

After sorting, following the completion of a major action, the valuables and money were packed into suitcases and brought to Berlin to the Economic and Administrative Main Office, and from there to the Reichsbank. A special department of the Reichsbank now looked after these things from the Jewish actions …
The dental gold was melted down in the SS infirmary and transported monthly to the main medical office … ”

Such was the “Operation Reinhard”, as described by a particularly influential person, the commander of the Auschwitz camp…”.

The authors (K/K) then go into details, as to how many pair of shoes, dresses, etc., etc., but not one word about the “extermination” camps Belzec, Sobibor and Treblinka, the supposed “Aktion Reinhardt” camps. As for clothing etc., K/K tell us that as soon as the arrivals disappeared into the “bath,” quotation marks in the original, all their belongings were taken to be sorted. Nothing sinister here: inmates were issued prisoner’s clothing; though, whatever valuables were found were confiscated, including clothing. It also appears that some inmates carried large amounts of luggage along. We read this in A Year in Treblinka, by Yankel Wiernick:

“Jews from foreign countries brought considerable luggage with them.”

(http://www.zchor.org/treblink/wiernik.htm#chapter5)

This is confirmed in the verdict of the Treblinka trial of September 3, 1965 (this used to be available at the IDGR [Informations-Dienst Gegen Rechtsextremismus] site, unfortunately it disappeared, all I have is the copy [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Informationsdienst_gegen_Rechtsextremismus]):

“Da alle diese Personen auch noch über zum Teil recht umfangreiches Gepäck verfügten, blieb der Raum für die einzelne Person auf wenige Quadratzentimeter beschränkt.“(Since all of those persons carried considerable amounts of luggage, room for each person [in the rail cars] was at a premium). Based on this, a case for theft can perhaps be made, but not for mass murder.)

Now to what was uncovered at the IMT. The following is from “One Hundred and Ninety-Sixth Day Tuesday; 6 August 1946, Morning Session”:

“REINECKE: It is obvious from the document that Globocznik was acting in his capacity as SS and Police Leader, charged with a secret special task, the so-called “Aktion Reinhard.” He is acting solely as police executive. Any connection between this activity and the organization of the General SS or any of its members does not exist in any way…

HERR PELCKMANN: Would you look to the top of Page 3? I think that indicates quite clearly who was dealing with those matters, and on whose authority Globocznik was acting.

REINECKE: Page 3 of this document shows that the Aktion Reinhard was divided into four parts: (a) resettlement, (b) use of labor, (c) use of materials, (d) seizure of hidden values and real estate. It also shows that Globocznik was communicating with Oswald Pohl personally, as well as with Himmler, on this matter. Pohl was chief of the SS Economic and Administrative Main Office,…

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/08-06-46.asp

Okay, we read “Reinhard” with no “t”, but this could be a translation issue. But here we have what “Aktion Reinhardt” was all about: economic issues. First resettlement of those unable to work; then use of labor and material; last the seizure of valuables. Why would the Germans kill valuable laborers, desperately needed for the war effort? And no, not just women, children and old people were allegedly killed in the three camps. Yankel Wiernik writes in A Year in Treblinka: “The day I first saw men, women and children being led into the house of death I went nearly insane.”

(http://www.zchor.org/treblink/wiernik.htm#chapter5)

Now to Globocnik, mentioned by Pohl above. This again is from the verdict of the German Treblinka trial referred to before. Under II. Die Endlösung im Generalgouvernement (The final solution in the general government), regarding actions in the three Reinhardt camps we read:

“Sie wurde in diesem Bereich – wahrscheinlich in Anlehnung an den Vornamen des damaligen Chefs des Reichssicherheitshauptamtes Reinhard Heydrich – unter der Tarnbezeichnung “Aktion Reinhard” oder auch “Einsatz Reinhard” durchgeführt.“

(The covert actions undertaken under the term “Action Reinhard” or “Effort Reinhard” were possibly named after the chief of the security office of that time, Reinhard Heydrich.)

Possibly? And then again not. True, the spelling used by the ‘judges’ was that of Reinhard, but as Messrs. Morsch and Perz point out, we have two different spellings. And as can be shown, economics were the issue: the ministry of finance initiated this action, hence “Reinhardt”.

Back to the verdict: first a letter from Viktor Brack from the chancellery (and we are to believe that Hitler was not involved) to Himmler, of June 23, 1942. In this letter, and I have the wording but too long to copy here, Brack informs Himmler that he has made some of his men available to Globocnik for the implementation of this special task (für die Durchführung seiner Sonderaufgabe). He then tells Himmler that he has now added personnel so as to not get stuck should transportation issues arise. Thus, transportation was a concern, understandably so since trains were needed for the war effort. And secrecy had to be maintained, for those deportations were not popular in Germany; quite the contrary.

We then have a second letter, dated October 19, 1943 – and we need to remember that Pohl claims all documents have been destroyed – in which Globocnik informs Himmler that all camps have been dismantled. In another letter of January 1, 1944 Globocnik informs Himmler:

“Die gesamte Aktion Reinhard zerfällt in 4 Gebiete:

A) die Aussiedlung selbst

B) die Verwertung der Arbeitskraft

C) die Sachverwertung

D) die Einbringung verborgener Werte und Immobilien“

(The whole of Action Reinhard consists of four subsections: A) resettlement, B) use of labor, C) use of materials, D) seizure of hidden values and real estate.)

All of these are economic issues, but of course we must read “mass murder” into this. From the Treblinka verdict again:

“Die bei der Aktion Reinhard angefallenen und in den drei Vernichtungslagern Belzec, Sobibor und Treblinka sichergestellten Sachwerte, die dem SS-Wirtschafts- und Verwaltungshauptamt in Berlin zur Verfügung gestellt wurden, machen nach einem von Globocnik unterzeichneten, für dieses Amt in Berlin bestimmten Bericht über die verwaltungsmässige Abwicklung der Aktion Reinhard den Betrag von RM 178.745.960,59 aus, der sich wie folgt aufgliedert:…“

(The valuables recovered in the three Action Reinhard extermination [sic] camps Belzec, Sobibor and Treblinka, and made available to the administration in Berlin, are summarized in a letter signed by Globocnik and amount to RM 178.745.960,59.)

178 million plus, not bad. But we must remember that the National Socialists considered them to be ill gotten gains, illegally amassed during the existence of the Weimar Republic. No doubt innocents were affected, but, following the renewed declaration of war by World Jewry, this time from Moscow and published in November 1941 by the “Anglo-Russian Parliamentary Committee”, Hitler had no choice but to consider all of them a potential threat to national security. (H. Härtle, Freispruch für Deutschland, Verlag K.W. Schütz, Göttingen, 1956, pp. 249-255)

Conclusion

Where are they then if not murdered? This is asked repeatedly; the answer: make a solid case for mass murder and the question becomes redundant. There have been some half-hearted “investigations” conducted in Belzec and Sobibor, but what has been determined is far from convincing and impossible to confirm; the Belzec grounds have been covered. As for Treblinka, where 880,000 Jews were “murdered” according to Yad Vashem, no investigation worth the term has ever been undertaken. The Soviets during their ‘investigation’ determined that the murder weapon was a motor used to pump the air out of the building, thus the Jews mass suffocated (Mattogno, Graf, Treblinka, Extermination Camp or Transit Camp? http://www.vho.org/GB/Books/t/4.html). According to Aradt, at first 700,000 Jews were murdered and buried in huge mass graves (http://www.vho.org/GB/Books/t/5.html, chapter 10) measuring 50m x 25m by 10m deep (roughly 150′ x 75′ by 30′ deep; http://www.zchor.org/treblink/wiernik.htm#chapter3) before being exhumed and burned. Those huge mass graves have yet to be located. An English archeologist, Carolyn Sturdy Colls, offered to investigate. She writes:

“Forensic archeology is the collection of evidence for use in a legal case. This can be anything from investigating a single murder to genocide or war crimes.

It’s hard to believe that there has been no systematic search for the six million victims who perished in the Holocaust.

800,000 people were murdered here at Treblinka and their bodies were never found. It’s time we started looking.

 I’m a scientist and while I obviously feel the same emotions as everyone else when I read about the atrocities committed during the Holocaust, I need to be able to do my job objectively. So I need to shut out these emotions sometimes, and let the evidence speak for itself.

There are some very vocal Holocaust deniers who use spurious archeology to claim that the Holocaust never happened. That’s why it’s so important that we use the most up-to-date scientific techniques. This can be done, and it should be done.”

(http://www.revblog.codoh.com/2010/11/uk-forensic-archeologist-sets-out-to-refute-treblinka-deniers/)

It now appears that Sturdy Colls is taking a closer look

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2087735/British-archaeologist-discovers-fresh-evidence-mass-graves-World-War-Two-death-camp-Treblinka.html#ixzz1jrlcIibB

But, and this is from the article linked to above:

“As Jewish religious law forbids disturbing burial sites, she and her team from the University of Birmingham have used ‘ground-penetrating radar’…”

So, again no investigation which would include experts in crime investigation and diggings, but just a sort of probing to then cover it all up again. And Jewish laws only selectively forbid digging, that is, it is allowed when they are reasonably sure to find something:

http://www.haaretz.com/jewish-world/news/germany-to-excavate-suspected-holocaust-era-jewish-mass-grave-1.274439

Nothing was found here either, but that is not the issue, digging is. Why then no proper investigation, what are the promoters of the story afraid of? Why not invite experts to come and investigate if all is “obvious”? We also mustn’t forget that this is almost 70 years later, why no investigation earlier? And from what I have seen so far of what is happening at Treblinka now can not be called an investigation, more an effort to satisfy the gullible and also to keep “The Holocaust” front and center.

Therefore, unless and until a proper investigation is undertaken, by experts in the field of criminal investigations – forensic experts – using all the tools at their disposal, including digging, “Aktion Reinhardt” must be considered to have been an economic undertaking.

This morning I found several emails asking and discussing whether a recently posted YouTube video of Ronald Reagan was real. Following the links, I found a short 9 second video of Reagan supposedly questioning the six million Holocaust story.  In the short excerpt Reagan says, “I challenge your history again. There is absolutely no record that six million people were put in concentration camps. They only have 16 million to begin with.”  But something is clearly wrong with this video.

First, the excerpt is taken out of context.  What was Reagan really speaking about?  The excerpt appears like those vintage World War II photos with incorrect captions asserting that something is there in the photo when it is not. A quick examination reveals that the footage is indeed real and was taken in 1967.  But wouldn’t such footage have been used against Reagan in his various political campaigns including two for the presidency?  And, even if buried at the time, surely such footage would have come out during his controversial visit to the Waffen SS cemetery at Bitburg.  But, I have no recollection of such comments.

Today, however thanks to the power of the Internet, one is able to answer such questions in minutes.  The short clip was indeed Reagan and it was taken in 1967.  However, the topic was not the Holocaust.  In fact, during a CBS Television and Radio broadcast on May 15th hosted by Charles Collingwood, then Governor Ronald Reagan was debating aspects of the Vietnam war with then Senator Robert F. Kennedy.

Jeff Jordan asked Reagan whether he approved that the Diem regime put six million in forced prison camps and that American advisors did nothing “but help them in this.”  To which Reagan responded,

“I challenge your history again. There is absolutely no record that six million people were put in concentration camps. They only have 16 million to begin with. Now, I’d also like to challenge something else about the supposed evils of the Diem regime. I do approve of Diem’s land reform in which he took from the great mandarin holdings, and began to make land available to the peasants and to the people of Vietnam, who had never owned land before. But also, I would like to call to your attention that a team from the U.N. was sent to Saigon, Vietnam, to investigate the charges against Diem’s regime They did investigate those, but as they returned to this country, Diem was assassinated, which I think was one of the great tragedies of this whole conflict; and the United Nations report, which they declined to make official because they thought why bring anything up now that he’s been killed, has on the other hand, been published, there has been public access to it, and the United Nations report completely cleared the Diem regime of any of the charges that had been brought against him.”

And thus in minutes our 9 second clip is exposed as a complete hoax.  I certainly hope that this hoax disappears quickly from the internet and is not passed around by those who think they have found an ally in Ronald Reagan. This video post, with it’s false caption, asserting a Holocaust connection does a disservice to all interested in historical truth.  It, along with its originator, should be denounced from all quarters.

The subject of what was known about the event now referred to as The Holocaust – and when it was known – has interested me for a while. During the occurrence of this alleged event – and it is referred to as an “event” more often than a “crime” — we have no solid information as to its actual occurrence. There were some reports, but they can be dismissed as rumors. But:

“It can be shown that the intelligence services of the Western Allies had a fairly accurate picture of what was going on in Germany. This was the case even before Mr. Allan Welsh Dulles, as head of the continental branch of the OSS, went to Switzerland (November 1942) and established permanent contacts with the Underground[...]” (Hans Rothfels, The German Opposition to Hitler, Henry Regnery Company, Hinsdale, Illinois 1948, p. 20)

True, Rothfels writes about the German opposition, but that the western intelligence services were well informed as to happenings in Germany is a fact, and that includes detailed information about concentration camps. For instance, Erwin von Lahousen, a high ranking Abwehr (intelligence service) official testified at the IMT:

“We were currently informed of all happenings by our officials at the front or in the camps. Offices of the Abwehr Division III were active in these camps, and in this way, that is, through the normal service channels, we were informed by reports and oral presentation of all these measures and of their effects.” (http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/11-30-45.asp, p. 458)

And still, even though spies and traitors were everywhere, nothing of substance was known about this alleged mass murder of Jews. In fact Rothfels writes in the abovementioned book, on p. 18:

“Of course, all this changed in the spring of 1945. The unbelievable horrors which were then discovered in the liberated camps…shook the western world[...]”

Nothing during the war? The alleged horrors were only discovered after it ended? That this is impossible has been realized and is of concern, thus efforts are made to rectify it, sort of. In a news article of January 16, 2009 in Spiegel Online, re. the upcoming (2010) publishing of “Das Amt und die Vergangenheit” we read that 200,000 Germans and Austrians were directly involved in the mass killings, with another 200,000 assisting. If this was so, details about it would have been known without the assistance of the secret services, but that was not true. Most of the ‘details’ disappeared after the Nuremberg trials. Perhaps this is why we are now back to square one. In the latest publishing “Neue Studien zu Nationalsozialistischen Massentötungen durch Giftgas” (2011) we read in the introduction that: “Even when it became known following the war what had happened in the camps…”, echoing what Rothfels wrote back in 1948.

There’s no consensus here either, as is the case with all things “Holocaust.” But this is a serious issue, for if it happened it would have been known, and since nothing was known…

But assuming it did occur. But, if the “Nazis” did murder millions of Jews in gas chambers of various designs, then Germans would have known about it and the subject of guilt would certainly arise. We are aware of Goldhagen’s assertion that ordinary Germans killed Jews willingly and happily. Basically if “The Holocaust” happened, then his is the only plausible theory.

But this theory can not be substantiated and to try and find an answer I look to older books, to find out how this issue was addressed in earlier publications. One of those books, Jewish Frontier, Anthology 1934-1944 (Jewish Frontier Association, Inc. New York, 1945), contains an essay by Hannah Arendt, titled “German Guilt”. It appeared in January 1945. And it is this essay I will take a closer look at, because of Arendt’s desperate attempt at an explanation.

Arendt starts out with:

“The greater the military defeats of the Wehrmacht in the field, the greater becomes that victory of Nazi political warfare which is so often incorrectly described as mere propaganda. It is the central thesis of this Nazi political strategy that there is no difference between Nazis and Germans, that the people stand united behind the government, that all Allied hopes of finding part of the people uninfected ideologically and all appeals to a democratic Germany of the future are pure illusion…”

The fact that the majority of Germans supported Hitler and the “Nazis” (I don’t like the term, it is used in a derogatory fashion) troubles Arendt, and as an explanation she claims that “Nazi political warfare” is to blame: Germans fell for it, which is of course nonsense. Winfried Knörzer writes that following the war the “virus theory” was advanced, the virus spreading from Hitler to infect the otherwise healthy populace (W. Knörzer, Stufen der Dämonisierung in der deutschen Vergangenheitsbewältigung [stages in Germany’s attempt to deal with the past]). And, efforts are still made to come to terms with this. In August of this year The End, Hitler’s Germany, 1944-45, by Ian Kershaw, was published. And although Kershaw only deals with the last two years of National Socialism, in an article in The Observer we read:

 “…Because no one, he maintains, has tried to answer the most important question – why did the Germans keep fighting to the bitter end, long after it was clear to any rational person that the war was lost and that to prolong it would only add further destruction to Germanys cities and misery to its population? Why were Hitler’s suicidal orders still obeyed? Kershaw argues that the answers are to be found by examining the structures of rule and states of mind inside Germany at this time.”(http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/21/the-end-ian-kershaw-review)

Kershaw completely ignores the traitors in the thesis he advances. His thesis is useless. But that is not the issue here, for he clearly also tries to find an answer as to why Germans supported Hitler to the bitter end. His endeavors of explanation fall flat, but these strenuous attempts to find the answer as to why a highly advanced, civilized people could become complicit in mass murder are an indication that all is not well with the official narrative. All of them ignore the elephant in the room, i.e., what is alleged could not have happened or Germans would have found out and turned against Hitler. They stopped the euthanasia program. Also, Germans did very well in that time period and therefore knew that the war was forced on them, thus the support.

Now back to Arendt. She continues:

“The implication of this thesis is, of course, that there is no distinction as to responsibility, that German anti-Fascists will suffer from defeat equally with German Fascists, and that the Allies had made such distinctions at the beginning of the war only for propaganda purposes. A further implication is that Allied provisions for punishment of war criminals will turn out to be empty threats because they will find no one to whom the title of war criminal could not be applied.”

Guilt by association. All Germans were guilty: an early Goldhagen theory. And Arendt means what she wrote, as she continues, and this is still from the first page of her essay, p.470 in the book:

“That such claims are not mere propaganda but are supported by very real and fearful facts, we have all learned in the past seven years. The terror-organizations which were at first strictly separated from the mass of the people, admitting only persons who could show a criminal past or prove their preparedness to become criminals, have since been continually expanded…Whereas those crimes which have always been a part of the daily routine of concentration camps since the beginning of the Nazi regime were at first a jealousy guarded monopoly of the SS and Gestapo, today members of the Wehrmacht are assigned at will to duties of mass murder.”

There’s no credible evidence that crimes were committed in the camps. Nor was there any direct mention of mass murder. All of that was put together following the war and never substantiated. She ignores the brutal partisan warfare, which sometimes elicited stern countermeasures by the Wehrmacht (armed forces). In her world Germans were willing mass murderers. But it doesn’t stop there:

“These crimes were at first kept secret by every possible means and any publication of such reports was made punishable as atrocity propaganda. Later, however, such reports were spread by Nazi-organized whispering campaigns and today these crimes are openly proclaimed under the title of “measures of liquidation” in order to force “Volksgenossen” whom difficulties of organization made it impossible to induct into the “Volksgemeinschaft” of crime at least to bear the onus of complicity and awareness of what was going on.” (pp. 470/71)

And there goes the ‘Top Secret’ theory, everyone in Germany – if not complicit – knew about it. The “Nazis” made sure of it. It is hard for me to understand how a seemingly intelligent woman can spout such nonsense. The only explanation: this was a desperate attempt on her part to try and find an answer as to why the majority of Germans supported Hitler to the end. Arendt was born in Germany; she knew Germans and sensed that what later was to become known as “The Holocaust” would be a hard sell. I lived in Germany at that time. My father, who hated “Nazis,” listened to the BBC, but even he never mentioned anything about mass murder of Jews. And here we are being told that all of Germany knew about “these crimes”. Though Arendt is vague as to specifics. German officials visited Switzerland, for instance, but seem to have ‘forgotten’ to go into details about “these (alleged) crimes” when talking to foreigners. Hans Gisevius, a one time secret service official with good connections, was one of them, but never told Dulles, whom he met in Switzerland, about any mass murder of Jews, even though people like Gisevius tried to topple Hitler (Allan Welsh Dulles, Germany’s Underground, Da Capo Press, 2000, pp.125ff). In fact, Dulles never mentions anything about “The Holocaust” in his book, much to the dismay of Neal H. Petersen (Ibid, p. xxiv). Also, at the IMT at Nuremberg, not one of the high-ranking officials who should have known about what was alleged knew anything at all. Thus it was established that only 200-300 were ‘in the know’. Arendt then tells the truth, but tries hard to explain it away. From p. 471:

“In order to appreciate the decisive change of political conditions in Germany since the lost battle of Britain, one must note that until the war and even until the first military defeats only relatively small groups of active Nazis, among whom not even the Nazi sympathizers were included, and equally small numbers of active anti-Fascists really knew what was going on. All others, whether German or non-German, had the natural inclination to believe the statements of an official, universally recognized government rather than the charges of refugees, which, coming from Jews or Socialists, were suspect in any case. Even of those refugees, only a relatively small proportion knew the full truth and even a smaller fraction was prepared to bear the odium of unpopularity involved in telling the truth.’

With the “change of political conditions” she is referring to what she wrote above, Germans were turned into accomplices and willingly allowed this to happen. The important part here is that rumors were spread about “these crimes”, but since nothing could be substantiated, a given, they were dismissed. Arendt however claims that the stories were not believed because they were told by “Jews or Socialists” and that people refrained from talking about “these crimes” for fear of becoming unpopular. Nonsense is not a strong enough term, pure desperation describes it better. But she is not done. On the same page:

“As long as the Nazis expected victory, their terror organizations were strictly isolated from the people and, in time of war, from the army…It was only their defeats which forced the Nazis to abandon (p. 472) this concept and pretend to return to old nationalist slogans. The active identification of the whole German people with the Nazis was part of this trend. National Socialism’s chances of organizing an underground movement in the future depend on no-one’s being able to know any longer who is a Nazi and who is not, on there being no visible signs of distinction any longer, and above all on the victorious powers’ being convinced that there really are no differences between Germans. To bring this about, an intensified terror in Germany, which proposed to leave no person alive whose past or reputation proclaimed him an anti-Fascist, was necessary.”

One needs to read this slowly to let it sink in. We are told here again that at first “these crimes” were kept a secret. Fact is, however, that this secret was kept till the very end. But Arendt understands that if what is alleged did happen it could not have been kept secret, thus she transforms the whole of the German population, minus the anti-fascists, into accomplices. To realize this she claims terror was unleashed; this of course never happened, although because of the many foreign workers in Germany, and thus acts of sabotage, police presence had to be increased. She has to admit, however, that:

“In the first years of the war the regime was remarkably “magnanimous” to its opponents, provided they remained peaceful.”

But:

“Of late, however, countless persons have been executed even though, by reason of years without freedom of movement, they could not constitute any immediate danger to the regime.”

How would Arendt have known about this change of policy? She fled to Paris in 1933 and moved to the US in 1941. As for communists and others being a danger to the regime, they were. The National Socialists were far too lenient when they came to power. But Arendt is not done, she continues, still on p. 472:

“On the other hand, prudently foreseeing that in spite of all precautionary measures the Allies might still find a few hundred persons in each city with an irreproachable anti-Fascist record—testified to by former war prisoners or foreign laborers, and supported by records of imprisonment or concentration camp internment—the Nazis have already provided their own trusted cohorts with similar documentation and testimony, making these criteria worthless. Thus in the case of inmates of concentration camps (whose number nobody knows precisely, but which is estimated at several million), the Nazis can safely either liquidate them or let them escape: in the improbable event of their survival (a massacre of the type which already occurred in Buchenwald is not even punishable under the war crimes provisions)—it will not be possible to identify them unmistakably.”

One has to marvel at those clever “Nazis”, providing their followers with documentation to show that nothing happened. She has it right of course, the documentation discovered does not prove that “The Holocaust” happened, but these are original documents, not forgeries to influence public opinion. As for murdering all the inmates, that also did not happen, the world was full of “survivors” after the war, in fact still is and I have no idea what the reference to Buchenwald is all about.

As for good and bad Germans, Arendt has this to say on p. 473:

“The most extreme slogan which this war has evoked among the Allies, that the only “good German” is a “dead German,” has this much basis in fact: the only way in which we can identify an anti-Nazi is when the Nazis have hanged him. There is no other reliable token.”

Incredible, but she is only warming up:

“These are the real political conditions which underlie the charge of the collective guilt of the German people. They are the consequences of a policy which, in the deepest sense, is a- and anti-national; which is entirely determined that there shall be a German people only if it is in the power of its present rulers; and which will rejoice as at its greatest victory if the defeat of the Nazis involves with it the physical destruction of the German people. The totalitarian policy, which has completely destroyed the neutral zone in which the daily life of human beings is ordinarily lived, has achieved the result of making the existence of each individual in Germany depend either upon committing crimes or on complicity in crimes.”

Words fail me. According to this person, obviously filled with hate, existence in Germany depended on complicity in crimes, and Germans either become “Nazis” and murderers or they deserved to die. As for propaganda:

“The success of Nazi propaganda in Allied countries, as expressed in the attitude commonly called Vansittartism, is a secondary matter in comparison. It is a product of general war propaganda, and something quite apart from the specific modern political phenomenon described above.”

Allied propaganda, i.e., Vansittartism which was dripping with hatred, was ineffective when compared to “Nazi” propaganda, but it gets worse. On pp. 473/74 we read:

“But even the best-intended discussions between the defenders of the “good Germans” and the accusers of the “bad” not only miss the essence of the question—they plainly fail to apprehend the magnitude of the catastrophe. Either they are betrayed into trivial general comments on good and bad people, and into a fantastic over-estimation of the power of education, or they simply adopt an inverted version of Nazi racial theory. There is a certain danger in all this only because, since Churchill’s famous statement on the subject, the Allies have refrained from fighting an ideological war and have thus unconsciously given an advantage to the Nazis”.

Aha, no ideological warfare by the Allies. They fought “the good war.” To stay with German guilt:

“The true problem however is not to prove what is self-evident, namely that Germans have not been potential Nazis ever since Tacitus’ times, nor what is impossible, that all Germans harbor Nazi views. It is rather to consider how to conduct ourselves and how to bear the trial of confronting a people among whom the boundaries dividing criminals from normal persons, the guilty from the innocent, have been so completely effaced that nobody will be able to tell in Germany whether in any case he is dealing with a secret hero or with a former mass murderer.”

No comment, but she seems to waver a bit later on. From pp. 474/75:

“Among the responsible in a broader sense must be included all those who continued sympathetic to Hitler as long as it was possible, who aided his rise to power, and who applauded him in Germany and in other European countries…Yet these people, who were co-responsible for Hitler’s crimes in a broader sense, did not incur any guilt in a stricter sense. They, who were the Nazis’ first accomplices and their best aides, truly did not know what they were doing nor with whom they were dealing.”

Innocent accomplices? This is exactly what she is implying, claiming that although Germans were made aware of the crimes, they somehow did not consider them to be crimes. This yarn is spun ’till today. In “Death Dealer. The Memoirs of the SS Kommandant at Auschwitz”, concerning the alleged confession written by commandant Höß, the translators/authors write:

“It is only at the end of his autobiography, written almost two years after the war had ended, that the moral implications of what Hoess did occurred to him and began to affect him consciously”.

Hard to believe anyone can write this, or in the case of Arendt suggest it. But, she has more to say on this subject, after she told us that starving “of seventy to eighty million Germans” would “simply mean that the ideology of the Nazis had won” she continues on pp. 475/76:

“Just as there is no political solution within human capacity for the crime of administrative mass murder, so the human need for justice can find no satisfactory reply to the total mobilization of a people for that purpose. Where all are guilty, nobody in the last analysis can be judged.*

* That German refugees, who had the good fortune either to be Jews or to have been persecuted by the Gestapo early enough, have been saved from this guilt is of course not their merit. Because they know this and because their horror at which might have been still haunts them, they often introduce into discussions of this kind that insufferable tone of self-righteousness which frequently and particularly among Jews, can turn into the vulgar obverse of Nazi doctrines; and in fact already has.”

She spares no one and goes into detail:

“For that guilt is not accompanied by even the mere appearance, the mere pretense of responsibility. So long as punishment is the right of the criminal—and this paradigm has for more than two thousand years been the basis of the sense of justice and right of Occidental man—guilt implies the consciousness of guilt, and punishment evidence that the criminal is a responsible person. How it is in this matter has been well described by an American correspondent, in a story whose dialogue material is worthy of the imagination and creative power of a great poet.

Q. Did you kill people in the camp? A. Yes.

Q. Did you poison them with gas? A. Yes.

Q. Did you bury them alive? A. It sometimes happened.

Q. Were the victims picked from all over Europe? A. I suppose so.

Q. Did you personally help kill people? A. Absolutely not. I was only paymaster in the camp.

Q. What did you think of what was going on? A. It was bad at first but we got used to it.

Q. Do you know the Russians will hang you? A. (Bursting into tears) Why should they? What have I done? (Italics mine. PM, Sunday, Nov. 12, 1944.)”

No mention of Jews, just people, the Jewish “Holocaust” was invented later. Arendt continues along the same lines and for her, Himmler was the arch villain. We learn that:

“Heinrich Himmler is not one of those intellectuals stemming from the dim No-Man’s Land between the Bohemian and the Pimp, whose significance in the composition of the Nazi elite has been repeatedly stressed of late. He is neither a Bohemian like Goebbels, nor a sex criminal like Streicher, nor a perverted fanatic like Hitler, nor an adventurer like Goering. He is a “bourgeois” with all the outer aspect of respectability, all the habits of a good paterfamilias who does not betray his wife and anxiously seeks to secure a decent future for his children; and he has consciously built up his newest terror organization, covering the whole country, on the assumption that most people are not Bohemians nor fanatics, nor adventurers, nor sex maniacs, nor sadists, but, first and foremost job-holders, and good family-men”.

The “Banality of Evil” as she would term it later, ordinary people turning into mass murderers, (allegedly) committing crimes of an immensity that boggles the mind, but without realizing that they were doing wrong. Some might say: Oh well, this was written in 1945, we now know much more. To them I reply: A crime of that enormity, had it happened, could not have been kept secret. But, nothing of substance was known about it during or shortly after its alleged occurrence; no investigation by experts in crime investigations was ever undertaken. Why not? Because what is alleged never happened, and the mental contortions of Arendt are evidence of that. If facts about this alleged crime had been available, then there would have been no need for these daring mental gymnastics performed by Hannah Arendt.

Inconvenient History Volume 2 contains all the content from our 4 issues from 2010. You will receive a hardbound book with the Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter issues of Inconvenient History.

This volume is jam-packed with hard-hitting revisionism. You’ll get Thomas Dalton’s Goebbels on the Jews, Carlo Mattogno’s The Truth about the Gas Chambers, Paul Grubach’s Non Jewish Stake in the Holocaust Mythology, Joseph Bishop’s Atomic War Crimes, Thomas Kues’ Evidence for the Presence of “Gassed” Jews in the Occupied Eastern Terrorities, Carlo Mattogno’s Origins and Functions of the Birkenau Camp, Joseph Bellinger’s The Lethal Liberation of Bergen-Belsen, Thomas Kues’ A Chronicle of Holocaust Revisionism Part 3 (1956-1960), Paul Grubach’s Christianity, Judaism and German National Socialism: Revisionism Confronts the Theology of Susannah Heschel, Joseph Bishop’s Katyn: Unanswered Questions, Frederic Freeman’s Going Underground: ‘Catacomb Revisionist’ and Revisionist Repression, Thomas Kues’ Halfway between Reality and Myth: ‘Hitler’s Ten-Year War on the Jews’ Reconsidered and Jett Rucker’s Joe Sobran: Relegated Champion.  But that’s not all!  You’ll get all of our challenging editorials, groundbreaking book reviews, commentary and our popular Profiles in History series.  No revisionist library is complete without this volume.

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