About Soviet spy rings operating in Germany, foremost “The Red Orchestra”.

Communism, as a form of government, can not co-exist with other forms of government, especially capitalist-, imperialist in Soviet slogan, democracies, V. Suvorov (W. B. Resun) explains in his “Stalins verhinderter Erstschlag”. This is why borders of communist countries were closed, no comparison allowed, only a selected few able to visit “The Capitalist West”.

The slogan: “Proletarians of the world, unite!” was intended to mean-, following the Bolshevik October revolution in Russia, “under Soviet banner”. That world domination was the goal is made clear when looking at that Soviet banner, with hammer and sickle superimposed over the globe. Also, Lenin and later Stalin, never made a secret of this intent, Stalin in his oath at Lenin’s funeral promised to “…solidify and expand the Union of Soviet Republics” (Suvorov, p.80). Germany was meant to play a leading role, Prof. Nolte provides details in “Der Europäische Bürgerkrieg 1917-1945” (The European civil war 1917-1945).

Communist ideology had many followers in Europe, including, of course, Germany. As mentioned in the preamble, almost 6 million Germans voted communist (KPD) in the November 1932 election, this translating into 100 seats in the Reichstag, the German parliament (Tony Howard, Twentieth Century History, p.93). Thus, the Soviets had support and through the Comintern (Communist International) made use of it. When Hitler came to power, many communist leaders were arrested, but the infrastructure, the Cadres, were never totally dismantled, remained largely intact. After the initial shock, those Cadres rebuild, operating in strict secrecy, independent from each other and not openly as communists, and were very effective in the opposition movement (Hans Rothfels, “Die Deutsche Opposition Gegen Hitler”, pp.59 ff).

The book “Deadly Illusions”, by John Costello and Oleg Tsarev, provides valuable information on Soviet spy organizations in Germany and elsewhere in Europe. O. Tsarev, as a KGB officer, had access to secret files, those files made available, partially, under Glasnost. The book is about Soviet master spy Alexander Mikhailovich Orlov, real name Leiba Lazarevich Feldbin, born into a family of Ashkenazim Jews (pp.13/4), but as mentioned gives a good overview of all operations, starting with the Comintern. From pp.44/5:

“The Comintern, as it was termed in Soviet Jargon, had been Trotsky’s brainchild. Set up under the chairmanship of Grigory Zinoviev, it had been packed by Moscow with international Communists eager to execute Lenin’s grand design for Comintern to ignite national Communist parties in a chain-reaction global revolution. But the collapse of the Communist insurrection in Germany in 1923, which Zinoviev had precipitately ordered, proved only the most glaring demonstration of the stubborn refusal of the international Proletariat to combust spontaneously. Nor had Comintern proved any more successful when it came to handling espionage[…]”

Thus, the first attempts at inspiring a “spontaneous” uprising of the international Proletariat, German Proletariat in particular, failed. But, Germany was the key to the envisioned communist Europe, according to Lenin, and all this failure did was force the Soviets to reorganize their efforts, and that they did. First, the Comintern was taken over, from July 1923 to July 1934, by the OGPU (Obyedinyonnoye Gosudarstvennoye Politicheskoye Upravleniye – Unified State Political Administration). From pp.47 ff:

“As the OGPU representative in France, Orlov commanded one of the largest Soviet intelligence networks in Europe, outside Berlin[…]When Orlov arrived at the Soviet Embassy (in Paris 1926. Wilf)[…]the OGPU was in the final stages of taking over the intelligence functions and “active measures” that had formerly been carried out through the Comintern network. They included penetration and provocation operations, the cultivation of sympathetic Communists as informers and running active agents. According to Orlov, misinformation – or disinformation as it is now called – was also on an OGPU rezident’s (Rezident – Soviet intelligence service station chief) agenda (Orlov, A Handbook of Counter-Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare, p.21)[…]”

Tsarev also discovered info about the Heß flight and published it on May 13.1990 in “Trud”, at that time a large Soviet newspaper. But, this was not well received by historians. Tsarev writes, p.xv: “Not only was there an inherent disinclination to believe intelligence in the Soviet intelligence files, but many historians had build their reputation on what they had written and I realized how strongly they would resist accepting a new theory[…]”. Tsarev also admits that many files are still inaccessible, it remains to be seen how historians, who “…had build their reputation on what they had written “ will react when they are made available. This as an aside, back to the spies.

Many more makeovers of the Soviet intelligence agency followed, the aim remained the same, “cultivation of sympathetic Communists” as agents, etc. Those efforts were very successful in Germany, the Red Orchestra one of its creations. Louis Kilzer in his “Hitler’s Traitor” tackles this subject, as does V. E. Tarrant in “The Red Orchestra”. Other authors have also provided information, the aforementioned book by Costello/Tsarev (C/T) deals with the topic, all be it in passing. I consider the latter to be the best source, because of Tsarev’s access to KGB files, Oleg being an insider. In chapter 3, “Industrial Help, Not Espionage” C/T show how successful the Soviets were in obtaining German technology secrets, from IG-Farben, Krupp, Rheinmetall, Borsig, Mannesmann, AEG and Siemens, as well as others (p.57 f). All this achieved “…with the help of trusted members of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD)” (p.59). This practice of operating through the various Soviet trade organizations which opened in the 1920s, closely tied to Soviet Embassies, was later abandoned because of various scandals involving Soviet “diplomats”, who were in fact industrial spies. Also later, when German agents were groomed for service by the Soviets, people who had no connection to the KPD-, who had no record of being communist sympathizers-, were preferred (much the same in Britain and elsewhere in Europe).

In chapter 4, “Dangerous Guesswork”, we find the beginnings of The Red Orchestra, C/T write, p.73:

“THE BERLIN SECTION of the Rote Kapelle had its genesis, according to the Soviet records, in the visit of a pro-Communist delegation of German academics to Moscow in August 1932[...]The secretary of this pro-Soviet group, which had been formed on the pretext of studying the planned economy of the USSR under the banner of Arbeitsgemeinschaft zum Studium der Sowjetrussichen or ARPLAN for short, was a thirty-one-year-old academic named Arvid Harnack[…]”

Not Tarrant nor Kilzer go back that far, the former beginning with the start of Barbarossa, the latter a little earlier. But this shows how early and under what circumstances traitors/spies were recruited, making it nearly impossible for any government to ferret them out. From pp. 73/74:

“[…]Arvid Harnack… left his unit (Freikorps. Wilf) in order to pursue a belated academic career, graduating four years later with distinction in legal studies[…]By 1931 Harnack and his wife had become committed Marxists. After studying the history of Lenin’s plan for building a Socialist state in the USSR, he had completed the transition from right-wing patriot to fervent, if not openly avowed, Communist[…]In common with many German intellectuals in the decade before Hitler came to power, Harnack chose not to wear his Communist political sympathies on his sleeve by openly joining the KPD (Kommunistische Partei Deutschland). Instead he became a member of the ARPLAN Society and a year later, in 1931, joined the Bund Geistiger Berufe (BGB), the so-called Union of Intellectual Professionals, one of the “cover” organizations set up by the KPD to extend its influence among academics, scientists and civil servants. According to a contemporary report received by the OGPU from Comintern sources, the BGB had been formed with the aim of “spreading ideological influence in those circles of the intelligentsia that, for various reasons, were hesitant to join a mass movement”[…]”

In April 1935, Harnack “joined the staff of the Ministry of the Economy”(p.74) and later on that year he agreed to become a NKVD informant, with “Balt”(later “Corsican”), his code name. Harnack was encouraged, by his first control officer Alexander Belkin, to establish “…a cast-iron cover for his underground activities” (p.75). He did this by joining the National Socialist Union of Lawyers and managed to become a member of the Herren Club, an exclusive circle of manufacturers, aristocrats, high ranking officers of the army, navy and air force, the latter providing valuable information, which Harnack passed on to Moscow via Belkin. Names are listed by C/T(p.77), names of prominent members of German society as well as the armed forces, including code names of those who worked for the Soviets. Harnack’s build up of his network was aided by Willy Lehman, a Gestapo officer and also a Soviet agent.

Contact to Moscow was interrupted in the summer of 1938, the reason Stalin’s purge of the NKVD, but re-established on September 17.1940, when Alexander Erdberg, nay Alexander Korotkov, knocked on Harnack’s door. At that time, as the KGB Corsican file shows, “…Harnack’s network had grown to encompass sixty strategically placed sources(p.80 )[…]”. From pp.80/81:

“Corsican[…]continued his proselytising work among the intelligentsia along the established lines of the BGB, avoiding any connection to the KPD[…]At present, within the larger circle, centres have been formed, each of which is dedicated to the education and training of a small group. Although CORSICAN himself cannot personally vouch for every person, every one of these sixty people, the whole network is
drawn exclusively from people who have the same background, think alike and come from the same social strata[…]CORSICAN himself tries to remain in the background although he is at the heart of the organization. The aim of them all is to prepare personnel to occupy administrative posts [in the German Government] after the coup d’etat. CORSICAN himself has had no contact with the Communist Party.
(Corsican file No. 34118, Vol. 1, p.108)[…]”

The aim of the Harnack group was to overthrow Hitler’s government, to use the Soviet Union as a means to that end. This “aroused concern” at Moscow Centre, but was eventually accepted for: “…Harnack would never have agreed to abandon his crusade against Hitler simply to become a channel for the transmission of the secrets of the Third Reich to the USSR[…](p.81)”. Harnack later send detailed plans about the buildup of German forces, prior to Barbarossa, to Moscow, as well as other information.

Now to the next Berlin group within the Red Orchestra, German officials never realizing just how extensive the Soviet spy ring was. From pp.82 ff:

“[…]Corsican’s file shows that the flow of accurate military information on German preparations for war against the Soviet Union increased dramatically after December 1940, when Harnack recruited a Luftwaffe lieutenant into his network. This important new source was Harro Schulze-Boysen[…]”

Harro, great-nephew and a godson of Admiral von Tirpitz, thus well connected, who had studied law and politics at the Universities of Freiburg and Berlin, embraced communism early on. He published an anti-Nazi magazine, “Der Gegner” (The Opponent), was arrested in 1934 and freed through the intervention of Göring, a close family friend. Harro, on Göring’s recommendation, enrolled in the School of Transport Aviation and later was posted in the Air Ministry, pursuing a career in Luftwaffe counter-intelligence. In 1936 he married Libertas, grand-daughter of Count Oldenburg und Hertfeld. Libertas also hated the Nazis and helped her husband “wholeheartedly”. Another list of names follows, men in high positions and members of Harro’s circle, among them counter-intelligence chief in the air ministry Gertz, as well as Major Gregor, liaison officer to Göring and also a communist. At the time Harnack and Harro agreed to co-operate, Harro headed a group of twenty (Through Harnack’s cousin, contact was established to Goerdeler, head of another large group of traitors/opponents). Harro also established contact with playwright Adam Kuckhoff, whose circle included (p.84):

“[…]Adolf Grimme, a leading Social Democrat and associate of the trade unionist named Wilhelm Leischer, whose own underground opposition group included Berlin’s Polizei-Präsident Graf Wolf von Helldorf[…] (Corsican File No. 34118, Vol I, p.327)[…]His network became the third major element in the Berlin section of the Rote Kapelle[…]”

In Appendix I, C/T give a list of Most Significant Messages relayed to Moscow in the six month before Barbarossa. Appendix II is titled “The Corsican and Senior Networks after June 1941”, providing details about the Red Orchestra and other anti-Hitler groups. It would make this too long to copy all of it, so, just portions of the last two paragraphs, p.405:

“One telling indication of the size and scope of the Soviet intelligence networks which had operated in Berlin was that the Gestapo round-up in 1942 resulted in the arrest of 130 members of the Berlin Rote Kapelle networks[…](Rote Kapelle File No. 80607, Vol. 6, p.17 RISA)
Soviet records show that the Gestapo round-up accounted for less than half the Underground membership of their CORSICAN, SENIOR and OLD MAN networks. The NKVD files indicate that the total figure for their Rote Kapelle networks came to close to 400 members, including a network in Hamburg, which was headed by Germans named Robert Abshagen, Franz Jacob and Bernhard Bästlein[…]”

Tarrant goes into detail about the Harnack/Schulze-Boysen groups and the arrests of some of the members. He shows that the Soviets had placed spies in many countries, including Belgium and France and that those circles were connected. Impossible to tell how many were spying for the Soviets. Tsarev writes that even today, aside from the fact that access to many archives is restricted again, it would be almost impossible to get that information, because of how files are archived. In footnote 15, p. 432, we read:

“[…]An occasional check on a name in registry would point to certain pages in these files, and then only those individual pages would be shown to the officer who would not have grasped the full dimensions”

Tsarev refers to the Orlov file here, but writes that this was/is generally the case.

And now a little from “Hitler’s Traitor”, by Louis Kilzer. Kilzer adds more names to the already impressive list of spies working for the Soviet Union, as well as names of other opponents. When Leopold Trepper, “Le Grand Chef” of one of the spy networks was arrested by the Gestapo (he later escaped), while keeping a dentist appointment, the Germans set him up in the “funkspiel”. Trepper was told to relay information to Moscow, via short wave, “funk”. This information was provided by people like Walter Schellenberg, intelligence chief of the SD, Heinrich Müller, Gestapo chief, as well as others. Kilzer claims that the information send was genuine, Schellenberg, Müller & Co. traitors, because the Soviets would have found out if it was bogus. But this gets me into the traitor issue, subject of the next article, so, back to the spies.

According to Kilzer, perhaps the most effective Soviet spy ring operated out of Switzerland, “Gisela’s Family in Switzerland”(p.23). Maria Poliakova, one of her code names “Gisela”, had assembled this group. Poliakova was made spy master, by the Soviets, during the second world war. Her “family” was extensive, here are some names as provided by Kilzer. BTW, this network was never put out of action completely.

Rachel Dübendorfer, code name “Sissy”, controlled Rudolf Rössler, known as “Lucy” during the war (she received information from at least 17 sources, p.71). Aleksandr Foote, code name “Jim” (and others), wireless transmitter for the Red Army operations in Switzerland (pp.31 ff). Ursula Hamburger, code name “Sonia” (Hamburger was in charge of sabotage against Germany prior to the German-Soviet pact. She had planned the Alexander Foote assassination attempt of Hitler. Later, she handled the Manhattan Project spy Klaus Fuchs for Soviet intelligence, pp.26-28). Alexander Rado, code name “Dora”, administrative head of the Rote Drei in Switzerland (pp.20-21). Rudolf Rössler, code name “Lucy”, provided the bulk of the information (pp.3 ff).

Many more names supplied, but “Lucy” was the most efficient informant, because he received his information from “Werther”. A little about “Lucy”. Rudolf Rössler was a German journalist, who on the initiative of Rosenberg lost his job as manager of the Bühnenvolksbund (Theatre group), moved to Switzerland in 1933 and “…was transformed into a fervent anti-fascist” (Tarrant, p.158). At the start of Barbarossa, he was 44 years old, the Soviets paid him 7,000 Swiss Franks a month, a “millionaire’s wage”, according to Kilzer (p.3). The information provided by “Lucy” helped the Soviets win the war, Kilzer leaves no doubt.

As mentioned, “Lucy’s” source was “Werther”, and who was he? Kilzer makes a case for Bormann being Werther, Tarrant believes Lieutenant-General Thiele, second in command of the communications department of the German High Command, send the information to “Lucy”, provided, in part, by General Erich Fellgiebel, who was “…part of the conspiracy to overthrow Hitler” (Tarrant, p.160). A third possibility has surfaced, Oberleutnant (first lieutenant) d.R. Dr. Wilhelm Scheidt. This reserve officer had access to all the information and with the help of two female radio operators (Nachrichtenhelferinnen) the vital parts were passed on to “Lucy”. Scheidt had written a dissertation on Goethe’s “Werther”, thus his code name (Bernd Ruland, “Die Augen Moskaus”). Regardless of who it was, it was someone privy to highly classified information. And that information was up to date, from Kilzer, p.266:

“As early as 1949, accounts of the Lucy ring began appearing after French journalists interviewed Foote. ‘Lucy,” he told them, “was able rapidly to obtain intelligence of the highest secrecy. Between the time when the German General Staff made a decision and the time when the Center was informed of it there elapsed scarcely 24 hours—that is to say, hardly more than the time needed to code and decode the message in question. In order to act so quickly, Lucy must be able to maintain contact with the German high command”(RG [U.S National Record Group and archivist’s coordinate] 319, Box 60, Vol.1). General Halder concurred. He declared in dismay to Der Spiegel: “Almost every offensive operation of ours was betrayed to the enemy even before it appeared on my desk.”[…]”

Conclusion.

It is clear that, with all those spies and traitors present in Germany and elsewhere, listening in and reporting, it would have been impossible to keep anything a secret. Heinrich Härtle, in his “Deutsche und Juden”, quotes minister Dr. Ohnesorge telling his friend Dr. Goldmann that since 1936 it has been impossible to have a plenary session of the parliament, because whatever was discussed would have been broadcast in England in the evening news. The communist sympathizers working directly for the Soviets, as well as the opponents/traitors, were looking for a way to discredit Hitler. Hitler was very popular with the common Volk, the NSdAP, the Nationalist “Workers” Party a party of the little people. The so-called intelligentsia, for the most part, had no use for that party and worked tirelessly to find a way to try and show the Germans that Hitler & Co. were criminals.

This then brings me to the Elephant in the living room, “The Holocaust”. With that many people involved in spying and treachery, and the fact that the mass murder of 6 million Jews could not have been kept a secret, why was no effort made to obtain details of this, alleged, mass murder, those details then made public in Germany and forwarded to Moscow or London? This was also an issue at the IMT, because most high ranking German officers, who should have known about this alleged mass murder of Jews, never heard of it. This is when the “only a few in the know” canard was invented. I already quoted Dr. Kaufmann and the 200-300, form July 9.1946, here is what Dr. Seidl had to say two days later, on July 11. http://avalon.law.yale.edy/imt/07-11-46.asp :

“In regard to the latter (the final solution. Wilf) it may be said here, on the basis of the testimony given by the witnesses Wisliceny and Hoess and of the documents presented by the Prosecution, that these measures were undertaken on Hitler’s express orders and that only a small circle of persons was concerned in their execution. This small circle was confined in the main to a few SS leaders of Department IVA, 4b of the RSHA and the personnel of the concentration camps that had been selected for the purpose.”

It is now admitted that at least 400 000 were directly involved in the alleged killings (“Spiegel” article of October 3.2008. http://einestages.spiegel.de/static/topicalbumbackground/1564/_ich_zielte_ruhig_auf_die_saeuglinge.html),

With that many in the know and the sites fairly easy accessible, why then were no details known? I have a list, compiled by a historian, detailing what was known about Auschwitz up to its liberation in January 1945. The list contains 12 items, 3 of them pertaining to Vrba-Wetzler who were discredited in the Zündel trial, leaving 9 dubious items, rumors at best, nothing of substance. Less was known about the AR-Camps.

There is another issue. Quite a few of the spies were Jewish, among them Trepper, Rado, Poliakova, Dübendorfer. The forced deportations of Jews to camps and ghettos was not a secret, efforts were made to keep it that, but they were in vain for obvious reasons. Is it not more than reasonable to assume that the Jewish members of the spy rings would have tried everything to find out what was happening to their brethren? Dübendorfer (D) was, according to Kilzer and he provides examples, perhaps the most independent minded of them all. When in 1943 D was unable to pass on information, in desperation she contacted a friend, Hermina Rabinowitch at the ILO (International Labor Office) in Montreal (another Soviet agent, Christian Schneider, worked as a translator for the ILO in Switzerland already in 1941). In 1943, Prof. Eugene Kulischer, working for the ILO in Montreal, published his work “The Displacement of Population in Europe”, which included data up to the middle of 1943. In this work, Kulischer devotes a whole chapter to “The Expulsion and Deportation of Jews” (p.96), yet, not one word of mass murder. D would have known about the mass murder, if it then happened, and would have send this information to her friend Hermina to have it passed on to their fellow Jew Kulischer.

Moscow knew nothing, or they would have made it public. In the Moscow Declaration of October 30.1943, not one word about “The Holocaust”. Sure, “Hitlerite atrocities” are mentioned, yet no details given. But with that many people having access to all sorts of information and passing it on, with 400 000 directly involved in the alleged mass murder, if “The Holocaust” would have happened, the Soviets, as well as the rest of the world, would have known about it from very early on. In fact , this is admitted to by Messrs. Rieger and Sagalowitz who rightly surmised that “Murder on such a gigantic scale could not possibly be hidden for long” (W. Laqueur, W. Breitman “Breaking the Silence”, p.140).

For me, the lack of information regarding “The Holocaust” at the time of it allegedly happening, 1941/42 to 1944 (?), is prove positive that what is alleged did not happen. If it did, details would have been known from very early on, Germans would have risen up and stopped it just as the euthanasia program had been stopped because of public pressure. Also, the Vatican was very well informed about all what happened in Germany and the occupied countries, but nary a word from Pius XII, other than some generalities based on rumors. But that will be an issue addressed separately.

Wilfried Heink

Allan Welsh Dulles was stationed in Switzerland from November 1942 to the end of WWII, as OSS chief to co-ordinate the activities of the German opposition (OSS=Office of Strategic Services, US intelligence agency formed during WWII). He wrote a book about his experiences, titled “Germany’s Underground. The Anti-Nazi Resistance”. Even though he was in contact with most of the leading opponents of Hitler, including Bernd Gisevius who stated at the IMT that the Abwehr knew what was happening in the concentration camps, we find not one word about the alleged mass murder of Jews in his book. Peter Hoffmann, who wrote the Introduction, tells us that Dulles was also informed by a leading German industrialist, Dr. Eduard Schulte, about “The Holocaust”, referring to a book by Walter Laqueur and Richard Breitman, “Breaking the Silence”(Simon and Schuster, New York, 1986). Here is their story.

In 1925 Eduard Schulte was appointed chief executive officer of Giesche, one of Germany’s leading mining firms, headquartered in Breslau. Before WWI, the companies worth had been estimated at more that $100 million. Following the war, part of it became Polish, the German part concentrating on mining, smelting and refining zinc (p.28). In the 1930s the company was once again one of the bigger concerns and Schulte, as its CEO, an influential person. There was an American angle to all of this, as the majority of the shares of the Polish half of Giesche had been sold to Harriman and Company and Anaconda Copper, who formed the Silesian-American Corporation of Wilmington, Delaware (p.44).

For Eduard Schulte June 17,1942 started like any other day. He began it at the desk in his Breslau (Wroclaw) office, studying the newspapers, when the director of production, Otto Fitzner, entered his office, and:

“Lowering his voice, Fitzner said that a very important visitor was expected later that day. “Who is it?” Schulte asked. “Himmler.” Schulte was startled and apprehensive until Fitzner assured him that the leader of the SS and chief of all German police forces had no intention of inspecting the Giesche works. He had some important business in the vicinity, apparently in Auschwitz. Fitzner could not tell Schulte more at the moment.”(p.12)

This then the well known visit of Himmler to Auschwitz of June 17-18,1942. Question is, what had Himmler’s visit to Auschwitz, more than 200km away, to do with Schulte in Breslau and why would Schulte be apprehensive? We have Himmler’s Dienstkalender (itinerary), from which we know that he arrived in Kattowitz (Katowice) at 15:15 and was taken from there to Auschwitz, going nowhere near Breslau. Then an p.13 we read:

“There was a concentration camp in Auschwitz, consisting mainly of old Austrian army barracks, but even this camp was not particularly distinguished. There were dozens of such camps in Greater Germany, and until 1942 some were considerably bigger. Himmler, furthermore, had never shown particular interest in inspecting them. In fact, he regarded this as the least pleasant part of his duties, and usually avoided it.
Schulte’s curiosity grew when he was told the following day that Himmler’s was not a short inspection tour of an hour or two; the head of the SS was staying on. The visit, as Schulte saw it, did not make sense.
News in the Upper Silesian mining region traveled fast. On the evening of July 17 Schulte already knew a little more about the visit, for on that evening, Himmler attended a dinner party given by Bracht, the Nazi Gauleiter, or party chief, of Upper Silesia. After dinner in Auschwitz the party moved on to the Gauleiters villa in a forest near Kattowitz. The villa happened to belong to the Company of which Schulte was general manager.”

The Bracht dinner is recorded in the itinerary, so the only news here is that the villa Bracht lived in belonged to Giesche. What of it? It is good business practice to get cosy with the higher ups and Schulte was no exception. Himmler arrived at 3:15 in the afternoon and Schulte claims to have known “a little more” about his visit on the same evening. Fact is, Schulte did not meet Himmler, and here is when the make believe starts:

“Within a week and a half after Himmler’s second visit to Auschwitz, Schulte became aware of the purpose of all this activity. He found out that an important decision had been made by Hitler and was about to be executed. Schulte, unlike his deputy Fitzner, was not a Nazi. In fact, unknown to all but those closest to him, he was consumed by a passionate hatred of Nazism. He was utterly convinced that the Nazis would bring about the ruin of Germany. He thought the Nazi leadership capable of committing any conceivable crime or folly. But the secret Nazi plans for Auschwitz and other camps that became known to a few people during the last week of July were so horrendous that even Schulte, who in his circle of close friends would refer to Hitler as “that madman,” hesitated for a moment. Surely, they would not dare . . .
The news Schulte learned shed new and ghastly light on the true fate of the Jews. He had listened, like everyone else, to the speeches in which Hitler had promised that he would eliminate European Jewry. But the term “elimination” could be interpreted in various ways. It could mean, for instance, resettling them in Madagascar, as some had proposed. Almost no one, not even a committed anti-Nazi like Schulte, believed that “elimination” should be understood literally”(p.15).

Schulte “found out”, but was not present himself when said decision was made. The authors do not inform us as to who told him and what he was told. According to this the decision to murder the Jews was made in Summer 1942, contradicting historians who give a variety of dates but none as late as that (It is alleged that Himmler witnesses a gassing of Jews on that visit, but that would of course not fit into the Laqueur/Breitman tale since according to them the decision to murder the Jews had just been made). What we do know about this visit is that Himmler ordered the camp to be expanded to eventually hold 200 000 inmates. Thus indeed, a decision had been made. The last part is interesting, however. This is plainly about the word “ausrotten”, translated as “elimination”. Schulte admits that the word had different meanings, “it could mean, for instance, resettling…”. Which is absolutely true. The question is how Schulte found out that now the word meant physical elimination, murder. The authors skip over this essential issue and on pp.15-16 continue:

“No one had seen a written order. Instructions were passed on by word of mouth on the basis of the “need-to-know” principle, which now, more than forty years later, makes it difficult to establish with absolute certainty who learned what from whom and at what date. All we do know for certain is that among those who learned the secret one exceptionally courageous man took the next train to Zurich to warn the Jews and the rest of the world that measures must be taken to prevent the mass murder. Why did Eduard Schulte act as he did, risking his life, when all others kept silent?” (Interviews with Dr. Albrecht Jung, Bad Homburg; Dr. Arthur Burkhardt, Stuttgart; and Dr. Wilhelm Grünfeld, Zurich. Also Eduard Schulte’s notarized affidavit in Zurich, 25 July 1945, NA RG #84, Zurich Confidential File 1945, Box 2386, 800. Hoess, Autobiography, 195-97)[…]”

If the sources listed provide information on how Schulte was informed, by whom and what exactly he was told, the authors would certainly have pointed this out. But they didn’t, which leaves me to suspect that this is all about irrelevant issues. No one has seen an order right up to today. But if mass murder had been decided upon, only those who needed to know were informed, and surely Schulte was not one of them. Himmler’s visit took him nowhere near Breslau and Giesche’s interests in Auschwitz, i.e., Monowitz, if any, were strictly of an economic nature. Also, the “next train to Zurich” is a bit of a stretch.

On July 29,1942, almost two weeks later, Schulte boarded a train in Breslau, destination Zurich. He had been a frequent traveler to Switzerland, for two reasons. The first was business interests, the other Doris, a lady friend he was to marry after his wife’s death. Doris was Jewish. On the way to Zurich Schulte had time to reflect some:

“He had been concerned about the fate of the Jews of Breslau. Once there had been a flourishing Jewish community, among it wealthy merchants, physicians, and scientists of national and international renown. The majority, however, were neither rich nor famous, eking out a living for themselves and their families not without difficulty. Their contribution to the economic and cultural life of the city was quite disproportionate to their number.
Then Hitler came to power, and within six years their number fell from twenty thousand to ten thousand. Many emigrated, some committed suicide. Even during the first year of the war some succeeded in getting out, via Italy and the Soviet Union, both then still neutral. By late 1941 only 8,100 were left; only the Gestapo knew exactly how many (On the Jews of Breslau as of 15 November 1941, see NA RG 242, T-81, R 676/5485696).
Then they too began to disappear, quietly, without attracting any attention. First they were concentrated in certain streets and buildings, and then, after a few months, they were “evacuated” to some villages not far from Breslau. They were temporarily housed in buildings that had once belonged to Cistercian monks, but after a few weeks they were again removed, this time to an unknown destination. According to rumor, they were “resettled” in Poland, a version that Schulte found difficult to believe, for his firm was operating in Poland and had a wide network of informants there; surely he would have heard details if this resettlement had indeed taken place. Now he knew the real meaning of resettlement[…]”(pp.117-118)

Lets forget about the “eking out a living part”, what is interesting here is that Schulte knew that Jews were able to escape during the first year of the war “via Italy and the Soviet Union”. Also, his firm “had a wide network of informants”, yet still, since they did not inform him that resettlement meant murder, he found out about it in Summer of 1942, we still don’t know how exactly, but, “Now he knew the real meaning of resettlement”. All of this is not convincing, the most important part is missing: the who, when and what.

Schulte knew people in Zurich of course. From pp.120/21:

“Schulte had decided that his information about the impending tragedy must be passed on to the leading Jewish institutions in America. Only they had sufficient influence to sound the tocsin and to induce the American and the British governments to take some action. (Schulte, like many non-Jews, tended to overrate the influence of “World Jewry.”) Who could be trusted to pass on this desperately important information, to be discreet and at the same time give it the necessary emphasis? Schulte went to the phone and asked to be connected with IKAP in Basel.
The person Eduard Schulte wanted so urgently to speak to at IKAP (Internationale Kapital Anlage Gesellschaft) was Isidor Koppelmann, Jacques Rosenstein’s right hand man,[…]” (Rosenstein was the owner of IKAP and in America at that time)

Here we again have this “What, we Jews have influence?” nonsense, but we have to remember that both Laqueur and Breitman are Jews. Schulte met Koppelmann, told him about the pending fate of Jews in Europe and that his information needed to be transmitted, immediately, “to leading Jewish organisations in America” (p.123). Koppelmann agreed that Schulte’s information was important and decided to contact Sagalowitz:

“[K]oppelmann said that Sagalowitz knew everyone of consequence, that he was one of the leading experts on Nazi Germany in Switzerland[…]Before Rosenstein had left for America, he had impressed on Koppelmann that if ever he needed political advise on Jewish affairs, his former classmate Sagalowitz was the man to consult (p,124)[…]Sagalowitz was a native of Russia. His father, Hersch, had been a wealthy merchant in Vitebsk(p.126)[…]He had obtained his first regular job not long before the outbreak of war: the Association of Swiss Jewish Communities made him head of their information bureau (JUNA, or Jüdische Nachrichtenstelle)(p.127)”

Sagalowitz had entered a chess tournament in Lausanne, but agreed to come to Zurich. Schulte did not want to meet him at this time, he had to return to Berlin for an important conference and returned to Germany “a little later”(p.125). The authors do not mention dates very often, but this must by now be July 30/31. From p.129:

“On a late July afternoon Benno Sagalowitz now had to face his own crisis—not a personal crisis but one confronting an entire people. Koppelmann arrived a few minutes early. He said that the German industrialist of whom Sagalowitz had heard from Rosenstein had been in town and wanted to convey an urgent message to Sagalowitz. He took a piece of paper from his pocket on which he had made notes and began to read: “I have received information from absolutely trustworthy sources that Hitler’s headquarters is considering a plan to kill all remaining European Jews.” It was no longer a question of a few thousand Jews here and there; the Nazis were talking of three to four million who were to be transported to the east and gassed with prussic acid. An enormous crematorium had been built. About the date of the Operation the industrialist had been a little vague: it was not clear whether the plan was in the last stages of preparation or whether the mass murder had already started.
The whole affair was kept in great secrecy by the Nazis. But even if the mass executions had not yet started, it was only a matter of days or weeks. Unless the Allies took action at once, it would be too late. The industrialist had also made it clear that by “action” he did not refer merely to protest or warnings. End of message. Koppelmann also said that the man thought that he, Sagalowitz, was the best person to convey this message to the world Jewish institutions and the Allies. Sagalowitz thought for a few moments. “Did he give his source?”
“He would not tell me.”
“May I quote him when I pass it on?”
“Under no circumstances; in fact, he wanted your word of honor that his name will be kept out.” Koppelmann went on to say that the man was personally unafraid, but there were others involved and he owed it to his family. The industrialist had also said that he would be in Zürich again in a few weeks, very likely with more information. But they should not wait for his next visit[…]” (Schulte’s name was never revealed, the authors had an extremely hard time finally identifying him)

This plan was “kept in great secrecy by the Nazis”, but Schulte knew of it, how he would not tell. He knew that 3 to 4 million Jews were to be killed with prussic acid and burned in an enormous crematoria which had been constructed. But, at that time, Krema II was perhaps in the planning stage. Bischoff mentions in a letter of August 3,1942, that the location for the new crematoria had been decided upon (VffG, Heft 3&4, Dezember 2003, p.360). Also, we are told that the Auschwitz bunkers were in operation then and this news would have spread like wildfire. Schulte would then have known about it long ago, because of his many contacts. Yet, Schulte makes it sound as if this mass murder was about to happen, he had just found out. But, would he not have revealed how he came to know? Throughout the book there is not even a hint that he ever mentioned how he was made aware of this alleged extermination program.

Sagalowitz had to decide whom to contact or who to pass this message on to. He considered some Swiss Jewish leaders, but dismissed this idea: “No, this was not an assignment for Swiss Jewry. The message should reach Roosevelt as quickly as possible. Who had the ear of the U.S. President?” (p.132). He finally picked Gerhart Rieger who lived in Geneva “…a young man to be sure, but earnest, eager, and reliable, who reported directly to the leaders of the World Jewish Congress in New York”(p.133). The authors go on by telling us how un-influential the World Jewish Congress really was:

“It had no power, no apparatus, no substantial budget of its own; it had small offices in New York and London, a few correspondents in various other centers. Its real center was whichever hotel room Nahum Goldmann, its peripatetic general secretary, happened to be in at the time[…]But with all its shortcomings, the Congress had a direct channel from Switzerland to America. Through its president, Rabbi Stephen Wise, a man of great renown in the Jewish world and an unofficial Jewish spokesman to non-Jews, it was in a position to make its voice heard in New York and Washington. And so Sagalowitz concluded that Riegner was his best chance (pp.133/34).”

Sagalowitz telephoned Riegner and asked to meet him in Lausanne. Riegner was by now dealing with problems he was not prepared for, because “Geneva suddenly became one of the most important listening posts in Nazi-occupied Europe, as the seat of the International Red Cross, the one organization that maintained some form of liaison among the combatants”(p.137). Sagalowitz informed Riegner about this message, Riegner wanted to know more about The Mysterious Messenger (title of chapter 5), but Sagalowitz replied “that he was not at liberty to divulge it”(p.137). Riegner then tried to fit this new information in with what he already knew: “Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Jews had been killed during the German invasion of Poland and in the months after[…]By the end of 1941 some 500,000 Jews in the German-occupied Soviet territories had been murdered[…]and in January 1942, Reinhard Heydrich convened a Conference in Wannsee, a Berlin suburb, to plan and coordinate the so-called “Final Solution” of the Jewish question[…]The Wannsee Conference was still a well-kept secret. There were no certainties, but there was reason to fear the worst[…]”(p.138).

Riegner and Sagalowitz had some doubts about this message. Should they wait? “Murder on such gigantic scale could not possibly be hidden for long”(p.140), but Riegner eventually contacted Paul Guggenheim by letter, Guggenheim legal advisor to the World Jewish Congress:

“He summarized what he had learned from Sagalowitz and Koppelmann and added his own Interpretation: “At first sight the affair sounds totally fantastic. But one cannot exclude the consideration that these measures are rooted in the inner logic of the regime and that these people have no scruples whatsoever.” Riegner quoted Hitler’s speech of January 30, 1939, prophesying that European Jewry would perish in the war and reviewed the news about deportations that had been received within the past month”(pp.145/46).
(Prof. Kulischer wrote about the deportations in his “The Displacement of Population in Europe”, providing data to the middle of 1943. Alas, not one word about mass murder of Jews, and Kulischer was a Jew.)

Guggenheim advised Riegner to contact the British and American consulates in Geneva. The American’s, as well as the British, promised to forward Riegner’s message but cautioned that without the name of the messenger chances of this getting anywhere are slim. “In a summary sent to the Office of Strategic Services, State Department officials in Washington termed the legation’s message a “wild rumor inspired by Jewish fears.”(p.149)

Riegner tried to get the message to Steven Wise, but “Wise was a major nuisance as far as some State Department bureaucrats were concerned”(p.150). On the same page we read:

“Paul Gulbertson of the Division of European Affairs at the State Department noted that Rabbi Wise might “kick up a fuss” if he found out that the State Department had withheld Riegner’s message. But in an internal memorandum his colleague Elbridge Durbrow bluntly stated the case for shelving the message:
“It does not appear advisable in view of the Legation’s comments, the fantastic nature of the allegation, and the impossibility of our being of any assistance if such action were taken, to transmit the information to Dr. Stephen Wise as suggested”.
A draft instruction to Harrison continued:
“The Department feels that it would be unfair to the American public if stories of this kind are given publicity unless careful efforts by our officers abroad have been made to obtain confirmation at least tending to support them. It is suggested, therefore, that in the future the Legation refrain from accepting information of this kind for possible transmission to third parties unless, after thorough investigation, there is reason to believe that such a fantastic report has in the opinion of the Legation some foundation or unless the report involves definite American interests (p.151).”

The Americans had agents in Europe-, had information passed on to them by the German opposition, many of whom in positions to known if Jews were murdered en masse, but they knew nothing, dismissed Schulte’s/Riegner’s story as rumors. The British were a little more sympathetic because the British representative to the World Jewish Congress, Sidney Silverman, was a member of Parliament and he received, with some delay, the message from Riegner. Silverman send it on to Wise by telegram via Western Union, but not until August 28 did the message arrive.

“August 28, the day the Riegner-Silverman telegram arrived in New York, was a Friday. Rabbi Wise was preparing for Sabbath Services”(p.152). The following week, after conferring with officials of the American Jewish Congress and the World Jewish Congress, it was decided, on September 2, that Wise contact Sumner Welles, to have him forward the Riegner Telegram, as it became known, to Roosevelt. But Wells also had to follow procedure and the information the State Department had was “that the deported Jews would be put to work, like Poles and Russian prisoners of war, on behalf of the German war machine”(p.153). The message was eventually forwarded to Roosevelt. In the meantime:

“Wise, however, had not been idle while waiting for Welles. On September 28, one month after receiving the Riegner telegram via London, Wise spoke at a rally against Nazi atrocities held at Madison Square Garden. But the government and the American public in general paid little attention. On November 24, after having received confirmation from Welles, Wise arranged for press Conferences in Washington and New York and made public what he knew. The Associated Press carried the story, which appeared in the New York Herald Tribune under the headline: “Wise Says Hitler Has Ordered 4,000,000 Jews Slain in 1942.” The publicity was far greater than anything generated previously(p.160)

and

“Wise also obtained an appointment for himself and four other Jewish leaders at the White House on December 8. The Jewish officials gave the President a memorandum entitled “Blue Print [sic] for Extermination” drawn from the Riegner-Lichtheim memorandum to Harrison and from other sources. It included a special section on Hitler’s extermination order, which quoted sections of Riegner’s telegram[…]the report correctly noted the essential point: for most Jews, deportation was just a euphemism for death”(p.161)[…]The State Department dragged its feet up to the last moment, but in the end the United States and eleven other nations joined the British government in mid-December in a joint declaration on Nazi killings of Jews.
Rabbi Wise proclaimed that this historic statement “will bring solace to, and hearten Jewish people throughout the world as a reaffirmation of the determination of the free peoples that Axis murderers cannot . . . destroy any race or faith of people.”
It had been four and a half months since Eduard Schulte had brought the horrifying news of the Final Solution to Zürich, and three and a half months since Wise had received Riegner’s telegram. Schulte had wanted the Allies to attack the death camps; instead they issued a tardy denunciation of Nazi killings. Schulte had to wait until the creation of the United States War Refugee Board in January 1944 to see that his message was not entirely in vain. By that time most of the Jews in Europe were dead(p.163).”

And thus “The Holocaust” was born, based on rumors. As already pointed out, we have not one word about Schulte’s source of information, nothing substantial throughout the book. Also, when taken the official version into consideration, the timing is wrong. For we are told that Hitler had decided to kill the Jews either in the summer of 1941 (Höß), December of 1941 (Gerlach) or early 1942, take your pick, but never as late as summer 1942. Perhaps this is why Schulte disappeared, was/is seldom, if ever, mentioned. He never received a metal for being a “Righteous Gentile”. But the rumors, Greulpropaganda, spread by Wise et al, based in large part on Schulte’s report, as well as other unsubstantiated allegations reaching Washington, started to take off. No doubt the Christmas message by Pope Pius XII was also influenced by this, but that will be a separate issue. Finally the War Refugees Board was established in January 1944 and this is when these same rumors were turned into “facts”. No investigation, by experts in the field of forensic-criminal investigations, have ever been undertaken to substantiate any of the rumors. To this day all we have is reports, as that from Schulte, with not one shred of substantial evidence to back those reports/witness testimonies.

Wilfried Heink

For the past, say, 40 years, the Holocaust has become more and more “the” crime, is front and centre now. Hardly a day goes by when it is not talked about-, used by politicians as an excuse to make threats, mainly towards Iran at the moment. But strangely, very little was known about it immediately following the war, and I can attest to that having lived at that time in Germany.

During the war years, and as mentioned I lived in Germany then, nothing about any mass killings of Jews was known, a fact that was confirmed during the “Nuremberg Trials”, when the IMT accepted the statement made by Auschwitz commander Höß „…that only about 200 to 300 people knew of that dreadful order of Himmler’s which was given during a conference which lasted for 10 or 15 minutes, on the basis of which more than four million people were exterminated”.
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/07-09-46.asp (p.65)

Lets leave aside the fact that no order has ever been found, issued by either Hitler or Himmler and Hitler would have been the one to order the mass killings, and try and determine what was known up to May 8.1945 when German armed forces surrendered, unconditionally.

A crime of that enormity, the alleged killing of between 5.1 to 6 million Jews and the cremating/burning of all the bodies, could not have gone unnoticed. But this is exactly what we are asked to believe, even though we have witness testimony, in regards to the alleged burning of the corpses, telling us “The result was one huge inferno, which from the distance looked like a volcano breaking through the earth’s crust to belch forth fire and lava” (Yankel Wiernik, A year in Treblinka, chapter 9). At the Nuremberg Trials, the statement by Höß was accepted as evidence (even though he had his numbers wrong), based on nothing but his word. The 6 million was “established” by Wilhelm Höttl at the IMT (somewhat confirmed by Wisliceny), who stated in an affidavit (I have a copy of the affidavit, in German [Rothe, Wolf Dieter Die Endlösung der Judenfrage, S.67/68]) that Eichmann had told him that 6 million Jews had been killed. I need to add here that Höttl was not called to testify, even though he was incarcerated in Nuremberg and the defense asked for him to be made available for crossexamination. Also, it has since been shown that Höttl was an American agent (H. Härtle, Freispruch für Deutschland, S.190ff, V. Falin, Die Zweite Front, p.483). In fact, David Kahn, in the Introduction to Höttl’s book titled The Secret History of the Author of The Secret Front confirms it, quoting Allan Dulles (p.vi).

A little about Wilhelm Höttl, based on his above mentioned book. He was born on March 19, 1915 in Vienna, “At 22 got his Ph.D from the University of Vienna in history, German, and geography” (p.ii). He joined the SS, his career was somewhat, shall we say, chequered but he finally ended up, in 1942, in the Abwehr (intelligence) on the recommendation of Walter Schellenberg, the head of Department VI (p.v). The Abwehr was riddled with traitors, Schellenberg one of them. Höttl was later involved in a Soviet spy affair (http://www.archives.gov/iwg/declassified-records/rg-263-cia-records/rg-263-krichbaum.html), not the most reliable person. As mentioned, Höttl provided the allies with the 6 million figure at Auschwitz, but in 1996 he retracted it. From the Irving website:

“On April 18, 1996 Wilhelm Höttl admitted in a letter to a rather querulous Austrian correspondent that he no longer believed the Six Million Figure to be true. In fact he disowned authorship of the figure. This Website has omitted the lady’s identity, but reproduces her letter in the lower panel.”
http://www.fpp.co.uk/Auschwitz/docs/Hoettl/Kien0496.html

This landed him in hot water, thus is the 1997 edition of his book he added an Appendix, we read:

“These additional pages on Eichmann were published by the author in his last book ‘Einsatz für das Reich’ (1997), and are reproduced here by permission of the publisher.”

He refers to “certain circles” in the last part of the Appendix, titled Eichmann and the 6 Million. Sort of an epilog, and makes it clear that this was added to his book because those “Certain circles made me the inventor of the murder of the 6 million, and there was a whole series of reproaches and even threats” (p.318). Who reproached and threatened him he does not reveal. On pp. 312 ff, Höttl tells us how he became to be a confidant of Eichmann and why Eichmann told him about the 6 million:

“While I visited Eichmann’s office for cases like that, he would visit me at home several times, usually on some official pretext, which was a natural thing for him, knowing his strict work ethic. On those occasions I discovered that he very much liked to drink, and he really loosened up and came out of his shell.
So it happened on one occasion at the end of August 1944 when Eichmann expressed his strong pessimism regarding the outlook of the war for Germany. He obviously was shocked by the fall of the Romanian head of state, Ion Antonescu, and the defection of the Romanian army to Russia. Shortly before, my friend Laszlo Baky, the Hungarian secretary of state, told me the whole truth about the mass murder in connection with the deportations. Baky obviously believed that I must have known everything, because of my rank. It must appear unbelievable, but I only knew about it by hearsay, even though I often listened to the—naturally strictly forbidden—BBC’s Germany programs, which often was impossible at the Schlossberg
in Budapest, due to the bad transmission conditions. Apart from that, the broadcasts, especially the ones that were put together by the British intelligence officer Sefton Delmer, contained in most cases obviously invented news, so that one did not believe the other, the true, stuff, either. By the way, as he once told me in a “weak moment,” Eichmann also listened to the BBC, but only alone in his private rooms. This fact seems to be of importance as it relates to the following conversation.
The depressed Eichmann said good-bye during the course of this conversation, because he was being sent on a difficult mission to “fallen Romania” and most probably would not return, if the enemies get a hold of him. He said he knew that the allies were after him, as one of the main war criminals, because of the mass murders of the Jews. In his own grotesque way, Eichmann also makes that statement in his autobiography, with the difference that he was convinced that he was never called a main war criminal, but “only” as war criminal No. 14
Anyway, I took advantage of Eichmann’s moment of weakness and asked him how many Jews had really been murdered. He said 6 million, which by now has become the magic number. The conversation about the 6 million murdered Jews—compare my affidavit in the Nuremberg trial against the so-called “main war criminals”— was to get me into trouble many years later, sometimes even today.
At this point I want to state that Eichmann was not drunk back then, even though he had much of his loved Barack (the liquor is actually called Palinka. Wilf) – the Hungarian apricot liquor. During that period Eichmann was, as I already mentioned, constantly “high” as today’s saying goes[…]”

Not very convincing, but at the IMT it was considered evidence and as mentioned, Höttl was prevented, by the prosecution, from testifying in person. A precautionary measure no doubt because what he had provided was not evidence but hearsay.

A little about the Abwehr. The investigation of July 20,1944, following the attempt on Hitler’s life, revealed that only two of the department heads of the Abwehr, Reinhard Gehlen and Kurt Gehrke, were not involved in the conspiracy (Falin, p.424). Bernd Gisevius, also a Abwehr officer was one of the crown witnesses for the prosecution at the IMT. He had written a book which had been introduce at the IMT as evidence. The following exchange took place at the IMT regarding this book. From the Avalon Project, 113 day, 24 April 64, pp. 186/87 http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/04-24-46.asp:

“DR. DIX: Dr. Gisevius, Dr. Pannenbecker has already mentioned the fact that you have published a book entitled To the Bitter End. I have submitted quotations from that book to the Tribunal as evidence, and they have been accepted as documentary evidence by the Tribunal. For this reason I now ask you: Are the contents of that book historically true; did you write it only from memory, or is it based on notes which you made at the time?
GISEVIUS: I can say here to the best of my knowledge, and with a good conscience, that the contents of the book are historically true. In Germany I always made personal notes as far as it was possible. I have said here that my dead friend Oster had in the War Ministry a considerable collection of documents to which I had access at all times. In writing about any important matter in which I made reference to friends in the opposition group, I never did so without having first consulted them many times about it. And since 1938 I have been in Switzerland, first as a visitor and later on for professional reasons, and there I was able to continue my notes undisturbed[…]
THE PRESIDENT: If he says that the book is true, that is enough[…]”

This was not the only book (fable?) accepted as evidence by the prosecution, one written by Hermann Rauschning while in America after having been dismissed by Hitler, titled The Voice of Destruction, was also admitted. Rauschning was however never called to testify, even though the defense had asked for him to do so. Back to the Abwehr and about what they knew concerning the persecution of the Jews. Again from Avalon, 114. day, p.259 http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/04-25-46.asp :

“Gisevius:[N]ebe, who as Chief of the Criminal Police had the same rank as the Chief of the Gestapo, Mueller, always told me that Heydrich took care to conceal his crimes.
With the entry of Kaltenbrunner into that organization, this practice ceased. All those things were now openly discussed among the department chiefs of the Gestapo. By now the war had started, of course. These gentlemen lunched together, and Nebe often came to me from such luncheons so completely exhausted that he had a nervous breakdown. On two occasions Nebe had to be sent on long sick leave because he simply could not stand the open cynicism with which mass murder, and the technique of mass murder, were discussed.
I remind you only of the gruesome chapter of the installation of the first gas chambers, which was discussed in detail in this circle, as were the experiments as to how one could remove the Jews most quickly and most thoroughly. These were the most horrible descriptions I have ever heard in my life. It is, of course, so much worse when you hear them first-hand from someone who is still under the direct impression of such discussions-and who because of this is almost at the point of physical and mental collapse, than when you hear of them now from documents. Nebe became so ill that actually as early as 20 July he suffered from a persecution mania and was a mere human wreck after everything he had gone through.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was it the custom to have daily dinner conferences of the chiefs of the Main Security Office, those who happened to be in town?
GISEVIUS: Daily conferences; everything was discussed at luncheon. This was of particular importance to us, because we heard details of the methods used by the Gestapo in the fight against our group[…]

And this, from day 115, p.269 http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/04-26-46.asp:

“MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And what positions did Canaris and Oster hold with reference to Keitel at this time when these reports were being submitted?
GISEVIUS: Canaris was the senior officer of the OKW[…]
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did he report to him the persecution and murder of the Jews and the program of extermination of the Jews that was being carried out?
GISEVIUS: From the first Jewish pogroms in 1938 on Keitel was minutely informed of each new action against the Jews, particularly about the establishment of the first gas chamber, or rather, the establishment of the first mass graves in the East, up to the erection of the murder factories later[…]”

Major General Erwin Lahousen, a “friend and close collaborator”(A. Dulles, Germany’s Underground. The Anti-Nazi Resistance, p.72) of Gisevius, had this to say at the IMT:

“LAHOUSEN: We were currently informed of all happenings by our officials at the front or in the camps. Offices of the Abwehr Division III were active in these camps, and in this way, that is, through the normal service channels, we were informed by reports and oral presentation of all these measures and of their effects.” (IMT, Vol.2, p.458) http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/11-30-45.asp

The Lahousen statement relates to the Commissar order and the like, not the Endlösung, but shows that the Abwehr had people/informers everywhere, a given, since any intelligence service can only be effective if it has eyes/ears everywhere. Thus, the Abwehr was very well informed about all that was happening in the camps and they had good contacts to the allies. Yet, nothing of substance, no details about “The Holocaust” emerged. Höttl stated in his affidavit of November 26, 1945, submitted as US-296 at the IMT, that, when he heard about the 6 million from Eichmann he assumed (Ich muss annehmen) the numbers given to be correct. The state of mind Eichmann was in at that time would rule out giving incorrect information. He, Höttl, remembers the conversation well, it made a deep impact on him, and he had told, before the war ended, American authorities in a neutral foreign country, whom he had contact with, details about it (“…und ich auch bereits vor dem deutschen Zusammenbruch naehere Angaben darueber an eine amerikanische Stelle im neutralen Ausland machte, mit der ich zu diesem Zeitpunkt in Verbindung stand [Rothe, p.68]). This neutral country was undoubtedly Switzerland, where Allan Welsh Dulles had set up shop in November 1942 to co-ordinate German opposition- and traitor activities. We know that Dulles had dealings with Höttl, David Kahn tells us, in the Introduction to Höttl’s book Secret Front, p.vi:

“[H]öttl became an intermediary between high Nazi officials and the main American secret service representative on the continent. This was Allen Dulles, the representative of the OSS, the office of Strategic Services, in Bern, Switzerland[…]In March (1945), Höttl came to Bern and met with Dulles[…]”

So, Höttl met with Dulles and told him, or one of his underlings, about the 6 million as he stated in his affidavit. However, Dulles makes no mention of Höttl or “The Holocaust” in his book. This did not sit well with Peter Hoffmann, author of The history of the German resistance, 1933-1945, who wrote the Introduction to the 2000 edition of the Dulles book. On pp. xxiv/xxv he writes:

“According to the editor of a selection of Dulles’s wartime intelligence reports, Neal H. Petersen, “OSS Bern’s coverage of the Holocaust was inexplicably meagre” (Neal H. Peterson, ed. “From Hitler’s Doorstep: The Wartime Intelligence Reports of Allan Dulles, 1942-1945” p. 50). Allen Dulles was deeply shocked and concerned by the persecution of the Jews from 1933 onward and quarrelled with his brother about Sullivan & Cromwell’s further operations in Germany. In 1942 he proposed a “tribunal” of distinguished jurists to examine all evidence about German, Italian, and Japanese perpetrators of violence (Richard Breitman, “Official Secrets: What the Nazis Planned, What the British and Americans Knew, p.131). Dulles did receive Information on the Holocaust from one of the most important sources on the subject, the German businessman Eduard Schulte (Walter Laqueur and Richard Breitman, “Breaking the Silence). But Petersen reprints only two reports from Dulles’s war years in Berne dated March 10 and December 30, 1943 which “contributed to Washington’s knowledge” about die Holocaust of March 10, 1943 and December 30, 1943, and four reports dated June 12 and July 8, 1943, and January 27 and May 31, 1944 in which he referred to the Holocaust.”
Petersen states that Dulles’s “reticence on this subject was among the most controversial and least understandable aspects of his performance in Bern.” He speculates that Dulles chose “not to emphasize the Holocaust in his reports to Washington” because “perhaps he believed that in view of German and European anti-Semitism, highest priority denunciation of the Holocaust would be counterproductive for the purposes of Western psychological warfare,” or “perhaps he feared that the flight of new refugees to Switzerland would interfere with his espionage activities”(Petersen, p.570; see also p.601). The true explanation may be less complicated. In view of the extensive Information that Allied authorities in Switzerland—particularly the Berne Legation and the Geneva Consulate—received from many sources about the extermination of the Jews and in view of the great amount of Information that reached the American government, but which it refused to believe or to act on until the establishment of the War Refugee Board on January 26, 1944 (Breitman. P.229 and passim; Petersen, p.601), it is likely that the paucity of Allen Dulles’s reporting on the Holocaust reflected more the interests of his superiors than his own.
Final assessment, however, must be deferred until a great number of classified OSS records are opened. There may well be among them reports from Allen Dulles dealing with the Holocaust.
Peter Hoffmann”

Not all documents are accessible but in spite of this, what Hoffmann writes is nonsense. The German opposition, as well as the traitors in the armed forces, were aware of the fact that Hitler was very popular with the common folk in Germany, right up to war’s end. Gisevius stated at the IMT that Brauchitsch told him: “Hitler is still such a popular man; we are afraid of the Hitler myth” (IMT, Vol.12, p.203). What better way to discredit Hitler than telling all about “The Holocaust”, when details about it were know from day one, according to Gisevius et al? The Germans would not have supported Hitler any longer, the war would have ended with the beginning of this alleged Holocaust or shortly thereafter. Here is what journalist Hans Fritzsche had to say at the IMT(PP.180/81) http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/06-28-46.asp :

FRITZSCHE: Yes. I made the most of an opportunity to which I will refer briefly later on. I asked a colleague of Obergruppenfuehrer Glücks, in Oranienburg-Sachsenhausen, about the Jews. Briefly summarized, his answer was as follows: The Jews were under the special protection of the Reichsfuehrer-SS who wished to make a political deal with them. He looked upon them as a kind of hostages and he did not wish a single hair from their heads to be harmed.
DR. FRITZ: Some of the Prosecution’s witnesses have asserted during this Trial that the German public knew about these murders. Now I just want to ask you, as a journalist who worked in the National Socialist State, what was, as far as you know, the attitude of the broad mass of the German people to the Jews? Did the people know about the murder of the Jews? Please be brief.
FRITZSCHE: Leaving out all those matters which have already been mentioned at this Trial, I should like to mention only a few observations which to me seem important. I shall omit the period shortly after the first World War, which has already been described, during which certain anti-Semitic feelings were popular in Germany. I should like to state only that in 1933 at the time of the Jewish boycott, which was organized by the NSDAP, the sympathies of the German people clearly turned again in favor of the Jews[…]…and there was only one justification for these racial laws. There was only one excuse for them and one explanation; that was the assertion and the hope: Well, now that the separation of the two peoples is being carried out, although painfully, there will at last be an end to the wild and unbridled agitation; and due to this separation there will be peace where formerly only unrest reigned.
When the Jews were forced to wear the emblem of a star and when, for instance, in Berlin they were prohibited from occupying seats on streetcars, the German people openly took sides with the Jews and it happened again and again that Jews were ostentatiously offered seats. In this connection I heard several declarations by Dr. Goebbels, who was extremely bitter about this undesired effect of the marking of the Jews.
I, as a journalist who worked during that period, am firmly convinced that the German people were unaware of the mass murders of the Jews and assertions to that effect were considered rumors; and reports which reached the German people from outside were officially denied again and again. As these documents are not in my possession (Fritzsche refers to the “Schnelldienst” archive, which could not be, ahem, found. Wilf), I cannot quote from memory individual cases of denial; but one case I do remember with particular clearness. That was the moment when the Russians, after they recaptured Kharkov, started legal proceedings during which killing by gas was mentioned for the first time.
I ran to Dr. Goebbels with these reports and asked him about the facts. He stated he would have the matter investigated and would discuss it with Himmler and with Hitler. The next day he sent me notice of denial. This denial was not made public; and the reason stated was that in German legal proceedings it is necessary to state in a much plainer manner matters that need clarification. However, Dr. Goebbels explicitly informed me that the gas vans mentioned in the Russian legal proceeding were pure invention and that there was no actual proof to support it.
It was not without reason that the people who operated these vans were put under the ban of strictest secrecy. If the German people had learned of these mass murders, they would certainly no longer have supported Hitler. They would probably have sacrificed 5 million for a victory, but never would the German people have wished to bring about victory by the murder of 5 million people.
I should like to state further that this murder decree of Hitler’s seems to me the end of every race theory, every race philosophy, every kind of race propaganda, for after this catastrophe any further advocacy of race theory would be equivalent to approval in theory of further murder. An ideology in the name of which 5 million people were murdered is a theory which cannot continue to exist[…]”

The last paragraph is nonsense, of course, for if this mass murder would have occurred, people would have known about it. The “strict secrecy” claim is also without foundation, as mentioned in the Preamble, some 400 000 were directly involved in this alleged mass murder. And not one of them told anyone? Lahousen stated at the IMT in connection with the Commissar order: “To a certain extent they were even known to the civilian populace; civilians learned far more details about these matters from wounded soldiers returning from the front than I could tell here”. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/11-30-45.asp (p.476). So, people knew about the Partisan order but nothing about “The Holocaust”. Totally unbelievable.

Hans Rothfels also writes about the problem the opposition faced in convincing the people that Hitler was ruining Germany, and that as late as 1944 (Die Deutsche Opposition Gegen Hitler, p.92). He provides details about the extend of the opposition and their desire to topple Hitler. But not one word about “The Holocaust” in his book and if it would have happened, the opposition would have known about it, they had people in the highest echelons.

Back to Dulles. Who was this Eduard Schulte, mentioned by Hoffmann in the Introduction, what exactly did he tell Dulles about the “Endlösung” and what was done with that information?

Stay tuned.

Wilfried Heink

But before I delve into the traitor/spy issue in The Third Reich, a few generalities first.

National Socialism came to be because of the thread Communism posed. Germany was to play a major role in the world revolution envisioned by Lenin et al, in fact, Lenin stated that there could be no world revolution without Germany. Communism was alive and well in Germany, in the last election before Hitler was appointed Chancellor, that of November 1932, almost 6 million Germans voted for the KPD, the Communist party, up from 5.2 million in the July election, translating into 100 seats in the Reichstag, a gain of 11 seats. When Hitler came to power, some of those Communists changed colors but many remained true to their Communist ideology, managed to conceal it. Those “closet communists” were people who worked in government offices, including the Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt=AA), had access to secret files and information. Not all of the opposition were Communists, of course, some were ideologically opposed to National Socialism, many of them had open channels to London, whereas the Communists-, and Communist sympathisers communicated with Moscow via spies installed by Moscow. To add to this, many high-ranking Officers in the armed forces were traitors.

A little about the Holocaust. The camps Auschwitz I and Birkenau were not located in isolated areas, access was restricted, but people from villages/towns around worked in the camps, prisoners were released, transferred to other camps, guards went on leave, etc. etc. Also, a well run resistance had been organized inside the camp, with contacts by various means to the outside. Treblinka, another alleged death camp, was located in the open as well, farmers from around sold milk, butter, bread, etc., to the camp staff daily, right at the gate. A village, Wolka Okraglik, was located only 1 kilometer to the east. Farmers tended fields which were practically surrounding the camp, making it impossible to conceal camp activities from prying eyes, especially since the so-called Totenlager was situated on an elevated part of the camp. And, “…scores of people escaped from Treblinka”, according to Nizkor/Yad Vashem http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/orgs/israeli/yad-vashem/yvs-camps-02-00.html
Yet, we had practically no detailed information from the time of the operation of the camp, just some allegations, most of them turned out to be untrue. Also, immediately following the war, “The Holocaust”, as it later became known, was hardly talked about.

To begin with: Who would have known? and: Why was not more known? The accusers at Nuremberg no doubt had a problem with this issue. Thus, they decided to have Höß, Auschwitz camp commandant from May 1940 to November 1943, state that only a few were in the know. The following is taken from day 174 of the IMT proceedings, Tuesday, 9 July 1946, p.65, extract from the deliberation by Dr, Kauffmann, counsel for the defendant Kaltenbrunner http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/07-09-46.asp :

“This witness (Wanneck. Wilf) then finally confirmed the fact that this operation (The Final Solution. Wilf) was conducted independently through a direct channel of command from Himmler to Eichmann and said that the position of Eichmann, which already had been a dominating one when Heydrich was still alive, had increased steadily, so that eventually he had acted completely independently in the entire Jewish sphere. And here I add that, according to the statement of Hoess, the only man left alive who is familiar with this question, it is established that only about 200 or 300 people knew of that dreadful order of Himmler’s which was given during a conference which lasted for 10 or 15 minutes, on the basis of which more than four million people were exterminated. And I add that a large nation of 80 million had learned little or probably nothing about these things which happened in the Southeast of the Reich during the war[…]”

Eichmann himself never acted independently. Also, Himmler was not the one giving those kind of orders, Hitler was, but that as an aside. According to this statement, 200 or 300 people knew of the order, but of the action itself, mass murder, “…80 million had learned little or probably nothing”. Impossible when considering the enormity of the undertaking.

We are talking of the assembling, transporting, murdering and body disposal of 5.1 (Hilberg) to 6 million Jews. Secrecy could not have been maintained long, many more must have been in the know. As the subject of traitors in all levels of government in the Third Reich, as well as that of the spy-rings operating in Germany proper and in the occupied territories, is being addressed it becomes more and more apparent that details would have been known. This the accusers at Nuremberg were aware of, undoubtedly, and care was taken to conceal it, to make believe that only a few would have known about the alleged Holocaust, or else the impossibility of keeping this a secret would have become apparent and the charges levelled exposed as untenable right then.

Prof. Raul Hilberg, may he RIP, in his “The Destruction of the European Jews”, was perhaps the first to acknowledge that a task of that extent, the alleged murder of up to 6 million Jews, must have involved thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of people in all sorts of departments. His book was shunned at first, I have to suspect because it violated the secrecy issue and thus would have opened Pandora’s box. We are given different reasons for rejecting Hilberg’s book. Prof. Finkelstein writes:
http://www.normanfinkelstein.com/article.php?pg=3&ar=102

“It is hard now to remember that the Nazi holocaust was once a taboo subject. During the early years of the Cold War, mention of the Nazi holocaust was seen as undermining the critical U.S.-West German alliance. It was airing the dirty laundry of the barely de-Nazified West German elites and thereby playing into the hands of the Soviet Union, which didn’t tire of remembering the crimes of the West German “revanchists.” The major American Jewish organizations rushed to make their peace with Konrad Adenauer’s government (the Anti-Defamation League took the lead) while those holding commemorations for the Jewish dead were tagged communists, which as a rule they were.
In Eichmann in Jerusalem, published in the mid-1960s, Hannah Arendt could draw on only one other scholarly study apart from Hilberg’s on the Nazi holocaust in the English language[…]”

This then one of the reasons offered, by Prof. Finkelstein, as to why the “Nazi holocaust was once a taboo subject” following WWII, but it is hardly convincing. Fritz Bauer, Hessian Attorney General from 1956 to 1968 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fritz_Bauer), in a conversation regarding the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem with Wayland B. Watters, American consul in Germany, on January 30,1960 gave another reason (the document I am quoting from was declassified in 2000 or 2002, hard for me to tell, I have no link to it but will copy it if necessary). Watters states in his report of February 7, 1961:

“Bauer did not think that Israel would be in any sort of a hurry with the Eichmann trial, on the contrary; nor did he think the trial would be particularly sensational. He seemed to feel all parties involved would “behave wisely” and that Ben Gurion’s main aim would be to secure “historical light” for internal educational purposes within Israel. (“Ben Gurion thinks the new generation in Israel is as unbelieving of Jewish passivity in the face of mass murder as the new generation in Germany is unbelieving of mass German guilt”, Bauer said)[…]”

Quotation marks in the original. Watters added at the end of the report, concerning Bauer:

“The reporting officer suspects, though he can in no way document his supposition, that Bauer may well be connected in some high-ranking capacity with the Israeli Intelligence Service in West Germany”.

This to demonstrate that even as late as 1961, “The Holocaust” was being downplayed, because, as Ben Gurion realized, the story presented was unbelievable. No investigations, by experts in the field of criminal investigations, have been undertaken since then; still by now all of it is presented as fact.

Back to the question: Who would have known? On February 25, 2008, an article appeared in “Die Welt”, a German daily, titled “Hitlers willige Vollstrecker im Auswärtigen Amt”(Hitler’s willing executioners in the foreign office), by Sven Felix Kellerhoff. The author tells us that a commission of historians concluded that the foreign office (AA) had been: “…tief in die Verbrechen der Nationalsozialisten verstrickt” (deeply involved in National Socialist crimes), this according to Eckhard Conze, chairman of the commission. However, after the war no issue was made of this, because: “Man schüttet kein dreckiges Wasser aus wenn man kein reines hat”(one does not pour out dirty water if no clean water is available). This is also not convincing because it is a simplification, an attempt to rationalize. Kellerhoff followed this up, the next day, with another article on the same subject, titled: “Zentrale Behörde des Nazi-Regimes”(central governing body of the Nazi regime), referring to the AA. I will comment on this later.

Then, on March 10, 2008, an article appeared in “Der Spiegel”, Germany’s best known political magazine, bearing the title: “Ich zielte ruhig auf die Säuglinge”(I steadily aimed at infants), by Georg Bönisch and Klaus Wiegrefe. In the first paragraph we are told that dentists, opera singers, teachers and school dropouts were actively involved in the destruction of European Jewry, 200 000 of them, Germans and Austrians, with an additional 200 000 Estonians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians and other foreigners as helpers, willingly or forced. Thus, we have 400 000 directly involved in the, alleged, mass murder of 5.1 to 6 million Jews, these people going home on leave, celebrate perhaps consuming alcoholic beverages which would have loosened their tongue, etc., still, nothing of substance was known about the alleged mass killings during the operation or immediately following the war. How can that be if what is alleged had happened? All 400 000 committed “Nazis” who told no-one? Totally unbelievable. And why now the attempt to change the story “established” at the IMT? But then, “The Holocaust” is an ever changing story which does not bode well for its veracity.

Now back to the “willing helpers” in the AA. Annelies von Ribbentrop in her “Die Kriegsschuld des Widerstandes”(War guilt of the Resistance) demonstrates, her sources include declassified files from the British Foreign Office (DBFP=Documents of British Foreign Policy) that the AA housed many traitors who had excellent contacts to Britain and elsewhere. Robert M. W. Kempner, chief prosecutor in the so-called Wilhelmstraße-Trial, the trail of AA officials, wrote a book about it, titled: “Ankläger einer Epoche” (Accuser/plaintiff of an Epoch). In it he states that he was told by his investigators while preparing the trial, that all documents of the AA had been secured and are available (the Russians also found AA documents [A. Dulles “Germany’s Underground”, p.147]). Kempner then remembered that someone from Eichmann’s staff had told him that the AA had been made aware of all deportations of Jews (Wir haben bei Deportationen ja immer im Auswärtigen Amt nachgefragt). Therefore, if those deported would have been murdered, word would have leaked out and reported back. And since some of the AA officials were looking for an excuse to discredit Hitler, telling their English contacts about “The Holocaust” would have worked well. They would have investigated, some did, but found nothing.

The lines of communication were not just open to England, the Soviet Union had also built up very effective spy networks in Germany, as mentioned at the start, one of them dubbed “Die Rote Kapelle”(The Red Orchestra). People who relayed the messages to Russia via short wave were called “Pianists”, thus the name Orchestra and Red is obvious. Many of the spies were committed communists, intend on getting rid of Hitler and help set up a Communist Government in Germany (“Deadly Illusions’, J. Costello and O. Tsarev, p.84). Yet, with all that information transmitted to Moscow and London, no details about “The Holocaust” were published by the Soviets or British. In fact, Soviet prosecutors spoke of Russian citizens at the IMT, Jews were hardly mentioned. But, and this is my point, if mass murder would have happened details about it would have been known and publicized.

To be continued.
Wilfried Heink

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/04/AR2009060402281.html

The Poles protested, of course, but it appears that here too history is being re-written, as is the case with “Barbarossa”. Following WWII, authors like Annelies von Ribbentrop and Heinrich Härtle have tried to set the record straight, showing clearly that Poland was to blame. The books written by them were inconvenient history, not fitting into the distorted version that was emerging, according to which only Hitler and the Germans were to blame. Recently, however, this issue has surfaced again, thanks to Dr. Walter Post (Unternehmen Barbarossa) and Gerd-Schultze-Rhonhof (Der Krieg der viele Väter hatte), to just name two. Those book were not well received, and the authors placed in the “extreme right” corner, accused of being Hitler apologists. But now it looks as if they are getting help from, who would have guessed, Russia.

One would have to first read all the Russian historian wrote, who The Washington Post introduces as: “Col. Sergei Kovalyov, director of the scientific-research department of military history, part of the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense”, before passing judgement. Nevertheless, this is encouraging. And since Mr. Kovalyov has made a fresh start, perhaps it is time to re-visit what v. Ribbentrop and Härtle wrote, as well as the work of Post. We do know that a war does not start with the first shot fired, a lot happens before that and here is some of what came to pass.

On January 26,1934 Germany and Poland signed a non-aggression treaty (Nichtangriffspakt). Relations between the two countries were relatively good, but the treatment of the German minority by the Poles, as well as the Danzig/corridor issues, were pending. Thus, on October 24,1938, foreign minister Ribbentrop had a lengthy discussion with the Polish emissary Lipski in which Ribbentrop expressed the desire to eliminate the existing problems and improve relations on a permanent basis. He suggested that Danzig be returned to the Reich and to provide access to east Prussia via a highway/rail link, the corridor. In return Poland were to receive special trading status with Danzig as well as a 25 year guarantee for its borders. Lipski promised to forward those proposals to foreign minister Beck (Hitler stated that he was the only one who could make this border proposal, in fact handing Poland territory that had belonged to Germany for centuries, because he had the trust of German people). In January 1939 Beck visited Germany and met with Hitler on January 5 in Berchtesgaden. Hitler stressed that he was interested in long lasting good relations with Poland and expressed the desire to settle the Danzig/corridor issue. Beck showed understanding, cautioned that the public will not accept the return of Danzig while promising to consider the issue. Citizens of Danzig wanted to again be part of Germany, but the tone in the Polish press, as well as that of the population, became more and more belligerent (Walter Post, “Unternehmen Barbarossa”, S.104).

Then came the Czechoslovak crisis which I will skip through here. The Sudetenland became part of Germany and Hitler promised Chamberlain in Munich that when the Czech government has settled all issues with its remaining minorities in a peaceful manner, he would have no more territorial demands. He stated: “Wir wollen keine Tschechen!” (we don’t want any Czechs)(Heinrich Härtle, “Die Kriegsschuld der Sieger”, p.275). It was in the interest of Germany to have a stable country on its southern border, and not only because the Russians tried to use it as a base. On March 13, Slovakia declared its independence, and with his the state of Czecho-Slovakia ceased to exist (Hitler did not pressure Tiso, Annelies von Ribbentrop, “Die Kriegsschuld des Widerstandes”, p.243, DBFP [Documents on British Foreign Policy] IV, No230). On March 14, Chamberlain told Henderson, in Berlin, to inform the German government that England would not interfere in issues that did not directly concern her (Ribbentrop, p.243, DBFP IV, No.247). Henderson relayed this message on the same evening (Ibid, p.243, DBFP IV, No.232). On March 17, Chamberlain retracted this in his Birmingham speech.

This Czech issue is used by historians to explain why Poland did not give in to Hitler’s reasonable claims (Kovalyov called the demands “quite reasonable”, according to the Washington Post article), he broke his word. But as can be proven, Hitler had no intentions on making the rest of Czechoslovakia a protectorate if the Czechs were to get their house in order. The Czechs were unable to, therefore Hitler acted as any statesman, responsible for the safety of his citizens, would have acted, he did not break his word. On March 31,1939 Chamberlain told the British parliament that England had given Poland a defacto cart blanche guarantee. Since this guarantee was aimed at Germany, Hitler declared on April 28 that because the Poles had violated the non-aggression treaty this treaty no longer existed. He stressed however that he would still welcome an understanding with Poland (Ribbentrop, p.264, DdP [Dokumente der deutschen Politik] Bd. V, S.47ff).

On August 23 Russia and Germany signed the non-aggression treaty. Up to then, Germany had tried to come to an understanding with Poland but met with no success, since the Poles had the English guarantee in their pocket. One would think that following the signing of the Russia/Germany pact the Poles would reconsider their strategy, they did not. Hitler did not want war and on August 25 he forwarded a memorandum to Henderson asking the British government to use their influence on Poland to try and prevent war. The memo stated that: 1. Polish acts of provocation have become unbearable and need to be addressed, regardless of who is at fault. 2. Germany is determined to solve this “Macedonian situation” on its eastern border and 3. The Danzig/corridor problem must be solved. Other issues were addressed as well. Germany is prepared, the memo continued, to come to the aid of the British empire if need be, no matter what (Post, p.126).

On August 28 the British answer to Hitlers proposal arrived in Berlin, personally delivered by Henderson. The British stated that England would be pleased to enter into negotiations concerning the British/German interest, but that the Polish issue must be settled first. Hitler agreed and promised to negotiate with a Polish government willing to negotiate. He then asked Henderson if England would be willing to accept a coalition with German, Henderson replied in the affirmative (Ribbentrop, p.353, DBFP VII, No.455). On August 29, Germany accepted the British proposal of an international panel concerning the settlement of the Polish issue (Post writes that actually Weizsäcker came up with the international angle), but it was stressed that in any discussions on territorial issues the Soviet Union had to be included. Hitler also stated that he will be expecting a Polish emissary on August 30, who would be authorized to make decisions (strangely the documents about the discussion of August 28-29 are missing [Ribbentrop, p.356]). In the morning of August 30, Hitler and some judicial advisors worked out the agreement, consisting of 16 points (Ribbentrop provides the whole text, pp. 361 ff).

On the evening of August 29, Henderson phoned London and told them that the German government is willing to negotiate with the Poles, they are working on proposals for a acceptable solution, which will be submitted to the English government “before” the Polish emissary arrives (Ribbentrop, p.356, DBFP VII, No.490). In fact the Germans had stated that the British government will “also” (a word omitted by Henderson) be informed “if possible before” the emissary arrives. Halifax then send a telegram to Henderson telling him that the British government will consider the German proposal, but it would be unreasonable to expect that a Polish emissary can be brought to Berlin. Henderson was advised to use the appropriate channels to inform the “proper” authorities about this. A copy of the telegram was send to Warsaw, Rom and Paris (DBFP VII, No.504).

Thus, Warsaw knew that the British did not intend to have a Polish emissary go to Berlin. Also, by proper authorities Ribbentrop is convinced that the Beck/Goerdeler group had been referred to, for, if the German government was meant why not say so. Henderson, who had claimed not to know what the 16 points contained, nevertheless informed Lipski on the 31 about them. Lipski paled and told him that he was not interested in German notes. He was well informed, had connections to Göring and other important people and was certain that should war break out Germany would decent into turmoil, allowing Polish troops to march into Berlin (Dahlerus, Der letzte Versuch, S.110).

Historians claim that those 16 points were to serve as a fig leave for Hitler, not so, he would have been bound by them if a Polish emissary would have arrived. But, nobody showed up. Lady Diana, wife of Duff Cooper, former first Lord of the Admiralty, found the 16 points to be quite reasonable. Duff was shocked because the English public could agree with his wife (Barbarossa, p.128).

Annelies von Ribbentrop writes that the tragedy that unfolded only days later is well documented, based on captured German documents. One of them deals with the situation in September 1939, stating: “Marshal Rydz-Smigly told a Rumanian official that the British had promised to send 1 500 aeroplanes… and that the French had broken through the Siegfried-Line on two places and were deep in German territory…Rydz-Smigly was adamant, stating that the Poles had counted on England’s help. President Moscicki was especially embittered, stating that Poland had been willing to accept the German proposals but that England had prevented them from doing so. And because his ministers had counted on assistance from England, they had allowed war to break out (M. Sp.; Nr.1585, micro roll (Mikrorolle) T120. 1496, frame 626334, England-Volumes 2&3, for the time of Jan.7.1933 to July 30.1949).

Hitler did not want war, tried everything to prevent it. However, the situation that existed in regards to the German minorities and Danzig needed to be settled. Hitler was well aware of Poland’s territorial aspirations, Roman Dmowski had outlined the Polish borders at the Paris Peace Conference on January 29, 1919. “West Prussia, Posen and very substantial sections of East Prussia were not really German at all…Dmowski put forward Danzig as an example. Obviously this city was an integral part of “historic Poland”. Most of those ambitions were denied (Richard M. Watt, “The Kings Depart…”, p.361). With England’s unconditional guarantee Poland was about to correct the wrong, as they perceived it, suffered at Versailles. Any conditional concessions by Hitler would be-, and were, interpreted by the Poles as a sign of weakness. Hitler had to draw the line in the sand, but tried desperately to come to a negotiated, peaceful, settlement with Poland. The Poles would have received large areas of German territory, in return Germany asked for the city of Danzig and the right to build a highway/rail link through essentially German territory. The corridor, as it was termed, was to be 1 km wide and 85 km long.

This is about as concise as it can get, other factors-, the issue of the German opposition to Hitler, Anglo-American as well as Soviet ambitions, were left out. Additional, more detailed, articles regarding these topics might follow. But this should serve to give an overview and perhaps with the Russians participating the truth will eventually emerge here as well. The Soviet-German treaty should also be looked at again, Stafford Cripps, a British emissary, was an almost permanent presence in Moscow at that time.

Wilfried Heink

However, I have recently found out that there are recorded cases of even more cunning gas chamber escapes. Unfortunately we don’t have any names, but we know that there were more than one of them, and that they were female (clearly not ladies prone to panic and hysterics but levelheaded and very resourceful members of the fair sex). In her book Den Livsfarliga Glömskan (“The Fatal Forgetfulness”, Brombergs, Stockholm 1986) Inga Gottfarb, a Swedish-Jewish writer and Zionist activist (an active member of the Swedish Committee Against Anti-Semitism) quotes from a report sent by her to the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee in New York “in mid-May 1945″ concerning the reception of female former concentration camp inmates in the Swedish city of Malmö on April 29 the same year (pp. 162-163):

«Många hade varit i Auschwitz, hade “gasnummer” intatuerade på sina armar. Några hade lyckats ta sig ut ur gaskammaren genom ett fönster».

Translation:

«Many had been in Auschwitz and had “gas numbers” tattooed on their arms. Some had managed to escape from the gas chamber through a window».

Can it really get more clever than this? Or should I expect to one day find a story of a successful gas chamber lock picker? As H.L. Mencken (or possibly the great hoaxter P.T. Barnum) once said, “no-one ever got poor underestimating human stupidity”.

- Thomas Kues

The document I will briefly discuss here (ZStL Slg. Polen, Bd. 353, p. 168) is a circular letter from the Government of the General Government, Main Department of Justice (Regierung des Generalgouvernements – Hauptabteilung Justiz) in Cracow to the local departments of justice (Abteilung Justiz) in all districts of the General Government (Krakau, Lublin, Lemberg (Galizien), Radom, and Warschau), dated August 21, 1942 and concerning the “Evacuation of Jews” (Aussiedlung von Juden). It reads in full:

«Es bestehen mitunter noch Zweifel, wie zu verfahren ist, wenn Juden, gegen die ein Strafverfahren anhängig oder eine gerichtliche Strafe zu vollstrecken ist, durch die Aussiedlung betroffen werden. Ich bemerke dazu folgendes:
   1. In anhängigen Strafverfahren kann grundsätzlich in entsprechender Anwendung des § 154 a Abs. 3 St. 0. von der Erhebung der öffentlichen Klage abgesehen oder – falls die öffentliche Klage schon erhoben ist – gemäss Abs. 4 a.a.O. das Verfahren vorläufig eingestellt werden. Das gilt inbesondere auch dann, wenn sich der Beschuldigte für die Staatsanwaltschaft oder das Gericht in Haft befindet; in diesen Falle kann er der zuständigen Behörde zur Aussiedlung überstellt werden. Zur Behandlung nach § 153 a Abs. 3 oder 4 St. 0. eignen sich jedoch nicht die Strafverfahren, in denen die Todesstrafe zu erwarten ist, welche Verfahren sind durchgeführen; eine Aufhebung der Haft zum Zwecke der Aussiedlung kommt in diesen Fällen nicht in Betracht.
   2. Von der Vollstreckung erkannter Freiheitsstrafen oder Maßregeln der Sicherung und Besserung kann in entsprechender Anwendung des § 456 a StF0. abgesehen werden. Hingesehen sind, wie schon aus dem wer laut des § 456 a Abs. 1 zu folgern ist, Todesstrafen zu vollstrecken.
   Überstücke zur Unterrichtung der deutschen Anklagebehörden sind beigefügt.

  gez. Wille».

Translation:

«It is still not quite clear how we are to proceed with regard to Jews scheduled for evacuation [Aussiedlung] who are pending a criminal proceeding or have been condemned to serve a legal sentence. To wit:
   1. In cases pending we can, as a norm, apply § 154 a Abs. 3 St. 0. and refrain from laying charges, or, if charges have already been made, we can postpone the trial as per Abs. 4 of the abovementioned law. This especially applies if the person charged is in custody and therefore available to the prosecutor or the court: in that case he may be made available to the competent authority for evacuation. However, § 153 a Abs. 3 or 4 St. 0. can not be applied in those cases where a death sentence is pending. Those trials are to proceed, and the release of the accused for reason of evacuation can not be considered.
   2. Jail sentences pending or rehabilitation measures can be disregarded by applying § 456 a StF0. However, death sentences are to be carried out, as per § 456 a Abs. 1.
   Copies for the German prosecuting bodies have been attached.

  sg. Wille».

In short, Jews designated for Aussiedlung should have any present judicial proceedings against them discontinued and, if already convicted, have their sentences lifted so as to enable deportation. The only ones exempt from this practice were Jews under sentence of death.

However, official historiography has it that

«Dr. Josef Bühler (…) demanded at the [Wannsee] conference that the “final solution” be applied first to the Jews of the General Government. (…) Bühler’s request that the Jews of the General Government in Poland be destroyed first was in fact accepted. The General Government included the districts of Warsaw, Cracow, Lublin, Lvov, and Radom, and its Jewish population was estimated by the German government at 2,284,000. The destruction of the Jews in the General Government would later be called Operation Reinhard…».
(Yitzhak Arad, Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka. The Operation Reinhard Death Camps, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis 1987, pp. 12-13)

This means that all Jews in the General Government were scheduled to be killed. At first, they were collected in ghettos, were many died from epidemics and other privations. Later, beginning in March 1942, they were brought by train to the three Aktion Reinhardt camps – Bełżec (opened in March 1942), Sobibór (opened in early May 1942) and Treblinka (operative from July 23, 1942) – where, still according to the official narrative, virtually all of them were murdered with engine exhaust gas. It is alleged that already in early 1943 as good as all Jews from the General Government were dead:

«The principal decision to terminate Operation Reinhard and close the death camps of Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka was taken by Himmler during his visit to Lublin in March 1943 (…). At that time almost all the Jews in the General Government had already been annihilated and the death camp of Auschwitz-Birkenau was in full operation and could meet the needs of the Nazi extermination machine».
(Ibid., p. 370)

At the time the above document was written, practically all transports from the General Government ghettos had as their final destination the alleged death camps. This is especially true for the deportation trains which left Warsaw during the period when the above cited letter was written:

«During the first five weeks of the killing operation in Treblinka, between July 23 and August 28, about 245,000 Jews were deported there from the Warsaw ghetto and Warsaw district; from Radom district, 51,000; from Lublin district, 16,500, bringing the total in this period to about 312,500».
(Ibid., p. 87)

Thus, according to official historiography, deportation from the ghettos in the General Government at this time meant virtually certain death. But why then were Jews sentenced to death by German courts exempted from deportation? Why the bother to hang or shoot these individuals when, together with the other Jewish convicts, they could be sent to the “death camps” and killed there en masse?

To give some examples of the punishments given to Jews in the ghettos: on November 9, 1942 the Warsaw Jew Herz Bresler was handed down a six month jail sentence for “not wearing the armband with the Zion star” (source: ZStL Slg. Polen, Bd. 349, p. 194), and on June 19, 1942, the Jew Aizyk Braun was sentenced by a Warsaw Sondergericht to 3 years of imprisonment for “leaving the [Warsaw] ghetto without permission” (source: ZStL Slg. Polen, Bd. 349, p. 192). Thus, while certainly very strict (as could be expected) the penal system imposed on the ghetto dwellers was not as draconic as one may believe, and it seems fair to assume that most of the Jews sentenced to death were considered dangerous to other people or a threat in some way to German troups. However, unarmed and surrounded by Germans and auxiliary guards at the ghetto’s Umschlagsplatz, waiting to be sent to the “pure extermination centers” they would hardly have posed a problem to the Aussiedlung process. On the other hand, they would surely have caused inconvenience if, instead of being gassed to death, as the exterminationist historians claim was the fate of their fellow ghetto Jews, they had to be accomodated in labor camps and settlement areas in the occupied parts of the USSR.

- Thomas Kues